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I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty years apart, Communism came to power in Russia and
China through the overthrowing of a weak "liberal" government,
itself a successor to centuries of imperial rule. From the inception
of the new Communist regimes and for decades following, their
leaders wrestled with an issue of fundamental force: what legal sys-
tem should this historic entity adopt? Four alternatives were avail-
able to both the Bolsheviks and the Chinese Communists. They
could adopt the traditional imperial legal structure and codes be-
queathed to them by history; they could use a modified form of
customary law arising from the culture of Russia and China and
modify it for their purposes; they could import the ripened Ro-
manist codes of the West;1 or they could dispense with the West-
ern concept of "legality" altogether and opt for a system more logi-
cally attuned to Marxist principles.
An imperial model of law is typified by the lack of formal con-
straints on the law-making capacity of the sovereign; a judiciary
which is a part of the central imperial bureaucracy; and a decretal
form of legislation usually directed to a single subject matter. Nor-
mally such decrees are formulated as administrative regulations
addressed not so much to the populace as to the bureaucracy.
Nearly always, the system lacks uniformity and consistency. Only
occasionally are the decrees collected in a coherent form.
Customary law rises out of the mores of a society and is articu-
lated and enforced interstitially. It retains longstanding patterns of
behavior and frequently relies on self-help, arbitration, or consen-
sus for adjudication and enforcement. Resolution of disputes
comes from within the group, rather than from an external disin-
I use the term "Romanist" to identify the system of law which developed in Western
Europe following the revivification there of ancient Roman Law. In this fashion, one can
distinguish that tradition of law not only from Common Law, but also from Romano-Byzan-
tine law which took a different tack after Justinian. The use of the word "Romanist" gener-
ally follows the example set by Professor John Hazard. See J. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND
THEIR LAW viii (1969).
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terested agency. Either the substance or the form, or both, of cus-
tomary law may be integrated into a developing legal society. De-
crees, statutes, judge-enforced rules, and political decentralization
have all been mechanisms of absorption of customary law into
more developed legal systems.
Western law of the Romanist type refers to the developed sys-
tems of Western Europe which grew out of the "rediscovered" and
rationalized Roman law structure of the later Middle Ages and af-
ter. Its modern form is predominant in continental Western Eu-
rope, and it is identified by a hierarchy of norms articulated in a
series of comprehensive codes and organic laws and supplemented
by statutes and administrative decrees. The legal system is seen as
a rational whole whose parts relate to one another in logical and
normative consistency. It possesses certain fundamental legal
norms relating to the individual as subjective agent, such as: no
valid law until promulgation, nullem crimen sine lege (no crime
without specific positive law prohibition), no retroactive criminal
statutes, fault for liability, formal requirements of consent for
binding contracts, an independent judiciary, availability of counsel,
and neutral procedures for determining guilt or liability.
A Marxist system of law would include mechanisms for the
maintenance in power of the dominant economic class until the
suppression of competing classes is completed. The system would
be partisan and flexible to meet the political needs of the ruling
class. Once all competing classes are eliminated, which can only
occur under socialism, law would progressively simplify and atro-
phy. Mechanisms for the gradual elimination of law would be the
hallmark of a Marxist system of law in a socialist society.
The two great Communist powers worked their respective ways
through these alternatives in remarkably parallel time sequences.
At one time or another, each state experimented with customary,
imperial, Western, and Marxist forms of law. At a critical point,
however, each state turned in a sharply different direction. Only
now does China seem to have committed itself to the same choice
made earlier by the Soviet Union, that is, to make Western law the
dominant form in its legal system. Why and how the two states
chose as they did is the subject of this study.
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We shall first examine the imperial heritage that informed the
legal culture of Russia and China, and then see to what extent re-
gimes of Kerensky in Russia and the Nationalists in China modi-
fied that culture. Primarily, however, this paper analyzes the strug-
gles in Communist China and the Soviet Union among the
different legal schools since the rise to power of the Communists.
Most importantly, the article explains why those who championed
Western forms have at last triumphed in both countries.
II. THE RusSIAN IMPERIAL HERITAGE
To the Bolsheviks, the adoption of the Tsarist legal frame-
work-with such modifications as the Revolution required-was a
viable option. There was much in the imperial manner of legisla-
tion that suited the new rulers. In addition, it was a distinct alter-
native to the bourgeois legal culture of Western Europe.
A. The Imperial Codes
Russian legal history is marked by progressive attempts to or-
ganize and collect legal power in the hands of a central authority.
Certain fundamental aspects of the developing Romanist tradition
in Western Europe such as rationalization, categorization, and
universality of legal norms remained absent from imperial Russia
until very late in its history. Yet its initial legal development was
not far different from what the West had experienced.
When an Arab chronicler travelled to the Kievan Rus early in
the tenth century, he reported on a state of law surprisingly like
that of the Germanic tribes who had spilled into Europe centuries
before. Ibn Rusta explained how these eastern tribesmen settled
their disputes.
If one of them has a complaint against another, he summons
him before their king and they plead their case against each
other, and if he settles their differences it will be as he wishes,
but if they disagree with his opinion, he orders them to settle
it with their swords, and whichever sword is the sharper will
be victorious, and the two sets of kindred go out, and they
two [both] take up their weapons, and the dispute is adjudg-
[Vol. 32
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ed in favor of the one who gets the better of his friend.'
The Kievan Rus formulated its first code of laws around 1018,
barely thirty years after its conversion to Christianity. Ordered by
Iaroslav the Wise, the code was styled the Russkaya Pravda, and it
confirmed the traditional primitive law of arbitration and self-help.
The code also reaffirmed the rights of blood feud and clan interac-
tion. Private rights of action remained the norm, and state adjudi-
cation of disputes was practically nonexistent.3
The wergild statutes were specific and focused on particular ac-
tions, using a formula similar to a classic "if ... then" phrasing:
ARTICLE 3. If anyone hits another with a club, or a rod, or
a fist, or a bowl, or a [drinking] horn, or the butt [of a tool or
of a vessel], and [the offender] evades being hit [in his turn],
he [the offender] has to pay 12 grivna and that ends the
matter.
ARTICLE 5. If [anyone] cuts [another's] arm, and the arm
is cut off or shrinks, 40 grivna.
ARTICLE 7. If a finger is cut off, 3 grivna for the offense.
ARTICLE 8. And for the mustache, 12 grivna; and for the
beard, 12 grivna.4
Over the following century, the Russkaya was revised and im-
pregnated with many Romano-Byzantine concepts, as the new reli-
gion carried law into the Rus.5 For the first time, the blood-feud
was abolished, and concepts of fiduciary duties imposed. Central
2 Ibn-Rusta on the Russians, Ca. 903-13, in 1 A SOURCE BOOK FOR RUssIAN HISTORY
FROM EARLY TIMES TO 1917 § 1:6, at 9 (G. Vernadsky ed. 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
SOURCE BOOK].
3H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 191 (rev. ed. 1963).
4 MEDEVAL RussIAN LAWS 27 (G. Vernadsky trans. 2d ed. 1969). One wonders if Peter
the Great, seven centuries later, realized the ancient taboos he was breaking in his program
of Europeanization.
Shortly after the conversion of Russia, certain -manuals of Byzantine law had been
translated into Slavic. Id. at 5. See Berman, The Background of the Western Legal Tradi-
tion in the Folklaw of the Peoples of Europe, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 553, 570 (1978) for an
explication of how conversions to Christianity gave an impetus to the writing down of tribal
customs, as in the Russkaya Pravda.
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authority began to assert itself. The wrongdoer was compelled to
pay fines to the prince, as well as to the victim or his family.6 Ro-
mano-Byzantine rules on loans, sales, bailments, intestacy, and
slavery became operative.7 But, despite these changes, Russia re-
mained legally backward. Whereas in Western Europe the "new
life" of Roman law was bringing a fresh surge of jurisprudential
and philosophical developments, the Rus possessed only a few an-
cient Roman devices handed over from a stagnant Byzantine
tradition.
Further Western influence was significantly delayed by the
Mongol conquest of 1240. For two and a half centuries, a ruthless
and centralized politico-military structure ruled Russia. The
Mongols applied the Code of Genghis Khan (the Yasa) to exact
tribute and to require such things as compulsory universal service
of males." But the Yasa was almost solely a code of military regula-
tion, and except for intensifying some penal sanctions, the Mongols
continued to let the Russkaya stand.' They even allowed the
Church to be exempt from paying tribute.10
The Mongol Yoke, as it is called, was overthrown in 1480 by the
Mongols' own vassals, the Princes of Muscovy, who had learned
the methods of their masters well. Combining the roles of Byzan-
tine Christian Emperor and Khan, the Grand Duke of Muscovy
(soon to take the title of Tsar) eventually claimed both the nobles
and the peasantry as subject to his dominion. Legal reforms, hav-
ing lain dormant for centuries, were quickly enacted. Along with
setting up a judicial system along Romano-Byzantine lines, the
Tsar enacted a procedural code in 1497 called the Sudebnik." The
Sudebnik reflected the new imperial ethos bequeathed to the Rus-
sians from the Mongols. More of a court manual than a code of
* See The Pravda Russkaia of the Twelfth Century, in 1 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, §
11:19, at 36-38.
7 Id.
8 E. L. JOHNSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SovmEr LEGAL SYSTEM 24 (1969).
9 Juwaini on the Imperial Code of Chingis Kahn in the Early 1200s, in 1 SOURCE
BooK, supra note 2, § M:7, at 47.
10 A Mongol Charter Concerning Protection of the Russian Church, Ca. 1308, in 1
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, § III:10, at 49.
11 BERMAN, supra note 3, at 200-01.
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laws, it was designed for administrative use by the Tsar's judicial
appointees. It was addressed not so much to the people, but to the
imperial bureaucracy in its adjudicative supervision of the
people.1 2
Beyond bringing in some additional Byzantine elements, the new
code contained elements of the Russkaya, of custom, and of parts
of a code from the principality of Pskov.1 3 The Pskov Code, and its
sister code from Novgorod, had been formulated a few years earlier
in the mid-1400's. Both codes were themselves progeny of the
Russkaya, but each (particularly the Novgorod Code) had a better
system of judicial procedure.14 The Pskov Code also added rules on
loans and hire.15
The Sudebnik was not entirely a useful charter, for the very dis-
parity of its sources worked towards a complexity of jurisdiction
and competence ripe for abuse. A 1550 revision helped clarify the
duties of the various judicial organs, but at the same time, the code
enforced a growing serfdom among the peasant class, concentrating
on issues such as slavery, tenancy, and other contracts that tied a
man to the land. 6
Litigation involving peasants was settled in regional (volost)
courts in which the local lord was required to have peasant elders
to assist in the judgment.17 The Sudebnik, however, was not a
comprehensive document and cases were decided either according
to Tsarist decree or by custom. Ivan IV tried unsuccessfully to re-
strict the role of custom in peasant courts. In various charters
granted to volosti, he allowed the peasants to elect their judicial
1 The court structure, reflecting a hierarchical influence of the Byzantine church, was
under the control of the Central Boyars' Duma or King's Council. In the Council there was a
judicial panel that was to decide cases where "no law was known to exist or in which there
was some doubt as to the interpretation of the applicable law." BERMAN, supra note 3, at
200. Such a structure, including the supervisory judicial panel, is similar to the imperial
Chinese Board of Punishments. See infra text accompanying notes 83-86.
13 Hazard, The Future of Codification in the USSR, 29 TUL. L. REv. 239 (1955).
" See The Charter of Novgorod, 1471, in 1 SOURCE BooK, supra note 2, § IV:8, at 67.
15 The Charter of Pskov, Ca. 1469, in 1 SoURcE BOOK, supra note 2, § IV:27, at 83.
16 The Sudebnik of 1497, in 1 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, § VI:7, at 118; The Sudebnik
of 1550, in 1 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, § VII:5, at 136-37.
17 Id. at 136.
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elders who could themselves decide cases, but only "in accordance
with our Code of Laws." The Charter of 1555 decreed that if a
decision could not be reached, "they shall send the records of their
court proceedings and both litigants to Moscow, to report to our
treasurers.... 18 It is not likely that many peasants made the trip.
Direct intervention by Tsarist decree continued in other areas of
the law. Ignoring the Sudebnik, the Tsar chartered inquest bodies
that travelled to localities to investigate, charge, try, and execute
thieves and other malefactors.19
The revised Sudebnik continued in use for another century until
1649, when Tsar Alexis published a massive new code, the
Ulozhenie Tsarya Aleksaya Mikhailovich. Like previous codes,
there was no attempt at a systematic legal ordering of society.2
Rather, the Ulozhenie was itself a patchwork of previous laws, in-
cluding Tsarist decrees, the Russkaya, the Sudebnik, and another
borrowing, this time from the Lithuanian Code of 1588. The Lithu-
anian code had established an aristocratic structure in Lithuania
and had given special privileges to the landed gentry.21 As trans-
formed in the Russian code, it did not compromise the Tsar's au-
thority, but it did establish serfdom more completely throughout
the country.
Taken together, the 900 articles of the Ulozhenie were in such
an unorganized state that in the next forty years, over fifteen hun-
dred new legislative acts had been promulgated affecting much of
the code's content. But there was no order to the reforms, and the
Russian legal tapestry was even more a patchwork. With no organ-
ized digest, a judge could not tell which laws had been superseded
by later edicts.
18 Ivan IV's Charter to Volosti in the Ustiug Uezd, October 15, 1555, in 1 SouRcE
BOOK, supra note 2, § VII:8, at 140. See also Ivan IV's Charter to Volosti in the Doina
Uezd, February 25, 1552, in 1 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, § VII:7, at 139.
29 See, e.g., Measures Against Crime: A Charter of October 23, 1539, in 1 SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 2, § VII:31, at 160; Measures Against Crime: Instructions of August 25, 1555, in
1 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, § VII:33, at 161.
20 The Ulozhenie of 1649, in 1 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, § VIII:32, at 223.
21 See, e.g., The First Lithuanian Statute, 1529, in 1 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, §
V:16, at 98-100; The Second Lithuanian Statute, 1566, in 1 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, §
V:18, at 100-03.
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B. Attempts at Westernization
Under Peter the Great and his successors, efforts were made to
import Western culture and law, but most of the attempts foun-
dered.22 From 1700 to 1815, more than ten commissions were ap-
pointed to draw up new codes; but to no avail.23 One innovation, in
1722, was the creation of the office of procurator. Finally in 1830,
the great jurist Michael Speransky put together a forty-six volume
collection of laws and enactments dating from the 1649 Ulozhenie.
This collection (the Polnoye Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii) con-
tained nearly 31,000 enactments. 24 Speransky subsequently di-
gested it into a more organized code of fifteen volumes (the Svod
Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperial), which was published in 1833.25
Although the Svod was largely modeled on the Corpus Juris of
Justinian 2e (which in fact itself made it something of an unsys-
tematic document) Speransky desired a greater Western influence.
Consequently, he organized volume ten (dealing with civil matters)
on the model of the Napoleonic Code, and incorporated into vol-
ume eleven (dealing with commercial law) much of the law
merchant. 27 The remaining volumes were made up of administra-
tive decrees and regulations styled after the Byzantine example.
The Svod, therefore, became the first substantial importation of
Western Romanist concepts into the Russian legal system. It re-
mained the controlling legal document of Russia thenceforth, being
updated and republished in 1881 and 1905.28
Nonetheless, the impact of Western law remained superficial.
The Russian legal culture continued to be impervious to the funda-
22 BERMAN, supra note 3, at 205. Professor Berman suggests that Peter the Great's law
reforms foundered because the monarchy itself did not pretend to ground its authority to
rule on law, and further, because there was no real private law base on which to build. Id. at
203.
2s Id. at 205.
24 JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 16.
25 See Nicholas's Manifesto Announcing the Code of Laws of the Russian Empire,
January 31, 1883, in 2 SouncE BOOK, supra note 2, § XII:4, at 534.
2, See 2 M. FLORINSKY, RussiA, A HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 770 (1953).
27 JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 17.
28 Hazard, supra note 13, at 240.
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mental intellectual conceptions of Romanist law.29 The code was
not a central hierarchical corpus to which other decrees and stat-
utes related. In the main, it was still only a collection of disparate
enactments.
Speransky knew his reforms were inadequate. For decades, he
had led a contested effort to reform the Russian state along West-
ern liberal lines. As early as 1809, he had drafted a reorganization
plan at the request of Tsar Alexander I, a plan that incorporated a
separation of powers structure for the Russian state, a modern
code, guarantees of procedural due process, economic freedom for
all (including the serfs) and acceptance of the doctrine of popular
sovereignty.30 Conservative reaction to Speransky's plan forced
him into exile in 1812.31
Speransky's continued agitation, however, bore some fruit. In
addition to Svod, specialized legal collections were published, the
most significant being a new criminal code in 1845.32 The code was
designed to contend with another of the continuing waves of crime
and violence sweeping Russia. Its provisions addressed labor
strikes, worker oppression by factory managers, and serf insubordi-
nation. It was still far from a Romanist code, however. For exam-
ple, it contained an analogy clause allowing prosecution for crimes
not specifically provided for."3
During the mid-nineteenth century, increasing numbers of Rus-
sian jurists, educated in the West, returned with high hopes of fur-
ther legal reform. These desires were whetted by Tsar Alexander
II's emancipation of the serfs in 1861. The emancipation decree
mandated that lands be transferred to the mir, the local village,
which was given the responsibility of dividing up the parcels for
the separate peasant households. The region (volost) was given
wider authority. Within each, an elected assembly was to choose
29 BERMAN, supra note 3, at 216-17.
30 Speranskii's Plan for a General Reorganization of the Administration, October
1809, in 2 SOURcE BOOK, supra note 2, § VIII:22, at 490.
31 Id. See also H. SETON-WATSON, THE RussAN EMpipR, 1801-1917 112 (1967).
31 2 FLORNSKY, supra iote 26, at 771.
3 The Criminal Law Code, August 15, 1845, in 2 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, § XIV:7,
at 536. The analogy clause was deleted in 1902. JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 39.
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four to twelve members to staff the volost court.3 4 (The peasants
had already been given the right to have separate courts in 1837.) 35
Three of the volost judges sat on panels to hear cases. Their deci-
sions were final "over all disputes and litigations between peasants
alone of up to one hundred rubles inclusive in value." Jurisdiction
included "not only immovable and movable property within the
limits of the peasant allotment, but also loans, purchases, sales,
and sundry kinds of transactions and liabilities, and likewise mat-
ters dealing with compensation for losses and damages caused to
peasant property .... 3,1 With peasants making the final decisions,
customary law became even more the standard. In 1912, a rural
appeals court was established, made up of a district Justice of the
Peace, centrally appointed, and the heads of the judicial volosts in
the district.3 7
In 1864, the Tsar went further and undertook a thoroughgoing
judicial reform of the country. He reformed the office of procurator
to emulate the similar institution in France. He also established a
regular court system that resembled the structure of the English
model, but whose criminal procedure followed French lines. For
example, under the new system, examining magistrates (like a juge
d'instruction) were attached to courts in criminal cases, and a jury
of judges and laymen decided guilt or innocence. 8 By means of its
additions to the civil and commercial sections of the Svod, the ju-
dicial reorganization established Western Romanist norms
throughout much of Russia. But, despite the extensive reforms,
three-quarters of Russian society remained outside of Romanist le-
gal culture.3 9 Even though the old class courts for the military, the
Church, merchants and the native tribes were eliminated from the
judicial structure, the peasants retained their volosti, and the peas-
34 The Statutes on the Emancipation of the Serfs, February 19, 1861, 3 SouRcE BOOK,
supra note 2, § XV:14, at 600-02.
35 SETON-WATSON, supra note 31, at 236.
38 The Statutes on the Emancipation of the Serfs, February 19, 1861, art. 96, in 3
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, § XV:14, at 602.
'7 The Judicial Reform of June 15, 1912, in 3 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, § XVII:45,
at 819.
'4 The Judicial Reform of November 20, 1864, in 3 SOmCE BOOK, supra note 2, §
XV:27, at 614-15.
34 BERMAN, supra note 3, at 213.
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ant courts therefore continued to decide cases on the basis of "cus-
tom and morality."
Furthermore, even the educated and industrial section of Russia
had not yet completely adapted to Romanist legal values, and in
the 1880's, the reaction to Tsar Alexander II's assasination even
brought a retreat from many of the Westernized innovations of
1864. Attempts at further reform were turned back. A civil code
commission tried to develop a more modern and comprehensive
Romanist code, but its recommendations were rejected, and, in
1903, a new criminal code was written, but never published. 0
The Revolution of 1905 and the revivification of the Duma
brought fresh impetus. By 1913 a comprehensive new civil code
modeled on the French and Swiss models was adopted by the
Duma, but its official enactment was curtailed by the start of
World War 1.41
When the Russian Empire collapsed, its legal system had not yet
matured into one resembling that in force in Western Europe. The
bulk of its population continued to be ruled by customary law.
Codification in the educated and industrial sectors was fundamen-
tally a device for the collection and digesting of thousands of stat-
utes and edicts. Even where the laws could be collected, they were
soon displaced by a torrent of new and contradictory regulations
stemming from a legally unchecked imperial power. The Romanist
conceptions of law, as evidenced in the modern European codes,
had not entered the Russian legal culture. Those hallmarks of the
Romanist tradition-universality, hierarchy of norms, conceptual
categorization, neutrality, and legal analysis42 -had not evolved
within the Russian legal system despite the vigorous, though be-
lated, attempts at reform. But the imperial structure at that time
was well suited to a regime that wished less for the constricting
traditions of regularity than for the ability to command changes
40 Hazard, supra note 13, at 240. However, some portions were apparently adopted sep-
arately. See BERMAN, supra note 3, at 215.
41 JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 37. There is evidence that the values underlying the
unenacted civil code had been accepted by much of the legal fraternity in and out of the
universities. Ioffe, Soviet Law and Roman Law, 62 B.U.L. REv. 701, 725 (1982).
42 See BERMAN, supra note 3, at 180-82.
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whenever the central authority deemed them necessary.
III. THE CHINESE IMPERIAL HERITAGE
Across the steppes, China too had been experiencing a centuries-
long tension between customary and code law, the implication of
which had a dramatic effect on the Communists after they took
power. In particular, the development of the familiar li-fa distinc-
tion in the legal culture of traditional China established a funda-
mental duality to last for over 2,000 years.
A. The Imperial Codes
When the ancient Chou empire was disintegrating, Confucius
appeared and prescribed a cure for the chaos that was infecting
China. He asserted that China would not find peace until its rulers
and people realigned themselves with the rules of natural har-
mony, rules supposedly observed during a legendary past.43
China's peoples must internalize the duties and obligations of a
hierarchial and organized order, Confucius taught. Indeed, any at-
tempt to impose order through a system of external restraints
would result only in friction and failure. The system of natural
harmony (li) must be used to educate all Chinese to a proper con-
sciousness of their respective stations. In Confucius' classic formu-
lation, there must be
[k]indness on the part of the father, and filial duty on that of
the son; gentleness on the part of the elder brother, and obe-
dience on that of the younger; righteousness on the part of
the husband, and submission on that of the wife; kindness on
the part of the elders, and deference on that of the juniors,
with benevolence on the part of the ruler, and loyalty on that
of the minister.44
Confucius (echoed later by Mencius) opposed the Legalists, who
offered China the alternative of a uniform law as a corrective for
's For an insightful analysis of the Chou dynasty, and Confucius and the Legalists, see
Creel, Legal Institutions and Procedures During the Chou Dynasty, in J. COHEN, R. ED-
WARDS, & F. CHEN, ESSAYS ON CHINA'S LEGAL TRADmON 26 (1980).
4 T'UNG-TSU CH'u, LAW AND Soc-ry IN TRADITONAL CHINA 237 (1965).
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disorder. The Legalists' law, fa, was imbued with principles of
strict and universal sanction. All were to be equal before the law,
and the punishment must fit the crime. Confucius held that to the
extent that fa must be tolerated at all, it should be only a tempo-
rary expedient. Its only use was to supplement the workings of li,
which, in point of fact, was regulated and enforced not through
courts but through communal pressure and example. Further, in
line with the variable duties and positions implicit in li, even fa
ought to be applied variably according to the subject's station in
life. In the end, when 1i succeeded in transforming the Chinese
man into a moral person who knew his place in the cosmos, then
virtue would be the lot of the people, and fa would wither away.
Confucius looked forward to the "state of no litigation, '45 where 1i
would enable men to "regulate human desire [and] to eliminate
disputes."'46
Led by theorists such as Han Fei Tzu and Shang Yang, the
school of fa triumphed in the emergence of the Ch'in dynasty (221-
206 B.C.). Succeeding in overcoming a Hobbesian state of nature
by means of an equally Hobbesian solution, the Ch'in empire im-
posed a code of rigorous penalties to be applied universally. As
Shang Yang declared, "Merit acquired in the past should not cause
a decrease in the punishment for demerit later, nor should good
behavior in the past cause any derogation of the law for wrong
done later. 47 Fa is classic positive law: a written command backed
by a specific sanction.48
The nature of fa is penal, whereby the state regulates proscribed
conduct by means of punishments. The nature of 1i is civil. It di-
rects the relationships of men and women through persuasion and
informal community councils.49 This duality is crucial to Chinese
law. Civil law is unwritten, customary, and regulated by the com-
munity informally. Penal law is written, legislated, and regulated
45 Id. at 249.
46 Id. at 238.
47 Id. at 243.
48 See J. NEEDHAM, HuMAN LAW AND THE LAWS OF NATURE IN CHINA AND THE WEST 24
(L.T. Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lecture No. 20, 1951).
'9 Cheng, The Chinese Theory of Criminal Law, 39 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 461, 461
(1948).
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by the state.
Although Chinese codification had begun previously in 536 B.C.
in the state of Cheng,50 it was the Ch'in dynasty which gave it a
universal legitimacy. Under the Ch'in it became established that
the primary purpose of fa was political. The Ch'in established a
centrist imperial structure throughout China for the first time, and
used a penal fa to cement its rule. The fundamental political and
imperial character of fa as then instituted was not to change for
more than 2000 years.
The Ch'in code helped unify China under an emperor and an
appointed bureaucracy. A central state structure for the adminis-
tration of justice was established.51 What we know of the Ch'in
code comes mostly from fragments that were adopted by its suc-
cessor, the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-200 A.D.), and from recent
archeological discoveries. 5 2 The Han code indicates that private
vengeance as a legal remedy was fresh in the mind of the legisla-
tors, for such vengeance was specifically forbidden under the code.
Beyond this (for the Han code is also incomplete), there is a nine-
fold classification of crimes: 1) Theft, 2) Violence, 3) Detention, 4)
Arrests, 5)Miscellaneous delicts, 6) General Laws (lu), 7) Taxes, 8)
Stables (i.e. military stores), and 9) Family. As in early codes in
other societies, the Han law established in great detail the specific
punishments that must be meted for specific offenses. Unlike other
early codes, however, fines were not the normal form of sanction,
for "[tlo the Chinese if a matter involved law [i.e., fa or the codes],
it involved punishment."53 Physical penalties were the norm, and
not only were many punishments severe in their details, but there
also was harshness in certain legal doctrines, such as the rule that
the family of the wrongdoer must share in his fate."
The use of a code to enforce centralized control, the prohibition
of private punishments, and the delineation of specific offenses and
10 D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 16 (1967).
', A.F.P. HULSEWt, REMNANTS OF HAN LAW 71 (1955).
, See 1 THE T'ANG CODE 7-8 (W. Johnson trans. 1979).
"Jones, Studying the Ch'ing Code-The Ta Ch'ing La Li, 22 AM. J. CoMP. L. 330, 349
(1974).
a4 See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 50, at 57; HuLSEwt, supra note 51, at 112.
1983]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
punishments makes the function of the Han code remarkably simi-
lar to the revised Russkaya Pravda, which the Kievan Rus em-
ployed when rationalizing its political structure. But in one partic-
ular aspect, the Han code was uniquely Chinese: it attempted to
reconcile 1i and fa.
Over the four centuries of Han rule, the dominance of Con-
fucianism had reasserted itself. Li was revived, and it not only
dominated the people in the countryside, but it ruled the actions
of the upper strata as well. One enthusiastic emperor, Wen, so em-
braced the renewed Confucianism that he tried to dissolve the
courts, abolish punishments, and raze the prisons.55 But other than
that episode, the process was gradual.56
As it happened, fa did not disappear, but rather was restruc-
tured along Confucian lines. Penalties were differentiated accord-
ing to the status of the wrongdoer, his membership in privileged
groups, or his position in the family.5 7 The code even attempted to
place penal sanctiong on certain traditional i rules. For example, a
section on the family was added. This trend extended into the pe-
riod of the T'ang dynasty (619-906), whose code (the T'ang lu su-i)
is the earliest of which there is an extant copy. The T'ang code
defined the worst possible crimes (called "the ten abominations")
as those against the state and the family.58 One oft-cited example
concerns the punishment due an impious son who reports his fa-
ther's wrongdoing to the authorities.59 The role of fa in such a case
is to enforce a requirement of 1i when informal group pressures
had failed to educate the consciousness of the son to his proper
responsibilities.6 0 Even so, fa remained much more than a mere
Cheng, supra note 49, at 462.
For a discussion of the ways in which the successive dynasties dealt with the problem
of private vengeance, see Dalby, Revenge and the Law in Traditional China, 25 AM. J.
LEGAL HisT. 267 (1981).
57 BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 50, at 33ff. See Bodde, Basic Concepts of Chinese Law:
The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Thought in Traditional China, 107 PRoc. AMER. PHnL.
Soc. 375 (1963).
' The ten worst crimes were: plotting rebellion, plotting great sedition, plotting trea-
son, contumacy, depravity, great irreverance, lack of filial piety, discord, unrighteousness,
and incest. 1 THE T'ANG CODE, supra note 52, at 17, 61-83.
J1 . EscARRA, CHINESE LAW AND COMPARATMIVE JURISPRUDENCE 20 (1926).
40 1 THE T'ANG CODE, supra note 52, at 10-12.
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corrective, as Confucius would have granted. It became a perma-
nent and growing body of rules and penalities, an indispensable
practical tool of the emperor's political sway.
The restructuring of fa caused the corpus of the codes to con-
tinue to grow. The T'ang code expanded to include 502 articles,
divided into twelve sections: 1) General Principles (1u), 2) Imperial
Guard, 3) Administrative Regulations, 4) Family, 5) Stables, 6) Le-
vies, 7) Violence and Theft, 8) Conflicts, 9) Fraud, 10) Miscellane-
ous delicts, 11) Arrests, and 12) Trial.61 The "if... then" formula
of specific offenses remained, and was to survive until the twenti-
eth century. For example, as carried over into the Ch'ing code,
If a blow is struck with the hand or foot, and produces a hurt
or wound ... the punishment ... shall amount to 30 blows.
... The offense of tearing away more than an inch of hair
shall be punished with 50 blows.62
The impregnation of some i values into the codes has led some
observers to conclude that an historic synthesis had taken place
between 1i and fa by the time of the T'ang. 3 There is something to
be said for that in the field of public law, but Chinese "private
law" continued to be ruled by informal procedures adjudicating
civil relations on the basis of Ii. Most issues of marriage, family,
divorce, inheritance, property, sales, and debts, were not covered
by fa in the codes. Even disputes formally subject to a punishment
according to fa were likely to be kept from the magistrate and set-
tled informally. At the same time, local judges frequently used
their powers against Buddhists and Taoists who were seen as a
threat to the state's Confucian structure." At its base, the Chinese
legal system remained fundamentally bifurcated: customary, tradi-
tional, and civil 1i; and legislated, specific, penal fa. China, like
Russia, lived with this duality throughout its imperial history.
Whenever some person was unfortunate enough to fall enough
afoul of the Confucian values as to be brought before a judge, the
61 2 BHATIA & CHUNG, LEGAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEM IN CHINA 29 (1974).
62 TA TSING LEu LEE 324 (Staunton trans. 1810).
63 See BODDE & MoRRis, supra note 50, at 29; ESCARA, supra note 59, at 18.
4 T'ANG-YIN-PI-SHIH 57 (Van Guilk trans. 1956).
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entire procedure was "intended to impress everyone with the maj-
esty of the law, and with the dreadful consequences of becoming
involved in it."' 5 The magistrate sat elevated with vestments and
symbols of his office, while the accused had to kneel below him on
the bare floor for the entire trial. The accused was assumed to be
guilty and had to prove himself innocent.' Beating followed upon a
denial of guilt; hearsay evidence was allowable. 6 Law (or fa) was
totally coercive and something to be feared.
Yet it is only at this point that China's history enters the era of
the Kievan Rus. In 960, the Sung dynasty came to power and
wrote its code (Sung hsing-t'ung) almost verbatim from the
T'ang,67 although there is evidence that it moderated some punish-
ment." But in the thirteenth century, China also fell to the same
peoples who had crushed the Kievan Rus. The Mongols yoked the
Chinese and the Russians under similar political regimes. In China,
as in Russia, the Mongols imposed a military and political control
bent on exacting tribute. As in Russia, the Mongols used the Yasa
along side the local legal rules, but the influence of Genghis Khan's
military code waned during the period in which the new dynasty
was in power.6 9 Styling themselves the Yuan dynasty in 1271,
China's new overlords at first nullified the code of the previous dy-
nasty. Eventually in 1323 the regime promulgated the Ta Yuan
t'ung-chih, which contained much of the traditional Chinese legal
structure and left the customary law intact.70 Both the 1i and the
65 Id. at 52.
Id. at 55-56.
87 BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 50, at 57.
"J. Langlois, Jr., "Living Law" in Sung and Yuan Jurisprudence, 41 HAnv. J. AsIATIc
STUDIES 165, 169 (1981). Langlois notes, however, that the drive for imperial power re-
mained the same. Leniency was designed to enhance "the legitimacy of the state by making
the state appear more benevolent." Id. The Sung emperors modified the effect of the inher-
ited T'ang code by a plethora of statutes, edicts and precedents. Since there were also as-
pects of the will of the emperor, they were superior over the code in cases of conflict. There
was a constant attempt at compiling the precedents to keep bureaucrats who adjudicate
disputes informed as to state of the law. B. McKnight, From Statutes to Precedent: An
Introduction to Sung Law and its Transformation, in LAW AND THE STATE IN TRADITIONAL
EAST ASIA: SEVEN STUDIES (B. McKnight ed. forthcoming).
"9 See P. CH'EN, CHINESE LEGAL TRADITION UNDER THE MONGOLS: THE CODE OF 1291 AS
RECONSTRUCTED xiv (1979).
70 Riasanovsky, Mongol Law and Chinese Law in the Yuan Dynasty, 20 CHINFSE Soc.
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fa remained vital, even though stagnant, legal norms, sharing the
fate of the Russkaya Pravda. The tension between the Yuan's
code, which was less than comprehensive, and the needs of the
Chinese society remained, however, and the regime sought to fill
the gap with supplementary legislation. 1
The foreigners from Mongolia taught the Chinese almost as well
as they did the Moscovy princes. In 1369 a peasant revolt dislodg-
ed Mongol control and established the Ming dynasty. The Ming
adhered to China's dual system of law. It returned to the T'ang
code for its own model (Ta-Ming lu-li), but it also kept much of
the despotic political structure of the Yuan. Imperial power
reached a new level of concentration. The emperor even estab-
lished the qualifications of village elders to judge local disputes on
the basis of li.7 2
In their pursuit of internal political control, the Ming revised
their code structurally in 1397 .7 The changes were significant.
First, the former divisions of subject matter were discarded in
favor of redividing the code along lines reflecting the central bu-
reaucratic structure. Each part of the code was placed under a
heading corresponding to the ministry responsible for its enforce-
ment. Thus, following a section on general principles, there were
groupings under Administrative Law, Civil Law (family, taxes, gov-
ernment granaries), Ritual Law, Military Law, Penal Law (the
largest division) and Public Works. This structure was to carry
over into the succeeding Ch'ing dynasty.74
A second structural innovation under the Ming dynasty occurred
in 1585. There, the Ming divided each part of the code into lu
(general statutes) and li (specific instances, precedents, subsequent
particular legislation-not the Confucian li of universal har-
& POL. SCi. RE V. 266ff (1936-37).
71 CH'EN, supra note 69, at 36-37. There is little evidence that the Yasa greatly influ-
enced the Yuan dynasty's haphazard legislation. Riasanovsky, supra note 70, at 289.
72 E. Farmer, Social Order in Early Ming China: Some Norms Codified in the Hung-Wu
Period, 1368-1398, paper read at the ACLS Conference on Law and the State in Traditional
East Asia, Harvard Law School, August 1978, pp. 1, 17.
73 BOD E & MoRRs, supra note 50, at 60.
74 See generally TA TsmG LE u LEE, supra note 62.
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mony).7 5 The concept of general statutes and controlling case ex-
amples was a sophisticated legal development of great importance.
It echoed a similar conceptual construct developed in ancient Ro-
man law, though the Chinese version never reached the level of
integrative jurisprudence that the rediscovery of Roman law had
wrought in Western Europe.
The lu-li structure of fa grew further in the Ch'ing Code dynasty
(1664-1912). The Ch'ing Code (Ta-Ch'ing lu-li) underwent succes-
sive revisions in 1690, 1721, 1764, 1818, and 1899, with the i por-
tions being reviewed even more frequently.78 In fact, the number of
1i grew steadily from 382 to 1892 as the empire sought to meet new
and varied problems.77 The integration of the specific 1i with the
supposedly permanent and changeless lu might have been ex-
pected to bring a new dynamism to Chinese legalism. For one
thing, the 1i were variable and thus able to help the lu provisions
contend with new situations. Indeed, a rule of construction re-
quired that the 1i was to be controlling in case of conflict with lu.78
Nonetheless, although this innovation might have made Chinese
law susceptible to further jurisprudential development, such pro-
gress did not come to pass. The added li were almost invariably
instances of new and frequently stiffer penalties. This trend was
also reflected in another rule of construction that held that in case
of conflict between two lu, the more severe was to be applied.79
Thus, the superiority of a rule of 1i may not have arisen from a
new belief either in precedent or in the principle of a later enact-
ment overriding the former. Rather, the rule was instituted simply
because the punishment of a later li was more likely to be more
stringent than that of the earlier lu. Confirmation of this point lies
in the reform of the Ta-Ch'ing lu-li in the early twentieth century.
There, the code was "modernized" substantially by means of re-
ducing the number of 1i and eliminating some of the crueler
71 BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 50 at 65. Where needed, I shall henceforth call the
traditional i the "Confucian li" to distinguish it from the particularistic 1i of the codes.
71 S. VAN DER SPRENKEL, LEGAL INSTrrUTONS IN MANCHU CHINA 59 (1966).
BODDE & Momus, supra note 50, at 65-66.
78 E. ALABASTER, NOTES AND COMMENTARIES ON CHINESE CRImINAL LAW AND COGNATE
Topics xLvi (1968).
79 VAN DER SPRENmL, supra note 76, at 63.
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punishments.
Enforced by a bureaucracy, the code enhanced political control
of the ever-growing empire.80 Shun Chi, the first emperor of the
Ch'ing, stated the aims of his dynasty's code. "The transgressor,"
he declared, "will not fail to suffer a strict expiation for his of-
fenses, and will be the instrument of deterring others from similar
misconduct.""" Where the central administration had little con-
trol-specifically in the area of civil law-the corresponding code
section is a mixture of disparate elements, for civil relations re-
mained primarily within the sphere of the Confucian Ii.
The judicial system of the Chinese empire was part of the cen-
tral bureaucracy, and was rationally organized. There were four
levels of courts, all staffed by professional civil servants. The low-
est district or department level investigated all cases, but tried
only those involving bambooing as a punishment.8 2 The second
level, the perfecture, heard final appeals of bambooing cases, but
transmitted all others upwards. The third, provincial level (the
first level with a specialized legal bureaucrat, the judicial commis-
sioner) tried all serious cases. Judgments at that level had to be
approved by the provincial governor. Cases then went to Peking to
the appropriate ministry whose code section had been violated
(usually the Board of Punishments) for final judgments.88 Capital
sentences were even sent through two further levels and on to the
Emperor for ratification. Like the Imperial Russians, the Chinese
allowed many charges based on analogy, but here all sentences,
even non-capital, had to be confirmed by the Emperor." In civil
matters, if the process of the Confucian 1i failed, an aggrieved indi-
vidual might bring an action against another, but this of course
brought the whole issue into the penal area. Such cases were re-
go As Professor William Jones observes, "[I]n China, the legal system was apparently
designed solely to advance the interests of the central government." Jones, Theft in the
Qing Code, 30 Am. J. Comp'. L. 499 (1982).
1 TA TsING LE u LEE, supra note 62, at lxvi.
82 See generally J. WATT, THE DIsTRICT MAGISTRATE IN LATE hIMPEUA.L CHINA (1972).
83 See § 44 of the Ta Ch'ing Lu Li, quoted in Jones, supra note 53, at 342 n.42. See
also BODDE & MoRms, supra note 50, at 115-20.
84 BODDE & MoRRIs, supra note 50, at 117, 176. But see Chen, On Analogy in Ch'ing
Law, 30 HARV. J. AsiATxc STUn. 212 (1970).
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ferred up to the provincial level's financial commissioner for trial
or review, not to the judicial commissioner. All sentences were re-
ferred back to the district for execution."5
Along with the Ta-Ch'ing lu-li, the Ch'ing dynasty also pub-
lished a collection of administrative regulations for the guidance of
the bureaucracy (Ta-Ch'ing Hui Tien, 1690). Together, the two
documents "provided the bureaucracy with comprehensive state-
ments of what the central authorities required both of them and of
the people resident in their areas of jurisdiction."8 6 The seeming
attempt of the two codes to cover every possible penal and regula-
tory contingency and their organization along bureaucratic lines
impressed European observers who, ignorant of the continuing role
of the Confucian i, applauded the "directness and lucidity" of the
codes.8 7 But the resemblance to modem European values proved
illusory.
B. Attempts at Westernization
The continuing sensitivity of imperial China to its political posi-
tion, the harshness of many of the punishments, and the economic
desires of Westerners, combined to produce serious tensions in the
18th and 19th centuries. After an initial period of admiration for
the Ta-Ch'ing lu-li, Westerners began to feel that it was unjust
and arbitrary, if not downright primitive. A primary cause of the
demand for extra-territoriality came from the enforcement of cer-
tain parts of the code believed to be highly objectionable, particu-
larly the extension of criminal liability to innocent persons on the
basis of a respondeat superior principle.88 But the British, Japa-
nese, and Americans specifically covenanted to give up their rights
of extra-territoriality in return for a reform of Chinese law.89 By
the early twentieth century, the pressures on the failing Chinese
empire had become too great, and the dynasty undertook to
8". BODDE & MoRmS, supra note 50, at 120.
SVAN DER SPRENKEL, supra note 76, at 63.
87 Id. at 64.
" TA TsING Lau LE LI xxx, I. xl, supra note 62, at 32, 41.
89 M. MEJER, THE INTRODUCTION OF MODERN CRiMINAL LAW IN CHINA 11 (1950, reprint
1976).
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restructure its law.
The reasons for revision were stated bluntly in an imperial edict
in 1902. All laws had to be re-edited to "bring them into accord
with the circumstances arising from the negotiations with foreign
powers."' 0 The men charged with the revision, Wu T'ing-fang and
Shen Chia-pen, had substantial goals in mind. First they wanted to
cancel certain severe penalties that had outraged the Westerners.
Then with Japan as a "mirror," they wished to redevelop Chinese
law along Western Romanist lines.91 Wu pressed for an entirely
new code, while Shen, at first, preferred the process to unfold in
stages.9 2
Wu and Shen presented a joint draft of their reforms to the
Dowager Empress in 1907.93 It was evident that they were aiming
at a major inculcation of Romanist values, for they had submitted
an entirely new code. Using the German/Japanese code as their
model, and assisted by young legal scholars recently returned from
Europe and Japan," the two commissioners wrote a code sup-
pressing the more cruel punishments and ending privileged treat-
ment for sections of the population. They removed the civil section
entirely and set up Westernized judicial procedures. There was no
doubt that they were seeking to construct a modem criminal
code.9 5 Other reforms were appearing. A Judicature Act of 1907 es-
tablished a hierarchical court structure. At the same time, formal
law training had begun at Peking University.""
The draft of the new criminal code, however, excited opposition
from conservative forces in the bureaucracy. Believing that the
traditional li-fa distinction was being undone, the protesters tried
to block the new draft.97 Their fears were well-founded, for Shen
90 Id. at 12 (quoting Imperial Edict of China, dated May 11, 1902).
91 MEIJER, supra note 89, at 14 (quoting Shen Chi-i hsien-sheng i-shu).
92 MEIJER, supra note 89, at 48.
93 Id. at 64.
91 BHATI& & CHUNG, LEGAL AND POLIcAL SYsTEM IN CHINA 31 (1974).
,9 MEWER, supra note 89, at 66-75.
"Macdonald, Legal Education in China Today, 6 DALHouSIE L.J. 313, 315-17 (1980);
Lee, Chinese Communist Law: Its Background and Development, 60 MICH. L. REv. 439, 443
(1962).
97MEIJER, supra note 89, at 79-96.
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and Wu not only intended to rationalize and mitigate the harsh-
ness of fa, they hoped also to place what had been the concern of
the Confucian 1i area under a modern, written, civil code.
To prevent the opposition from undermining the entire project,
Shen incorporated most of his reformist legal values into a second
draft that purported only to revise the Ta-Ching Lu Li. Presented
in 1909, the revised code included the cessation of cruel punish-
ments, the deletion of civil matters, and a general reorganization of
the code more towards legal rather than bureaucratic categoriza-
tion. The revised code had fewer problems and it was approved by
the Emperor in 1910, taking the title Hsien-hsing hsing-lf.0 8
Much the same as the Russian Romanist Speransky, Shen did
not give up on the new "Western" criminal code, for events were
moving fast in China. The old Dowager Empress had died in 1908,
and a constitutional committee was at work aiming to turn the em-
pire into a constitutional monarchy. An assembly was convened as
a precursor to a parliament.99
Shen, however, still had hopes for his draft criminal code. He
undertook a revision and resubmitted it in 1910. It was still based
on Romanist lines. Referred to the Assembly, the code became
mired in debate. Disappointed, Shen resigned his commission.100
Meanwhile, Wu T'ing-fang, Shen's co-commissioner, had left the
service of the Emperor to join the revolution sweeping China. In
1911, he negotiated with the Emperor's main minister for an end
to imperial rule.10 1 By 1912, the Emperor had abdicated and the
republic was declared. Shen's draft criminal code became lost in
the swirl of events.
In imperial history, law was an order of command from the em-
peror to his governmental bureaucracy. It was directed not to the
citizens in their mutual relations, but to those who were charged
with maintaining the emperor's peace. 10 2 The magistrates were
98 Id. at 52, 54.
99 Id. at 102.
100 Id. at 118.
"01 W. TUNG, THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN CHINA 19-20 (1964).
202 Jones, supra note 53, at 338. "[O]ffenses are organized according to the way they
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parts of the imperial bureaucracy who gained their positions by the
examination system. Although legal training occurred in the Han
and later dynasties, and although magistrates were at times tested
on their knowledge of the law, there nonetheless never developed
an academic tradition in China of how to analyze legal relations as
took place, for example, in ancient Rome and in Islam.10 3 As in
Russia, there was no hint in the legal culture of the emperor being
part of a framework of legal relations. A Northern Sung official
once warned that if the emperor's rules "are generalized into a sys-
tem of laws, then affairs will revert to [the control of] the officials,
and the ruler's control will be lost . . . ."' Whatever progress
there was in the codes was limited to organizational refinements. 10 5
In light of this tradition, only a revolution could have turned the
emperor into a constitutional monarch. For the Communists, such
a command-based legal system had obvious attractions.
The legal history of the Russian and Chinese empires were more
similar than different. Both had a history of progressive codifica-
tion. Each had a bifurcated system of law, split generally along
customary and penal lines. Both were primarily concerned with the
rule of the central administration. Both were influenced in the
same way by the Mongol occupation. And both sought energeti-
cally, and belatedly, to inject substantial Romanist principles into
their systems. Before the process could be completed, each empire
expired in revolution.
IV. INTERREGNUM
A. The Russian Provisional Government
The time between empire and Communism differed so much in
length in Russia and China, that the two countries fell out of his-
torical synchronization. During its brief reign in 1917, the Provi-
sional Government in Russia made an important legal choice. It
decreed that the Svod Zakanov of 1833 would remain in force, sub-
ject to the revisions that the laws of the new government would
affect the work of the central bureaucracy, not according to the crime... ." Id. at 339.
103 Id. at 331.
104 McKnight, supra note 68, at -
105 See Jones, supra note 53, at 331.
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require. Ignoring the authorized but umpromulgated 1913 Civil
Code of the Duma, the Kerensky government seemed in no hurry
to restructure the law of the new Russia in a Romanist image. On
July 16, 1917, the government passed a law establishing a Codifica-
tion Division which was charged with revising and republishing the
Suod in light of recent legal changes.106 It never really began its
task.
B. The Chinese Republic
In China, events had more time to develop. The new republican
government in China also opted, at first, for imperial rather than
the Romanist legal precedent. Soon after coming to power, the new
leaders adopted the Hsien-hsing hsing-lu as their own Provisional
Criminal Code, choosing not to resurrect Shen's Romanist draft.
The government only excepted those provisions that were inappro-
priate to a republican legal order.107 One practice no longer permit-
ted was indictment by analogy.'08 For the next twenty years, tradi-
tional and modern forces jousted over the criminal code.
In 1914, conservative impulses engendered amendments to the
Provisional Criminal Code that reestablished certain variable pen-
alties according to the wrongdoer's family status. 09 By 1918, the
government appointed a commission to create a new criminal code,
but its results were disappointing. When the code was finally pro-
duced and promulgated in 1928, it was, once again, an amalgam of
Western innovations and traditional Chinese conceptions of fa. In
particular, there was included the practice of specifically defined
grades and varieties of punishments.11 0
The Legislative Yuan, dissatisfied with the imperfect attempts
at modernization, took on the job itself. Through advisory commis-
1" 1 R. BROWDER & A. KERENSKY, THE RUSSIAN PROvIsIoNAL GOVERNMENT 1917 241
(1961).
107 THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIc OF CHINA viii (L. Fuller & H. Fisher trans.
1960); W. HUNG, OUTLNES OF MODERN CHINESE LAW 251-52 (1934); ESCARRA, supra note 59,
at 19.
08 P. CHEN, LAW AND JusTICE: THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN CHINA 2400 B.C. TO 1960 A.D. 41
(1973).
209 Id.
110 See HUNG, supra note 107, at 285-92.
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sions, it examined the codes of ten modern states, all of which were
in the Western tradition.111 In 1935, the debate ended when the
Nationalist government published a criminal code undeniably Ro-
manist in character.
The new code was not entirely devoid of Chinese content. The
Three Peoples' Principles of Sun Yat-sen (nationality, democracy,
sociology) had structural analogues in the code.112 But in its con-
ceptions of uniformity, individual guilt, corrective rehabilitation,
and in nullum crimen sine lege, the code was fundamentally
Romanist.
The idea of a Westernized civil code was also gaining adherents
in the last days of the Ch'ing empire. In 1907, for example, the
Empress had added to Shen Chia-pen's standing as a legal re-
former by appointing him to a commission to devise a modern civil
code. The commission made use of a Japanese legal scholar whose
influence was significant. The code followed the German and Japa-
nese models in having five major sections (general principles, obli-
gations, things, family, and succession). The commission submitted
the first three sections (of 1316 articles) in 1911. The remaining
two sections (of 253 articles) were not completed until after the
republic had been established. The task of their completion fell
upon two other Chinese lawyers, who finished the draft in 1916.113
Meanwhile, Japanese-educated legalists grew in numbers in
China after the revolution, 4 and their influence was evident in a
new civil code presented to the Legislative Yuan in 1925. But in
contrast to the succeeding Criminal Code of 1928, the 1925 civil
code draft struck the Nationalists as overly Western. Like Shen's
code, it followed the European model, its text being taken nearly
verbatim from the German Code of 1896.115 But the republican leg-
. CHEN, supra note 108, at 42.
112 THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 107, at x.
113 van der Valk, Movables and Immovables and Connected Subjects in Chinese Law,
in MiscFnAuNm 171 (Szinnai ed., Law in Eastern Europe, no. 7, 1963). See also Yu Kwei,
Some Judicial Problems Facing China, 23 WASH. L. REV. 363 (1948).
114 During the 1920's, 70% of the textbooks at Peking Law College were translations of
Japanese works. Macdonald, supra note 96, at 318.
21 Y. TSENG, MODERN CHINESE LEGAL AND POLITCAL PimLosopHs 206 (1930).
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islature did not, in the end, modify significantly the code's Roman-
ist character. And, taking into account newer advances made by
the Swiss Code of 1907, and more importantly, adding in the judi-
cial doctrines developed by the new Chinese Supreme Court, the
Legislative Yuan revised the draft into a final product."'
The modern Chinese Court system had been inaugurated under
the Provisional Constitution of 1912. At first, following the reform
of 1907, four levels of courts were contemplated, paralleling the
imperial structure but with the added principles of judicial inde-
pendence and stare decisis. The ascending levels were Primary
Courts, District Courts, High Courts, and the Supreme Court. The
Primary Courts soon fell into disuse, however, and the District
Courts became fora of first instance. There was much emphasis on
fair judicial procedure, and there was even an Administrative
Court structure following the French example. During the years
when China remained in turmoil and the legal structure had not
yet formed, the courts filled an important gap. Operating very
much like a court of common law, the Supreme Court redefined
many civil relations in terms of Western law.117 Its work during
that period provided a fundamental corpus of interpretation and
conceptualization out of which the codes could be formed.1 8 Con-
sequently, when the codes were finalized, they were drafted in a
way that courts could understand and apply.
The Republic of China solidified its legal structure during the
years 1929-1935. During that period the Kuomintang produced the
Six Codes: 1) the Organic Law, 2) the Commercial Law, 3) the
Civil Code, 4) the Criminal Code, 5) the Civil Code of Procedure,
and 6) the Code of Criminal Procedure.1 9 Although reformed in
1932, the Chinese court structure retained its 1912 outlines. The
Administrative Courts remained, and French procedure dominated
"' Tay, Law in Communist China-Part 1, 6 SYDNEY L. REv. 153, 164 (1969) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Tay, Part 1]. See generally B.P. CHu, COMMENTARIES ON THE CHINESE CIVIL
CODE (1935). The tension between westernized law codifiers and traditional forms was most
evident in the civil law area during the 1920's. EscARRA, supra note 59, at 30.
117 See V. RusANovsicy, CHINESE CIVIL LAw 22 (1938).
118 See generally CHU, supra note 116.
1 Tay, Part 1, supra note 116, at 164.
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the judicial activity of the regular courts. 120 The Chinese incorpo-
rated the office of procurator into their system. Although French in
origin, the institution of the public procurator closely resembled
the traditional office of the Chinese Censorate. Ironically, the Kuo-
mintang may have more directly derived the institution from the
Soviet system.
The Civil Code remained the capstone of the nationalist legal
reforms. Roscoe Pound, legal adviser to the Chinese government
after World War II, praised it as "an excellent law book which will
take its place with the very best of recent codes."'12' Despite the
disruption caused by the war, Pound believed that the modern
Chinese legal system was having an efficacious effect on the
society.'22
In retrospect, we know that Pound was overly sanguine. During
his years on the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek had never fully solidi-
fied his control. Although the structure of his laws was Romanist
and in the Western European "liberal" mold, Chiang's record on
fundamental political freedoms was not exemplary. The regime
lived under three provisional constitutions until it finally promul-
gated a permanent document in 1946 (also while Dean Pound was
an advisor to the Chinese Ministry of Justice).1 23 Because of the
civil war and the subsequent "state of seige" on Taiwan, the politi-
cal freedoms in that document also have never been fully realized.
Nonetheless, there were significant areas of mainland China that
lived under the writ of the Nationalists. A relatively developed
court system was able to effectuate much of the new Romanist le-
gal system. Had the Nationalists triumphed in the civil war, it is
likely that Chinese legal relations would have become more pro-
gressively aligned with the structured codes as enforced by that
well staffed court system.
It may be thought that the Kuomintang's legislation returned
120 Pound, Progress of the Law in China, 23 WASH. L. REv. 345, 353 (1948).
121 Pound, The Chinese Civil Code in Action, 29 TuL. L. REv. 279 (1955).
122 Id. at 291.
123 See J. Cohen, China's Changing Constitution, paper read at the Conference on Law
and the Economy in the PRC, Harvard Law School, pp. 1-5 (Aug. 30, 1978).
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the ideology of the ancient Legalists to dominance. It is true that
specifically defined crimes, a uniform system of punishments, and
a written code are common to both; however, the Nationalists dif-
fered from the Legalists in viewing the penal sanction not as the
failure of the traditional methods of persuasion, but as a prelude to
further rectification. Their punishments were far less severe, and
their ideas of a civil code as nonpenal were totally outside the ken
of the Legalists. When the Nationalists were defeated in 1949, they
left for the taking a systematic, developed, sophisticated legal sys-
tem, far more modern, and far more Romanist than the system
that Kerensky had left for Lenin.
V. THE SOVIET CHOICE
A. War Communism
We turn now to the Communists and how they regarded the le-
gal legacy that was open to them. Soon after the Bolsheviks took
power they issued a series of decrees on the judiciary. In the main
their thinking at first followed the immediate example of the Ker-
ensky government: acceptance of the imperial codes as revised by
numerous special and general decrees, and subject to the "revolu-
tionary conscience" of the judges.124
In December, 1917, the First Decree on the Courts instituted
District Courts of first instance, each court staffed by a profes-
sional judge and two lay assessors.1 25 It was this decree that main-
tained the prima facie validity of imperial law. The Second Decree
on the Courts (February 15, 1918) established a Peoples' Court for
more serious crimes and required that any departure from imperial
law be justified "by a reasoried opinion. 1 26
'I" See Decree of the Council of Ministers of the RFSFR, December 5 (November 22),
1917, "On the Judiciary" (Decree No. 1), S.U. R.S.F.S.R. 1917, No. 4, Text 50, Y 5 in Z.
ZILE, IDEAS AND FORCES N SovIET LEGAL HISTORY: STATUTES, DECISIONS AND OTHER MATERI-
AL8 ON THE DEvELoPMENT AND PROCESSES OF SoviET LAW 31, 33 (1967); JUSTICE AND THE
LEGAL SYsTEM IN THE U.S.S.R. 13 (R. Conquest ed. 1968). In 1920, another law added an
appeal structure. See JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 33; Hazard, Soviet Law: The Bridge Years,
1917-1920 in RUSSIAN LAw: HSTORAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 235 (W. Butler ed. 1977).
12 JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 31.
2 Id. at 32.
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By the spring of 1918, however, the Bolshevik leaders had de-
cided to jettison all ties to the imperial legal forms and adopt a
revolutionary Marxist structure designed to oversee the transition
towards a stateless society. Lenin had earlier asked Jacob Sver-
dlov, Chairman of the Party and Chairman of the Central Execu-
tive Committee, to develop a draft of a constitution for the new
state, and a constitutional commission was formed for that purpose
in early 1918.127 Although Lenin's enthusiasm for the project
waned, the drafting was completed and the Constitution of the
R.S.F.S.R. was proclaimed on July 10, 1918.128
The constitution was primarily a collection of decrees reflecting
the revolutionary Marxist stage of Soviet legality. It declared the
political aims of the revolution 129 and delineated the central struc-
ture of the Soviet state.130 Various provisions abolished private
property, decreed universal labor, and established the new state's
authority.13'
The revolutionary government had set its face against regular-
ized legal forms. As Lenin pointedly noted, the constitution was
"not the invention of a commission, nor the creation of lawyers.' 18 2
Article 23 gave the state the power to deprive individuals and
groups of rights used "to the detriment of the interests of the so-
cialist revolution," the provision which Lenin said was "the article
of the constitution that we observe most strictly and which shows
that in all our activities we stick to the constitution."' 3 The 1918
constitution, like the constitutions to follow, was not primarily a
law-making document. Rather, it was "proclamatory," reflecting
the current view of the regime regarding its desired political ends
12 Hazard, The Common Core of Marxian Socialist Constitutions, 19 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 297, 298 (1982); A. UNGER, CONsTUTIoNAL DEvELOPMENT IN THE USSR 9-10 (1981).
128 Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Re-
public of 1918 [hereinafter cited as R.S.F.S.R. Const. of 1918], in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY STATES 2 (J. Triska ed. 1968).
21' R.S.F.S.R. Const. of 1918, paras. 1-23, id., at 2-5.
11 R.S.F.S.R. Const. of 1918, paras. 24-63, id., at 6-11.
13, R.S.F.S.R. Const. of 1918, paras. 3, 12, id., at 2, 4.
132 28 V. I. LENIN, COLLECTED WoRKS 36, 146 and 30 V. L LENIN, COLLECTED WORKs 30,
456 (1960-1970), quoted in UNGER, supra note 127, at 11.




and the suitable legal principles. It did not order legal relation-
ships; it merely provided the ideological signal of what those rela-
tionships should be and what their purposes were.
On November 30, 1918 another decree dealing with the Peoples'
Courts finally abolished the imperial laws altogether and required
that judges decide cases on the published decrees of the revolution.
When decretal law did not cover a particular case, the judges were
instructed to be guided by their "socialist conscience. ' 184 The Dis-
trict Courts were abolished but the new law retained the Peoples'
Courts each with the panel of one judge and two assessors for mi-
nor cases.135 The decree reserved the trials of counterrevolutiona-
ries and political dissidents to the Revolutionary Tribunals which,
free of all procedural inhibitions, had been in place since the Octo-
ber Revolution.3 6 In addition, the Cheka, or secret police, had
their own independent arrest and adjudicatory means to deal with
the Revolution's enemies.1 37
The abolition of the Tsarist codes was the most significant legal
act of the early Bolshevik era. It signified both a break from the
past, and a rejection of the bourgeois law of Western Europe. The
regime's goal was to win the civil war and then impose a new sys-
tem of political and economic relationships on Russia. The old set
of legal rules could only hamstring the effort. A.G. Goikhbarg, a
leading Bolshevik lawyer, described the enemy: "The temple of
bourgeois rule is legislation and its fetish is the law.... , "I8 Lenin
had been impatient to replace the imperial codes from- the start.
From the time he signed the First Decree on the Courts, Lenin
evinced the desire that there be more laws emanating from the new
regime to guide the courts.139 P.I. Stuchka, Commissar of Justice,
'" JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 32.
183 Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, November 13, 1918, "On
the People's Courts of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic," S.U. R.S.F.S.R.
1918, No. 85, Text 889, § 22 in ZILE, supra note 124, at 34-35.
136 BERMAN, supra note 3, at 31.
See 1 A. SOLzHENiTsYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 300 (1973).
van den Berg, Elements of Continuity in Soviet Constitutional Law, in RUSSIAN
LAw: HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSP.CMMS, supra note 124, at 227. See also Shelley, So-
viet Criminology after the Revolution, 70 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 391 (1979).
'9 Hazard, supra note 124, at 247.
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was an outspoken critic of the idea of formalized law.
Imagine talking about unchangeable written civil law (actu-
ally bourgeois law) during the transition to a socialist system!
Or about generally binding criminal law (i.e., the law which
above all else protects the legal relations of the existing sys-
tem) at the moment when this entire system is sinking into
oblivion! 40
The Marxist understanding of law was also reflected in a set of
Guiding Principles of Criminal Law, issued for the R.S.F.S.R. in
1919. There, law was defined as "organized force" designed to pro-
tect the ruling class. Criminal laws were measures of repression en-
suring the "social relations of a particular 'class society,'" and So-
viet criminal law was the means whereby the social relations
established by the dictatorship of the proletariat could be pro-
tected during the transition from capitalism to communism. 14
The attitude also affected the government's enactments of sub-
stantive law. Early decrees and laws abolished large landholdings,
nationalized the banks, gave the workers control of the factories,
expropriated various industries, liberalized marriage and divorce
rules, and delineated basic working conditions. 42 Political objec-
tives, not legal models, animated the Bolshevik leaders. By means
of the revolution, they seemingly had liquidated the concept of a
structured "law" as antagonistic to their needs.
B. The N.E.P.
The three year period of militant Communism came to an end in
1921 with the initiation of the New Economic Policy. Lenin had
decided that more was needed to revitalize the economy than
judge-made law and revolutionary decrees.1 43 The new policy was
140 P.I. Stuchka, Staryi I. Novgi Sud (The Old and the New Judiciary), P.I. Stuchka,
Izbrannye Proizvedeniia Po Marksistsko-Leninskoi Teorii Prava (Selected Writings on the
Marxist-Leninist Theory of Law) 227, 231-235 (Riga 1964) (Orig. Pub. in Pravda, January 5,
1918) in ZmIE, supra note 124, at 44.
"1 Guiding Principles of Criminal Law of the R.S.F.S.R. (1919) in Znm, supra note 124,
at 46.
142 JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 28-30.
143 Hazard, supra note 124, at 247.
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designed to strengthen the Soviet economy and to give the regime
additional economic and political stability. Instead of socialism via
revolution, the regime pursued transitional capitalism via order.
Code law became a prime means by which the Soviet state ration-
alized the social structure.
The R.F.S.F.R. took the lead in formulating the codes. Not all of
the codes were Romanist, or even particularly Western in content.
On the One hand, the Land Code of 1922 retained the nationaliza-
tion of large estates, and the Family Code of 1926 was even more
radical than its predecessor. The Labor Code of 1922, on the other
hand, was not unlike those in liberal Western nations.4 Content
aside, the process itself represented acceptance of the principle
that a society should be ordered through inclusive codes. In so do-
ing, the Soviet leaders went beyond the Tsarist tradition of having
mere restatements of widely disparate decrees and statutes.
Beyond accepting the Western conception of "code," the Rus-
sian state went further and actually adopted Romanist models for
their civil and criminal legislation. Considering that the Tsarists
had never developed a modern civil code, and considering that
even Kerensky's government was not enthusiastic over the possi-
bility, it is surprising that the R.F.S.F.R. adopted a Romanist civil
code so unhesitatingly (at least at first). The Civil Code of 1922
had elements primarily taken from the French and Swiss Codes.1 45
Ironically, a major vehicle of these codes used by the Russians was
the 1913 Draft Civil Code of the Duma.1 46 Once the decision was
made to have a code, it took only four months to produce an ac-
ceptable draft.1 47 Goikhbarg was the compiler, and his training as
lawyer and legal writer under the imperial regime served him well
in the task. He was not, however, an apostate from Bolshevism, for
it was he who authored the radical Family Code.1 48
144 JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 36.
145 Hazard, supra note 13, at 242.
14 1 V. GsovsKi, Sovwr CiWL LAW 25 (1948). Professor Ioffe suggests that the lawyers
of the revolution had not been immune to the trend of Romanism that had begun to im-
pregnate legal thought prior to the revolution. Ioffe, supra note 41, at 726.
47 1 GsovsKi, supra note 146, at 24.
148 G. K. GUINS, SoviEr LAW AND SovmT SocErTy 47 (1954).
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With the exception of areas of land and family law-the compil-
ers having chosen to treat them separately-the contents of the
code were not very much different from what could be found in
Western Europe. Subjects covered property (movables), contract,
tort, succession, legal capacity, persons, corporations, transactions,
and mortgages. 149 Familiar Romanist rules had few new glosses.150
Knowing that the code was the law of bourgeois nations, however,
Soviet legalists feared it would contaminate the revolution. Conse-
quently, Art. 1 declared, "Civil Rights are protected by law except
in those cases when they are exercised in a manner contrary to
their social and economic purpose."' 5' The provision allowed
courts to void transactions that seemed overly capitalist or ex-
ploitative. At first, the Peoples' Courts applied the article widely,
but appellate courts subsequently restricted the breadth of its
effect.152
A similarly Romanist Civil Procedure Code was enacted in 1923.
Rules were specific and intended to be strictly enforced. The code
emphasized the primacy of documentary evidence, and enforced
clear requirements of jurisdiction and notice. Judges were pre-
cluded from using custom, but they were encouraged to take an
active role in the case to bring out all of the facts (a practice simi-
lar to that in German courts). The state prosecutor, moreover, was
allowed to intervene in the interest of securing justice. 53
There were three important criminal codes in the period of the
NEP: the R.F.S.F.R. Criminal Code of 1922, the U.S.S.R. Basic
Principles of Criminal Law of 1924, and a follow-up R.F.S.F.R.
Criminal Code of 1926. The codes were complemented by the insti-
tution of the Procuracy with its sources partly traceable to a
Tsarist heritage, but in its modern formulation more directly cop-
ied from the French.1' Significantly, Lenin had accepted Romanist
1' 2 GsovsKi, SovmT CwvL LAW 15 (1949).
'50 JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 38.
151 Id. at 37.
152 Id.
183 J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER, & P. MAGGS, THE Sovmr LEGAL SYSTEM 134 (3d ed. 1977).
"5 Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, May 28, 1922, "Statute on
Procuratorial Supervision," S.U. R.S.F.S.R. 1922, No. 36, Text 424, in ZnE, supra note 124,
at 65. See UNGER, supra note 127, at 51; Rudden, Courts and Codes in England, France and
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models without any evident qualms. In 1918, he had been "out-
raged" when presented with a draft criminal code based on the im-
perial model, but when shown the drafts of the new codes in 1922,
he calmly initiated them "without question,"15 5 despite the fact
that there remained a vociferous wing of Bolsheviks who were un-
reconciled to accepting a form of structured law.156 Nevertheless,
although the codes followed Romanist examples, there were signifi-
cant socialist variants. In the 1926 Criminal Code, for example,
there was a retrospective offense carrying the death penalty that
applied to former members of Tsarist officialdom.157 And, generally
speaking, punishments for political offenses were severe, and there
were special provisions for official and for economic crimes. The
compilers even found the Tsarist (and without knowing it the Chi-
nese imperial) device of criminality by analogy useful for socialist
purposes.158
The Codes of Criminal Procedure (R.F.S.F.R. in 1923, and
U.S.S.R. Fundamental Principles in 1924) were even more heavily
Romanist, hewing closely to the continental style. 59 It included
such classic devices as the juge d'instruction, and the ability to tie
in civil suits with criminal prosecutions. 60 Although the code in-
cluded procedural guarantees, it also allowed for short-cuts to be
taken against those whom the regime regarded as threats. State
security organs, for example, were exempt from the rules on arrest
and investigation."1 In special cases the procurator could keep an
accused under indefinite detention pending investigation, without
the accused having a right to counsel.16 2 Higher court procedures
often denied persons the right to counsel and the right to their
Soviet Russia, 48 TUL. L. RE V. 1010, 1018 (1974). See generally Timasheff, The Procurators'
Office in the USSR, in LAw IN EASTERN EUROPE (Szirmai ed., Law in Eastern Europe, no. 1,
1958).
Hazard, supra note 124, at 247.
1 2 Istoriia Gosudarstva I Prava SSSR (History of USSR State and Law) 161, 162-164
(Moscow 1962), in ZI.E, supra note 124, at 61.
157 JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 40.
188 K. GazymowsKi, SoviET LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 185 (1962).
189 H. BERMAN, SovIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 47 (2d ed. 1972).
160 HAZARD, BUTLER, & MAGGS, supra note 153, at 108-09.
'x BERMAN, supra note 159, at 49.
162 Id. at 52.
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own witnesses in certain serious crimes.1 3
There were also administrative sanctions that could be used to
detour around the required criminal procedures. Under non-judi-
cial arms of the bureauracy, administrative infractions could be ad-
judged outside of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and sanctions
imposed ranging from fines and reprimands to corrective labor and
imprisonment.16 4 Those who fell through this gap in the procedural
system can never be counted.16 5
The legal values of the NEP were confirmed in the new constitu-
tion promulgated on January 31, 1924.166 This second constitution
officially established the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by
joining the constituent republics into a federal structure tied to-
gether in fact by the ubiquity and central control of the Commu-
nist party. The constitution did establish a judicial structure with
a Supreme Court and a recognized role for the procuracy16 7 Al-
though the secret police were formally placed under the supervi-
sion of the procuracy,6 8 the police were not truly limited. They
continued unchecked in their extra-legal pursuit of the enemies of
the state.169 In 1926-27, the U.S.S.R. published a four volume com-
pilation of laws in force at the federal level.170 It was the last major
legal reform of the NEP.
C. The Marxist Phase
Ending in 1929, the NEP period had seen the Soviet Union in an
uneasy experiment with Western European models. The legal su-
perstructure had been cast in a Romanist form. Though a few tra-
243 Id. at 56.
164 Id. at 49-50.
'" See SOLZHENrrsYN, supra note 137. But see Stratman, Political and Lumpen Prison-
ers, The Question of Compliance and Sociological Investigation, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1629,
1636 (1975).
"' Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [here-
inafter-cited as U.S.S.R. Const. of 1924], in TRIsKA, supra note 128, at 17.
167 U.S.S.R. Const. of 1924, paras. 43-48, id. at 24-26.
168 U.S.S.R. Const. of 1924, para. 63, id. at 27.
169 UNGER, supra note 127, at 52.
170 Butler, Towards a Svod Zakonov for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in
CODIFICATION IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD 91 (F. Feldbrugge ed., Law in Eastern Europe, no.
19, 1975) [hereinafter cited as CODIFIcATION].
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ditions from Tsarist times had remained,17 1 the real competitor to
the codes was the continued hankering for a truly revolutionary
legal system. Even during the NEP, Lenin himself had not com-
pletely disguised his hostility to the effects of the legal system.
[W]e must enlarge the interference of the State with the rela-
tions pertaining to "private law," enlarge the right of the gov-
ernment to annul, if necessary, "private contracts," and to ap-
ply to private law relations, not the corpus juris romani, but
our revolutionary concept of law.172
While the civil codes were tolerated as useful temporary ex-
pedients to guide the new state through an induced capitalist
stage, the criminal codes, lacking the structural rigor that the
Western European models had developed, were perceived as not
working well at all. Taken together they were "full of unintended
inconsistencies and ambiguities" and "a hodgepodge of rules and
exceptions to rules. 173 Political rhetoric clouded the underlying
Romanist structure.1 74
Within a very few years of the imposition of the Romanist codes,
the Soviet legalists were busily preparing for their eradication. As
the NEP was extinguished, collectivization enforced, and totalitari-
anism cemented, most juristic opinion held that the codes could be
substantially dispensed with, as bourgeois forms of law were no
longer relevant. The leading Soviet jurist E. B. Pashukanis de-
clared that since the only function of law was to regulate private
interests, then as private interests fade, so will the law.1 75
Pashukanis' "commodity exchange theory of law" held that private
legal relations were the result of a need of capitalist society to have
individuals hold and exchange commodities. As capitalism was
eradicated, law as such would disappear, to be replaced by a sys-
tem of administrative rules and regulations.17 6
17 There was, for example, the role of the Procurator, and the tendency to pass waves
of decrees and statutes in bewildering confusion. See BRmAN, supra note 3, at 25.
172 1 Gsovs i, supra note 146, at 28.
* BaRsuA, supra note 159, at 114.
174 Id.
171 See 1 GsovsKi, supra note 146, at 167-170.
175 See E. PASHUKAN Is, TE GENERAL. THEORY OF LAW AND MARXISM (1st ed. 1927), in P.
BmRNE & R. SHARLLEr, PASHUKANIS: SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW 40 (1980).
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Although the commodity exchange theory of law was not uncon-
tested, it became the dominant legal theory in Russia in the late
1920's and early 1930's. In 1933, N.V. Krylenko asserted that the
Civil Code was already sixty percent dead. 17 Stuchka, President of
the Supreme Court, wrote that "Communism means not the vic-
tory of socialist law, but the victory of socialism over any law, since
with the abolition of classes with their antagonistic interests, law
will die out altogether.' 7 8 A Soviet law textbook officially con-
firmed the doctrine: "Marxism declares a merciless war against the
capitalist legal concepts and the dogmatic method in jurispru-
dence. 17 The legal developments paralleled the start of the first
Five-Year Plan and Stalin's increasing war against "class enemies"
such as the intelligentsia and peasant landowners.'80
The state of the law seemed to be following the trend of legal
opinion. A system of arbitration, specifically separated from the re-
quirements of the Civil Code, was instituted to resolve disputes be-
tween state enterprises. The Civil Code itself was "treated with
considerable disdain."'' There were moves to replace tort law by a
universal system of liability insurance. The entire study of law de-
clined in importance.'82 In the law schools, students were in-
structed on how "to preside over the gradual withering away of thelaw.,,2183
The experiment with the bourgeois Romanist codes seemed
doomed. Pashukanis decried the "immobility" of capitalist law.
"[W]e need the utmost elasticity in our legislation," he said. "We
cannot tie ourselves to any system because we are every day break-
ing up the economic system.' 8 4 Work moved briskly on the draft-
ing of codes befitting a post-capitalist society. Stuchka had taken
177 1 GsovsKi, supra note 146, at 6.
178 3 Entsiklopediia gosudarstya i prava (Encyclopedia State and Law) 1594 (P.
Stuchka ed. 1927), quoted in BERMAN, supra note 3, at 26.
178 1 GsovsKi, supra note 146, at 164.
ISO See P. JUVILER, REVOLUTIONARY LAW AND ORDER, 42-58 (1976) (discussion of class
struggle and law).
181 BERMAN, supra note 3, at 45.
182 Id. at 46.
183 BEIRNE & SHARLET, supra note 176, at 26.
184 Pashukanis, The Situation on the Legal Front, 11/12 SOVIET STATE 47-48 (1930),
quoted in 1 GsovsKi, supra note 146, at 186.
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the lead in drafting a set of federal fundamentals on civil law that
would have replaced the 1922 Civil Code of the R.F.S.F.R. and the
parallel codes of the other republics. According to his draft, which
he published in 1931, private property was to be permitted "in [an]
ever lessening degree."185 The transitional nature of private rights
was noted elsewhere in the code.18 Judges were to apply private
rights under the code unless they contradicted, among other
things, the "consolidated state plan for the reconstruction of the
national economy."187 Certain private groups, such as religions,
were denied legal legitimacy. 18 The code was to bow in all in-
stances to state economic legislation, and nothing that was outside
of the code of state legislation, such as custom, could guide the
judge. Since relations among state agencies were to be arbitrated
under special legislation, it was expected that the remaining legal
relations, which were under the code, would soon dwindle. The dis-
tinction between "law" as seen in a civil code and administrative
regulations as based on economic policy is central to the commod-
ity theory of law. Yet even Stuchka's draft was too conservative for
the Pashukanis wing of the Soviet legal fraternity. In 1931, the 1st
Congress of Persons Engaged in Soviet Construction and the Law
resolved against a separate civil code and called instead for a set of
"Fundamental Principles of Economic Law."1 19 For that group, the
very concept of a "civil code" was representative of a bourgeois
legal order.
Meanwhile, N.V. Krylenko, head of the R.F.S.F.R. People's
Commissariat of Justice, led the drive for a new criminal code. The
man who had directed the prosecution of state enemies in the early
years of militant Communism had never been reconciled to the
1922 Criminal Code. It was bourgeois in form, and Krylenko
185 Osnovnye nachala grazhdanskago zakonodatel'stva SSSR, Proekt (pod redaktsiei i s
predisloviem P. I. Stuchka), art. 1 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Draft Stuchka-Pashukanis],
quoted in Hazard, The Abortive Codes of the Pashukanis School in CODIFICArION, supra
note 170, at 150.
188 Draft Stuchka-Pashukanis, arts. 12, 49. Id. at 153.
187 Draft Stuchka-Pashukanis, art. 2c. Id. at 150.
Draft Stuchka-Pashukanis, art. 26. Id. at 153.
Id. at 147-48. Stuchka had published his draft after the declaration of the Congress
in the hope that the momentum would shift to his side. His tactic was unsuccessful. Id. at
148.
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pressed for a code more reminiscent of the decrees under which the
courts had operated from 1919 until 1922.190 His own draft code
appeared in 1930, reflecting the doctrines of the Pashukanis school.
Krylenko asserted that his draft code pointed to the day "when
the proletariat will need no law of any kind, including criminallaw.,,191
The primary feature of Krylenko's draft lay in its rejection of
the so-called "dosage system," whereby punishments were calcu-
lated to fit specific crimes. Pashukanis held this to be the essence
of the bourgeois market mentality. In its stead there were to be
but two kinds of crime: 1) highly dangerous acts or omissions to
act, and 2) other crimes. Those found guilty of serious crimes
against the socialist order were to be branded as class enemies and
brutally repressed. Those who committed the more ordinary types
of crimes would not be repressed, but would be re-educated. 192 Ac-
cording to Krylenko there would not be "punishment" as such, no
"market payment" for one's crime. Repression meant the protec-
tion of the socialist commonwealth, not retribution for the act.
Consequently, severe measures of "self-protection" could be toler-
ated against those who were threats, even though their specific
crimes might be regarded as relatively minor under a bourgeois
system.
Krylenko listed categories and examples of especially dangerous
acts. In descending order, they were: 1) counter-revolutionary acts,
2) "equivalents to counter-revolutionary acts," 3) crimes against
the administrative order, 4) economic crimes, 5) labor law viola-
tions, 6) crimes against individuals, 7) property crimes, and 8)
"crimes that were relics of a tribal culture."1 3 Krylenko also gave a
list of kinds of repression to be applied by the judge depending on
the circumstances of the threat.1 Article 6 allowed for the perse-
cution of potential class enemies.
Measures of class oppression, and of enforced educational in-
1o Id. at 159.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 159-60.
193 Id. at 161-62.
194 Id. at 162-63.
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fluences, may be applied to persons who have committed a
certain delinquency as well as to persons who, in spite of not
having committed a definite crime, justify the serious appre-
hension that they eventually may commit delinquencies, in
consequence of their relations to criminal surroundings, or of
their own criminal past.195
When he gave examples of the less dangerous categories of crime,
he grouped them not according to type of action, but instead ac-
cording to what aspect of the socialist order might be disrupted:
e.g., "opposition to an officer of state authority," or "false testi-
mony to state investigators." 19 6 Krylenko was equally wrathful of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, crying "down with chicanery,
down with fetishistic adherence to the letter of laws, down with the
present complexity of the Code of Criminal Procedure. '197
At the same time that Krylenko published his draft code for the
R.F.S.F.R., a state committee under E. Shirvindt put out a set of
federal "fundamentals" on criminal law. It too followed the trend
to more flexibility in criminal categories, although there were more
verbal resemblances between it and the 1924 Fundamentals.198 De-
spite the doctrinal similarities between the two drafts, the splenitic
Krylenko rejected the Shirvindt version as insufficiently
Marxist. 9"
D. Stalin's Intervention
In the same year of 1930, Stalin undermined the doctrinal base
of the Stuchka, Krylenko, and Shirvindt drafts. In his famous
speech to the XVI Congress of the Communist Party, Stalin de-
clared that the law would not wither away by degree as socialism
grew. On the contrary, the state must be strengthened until social-
ism is completely built and all imperialist states around the world
1' Draft Krylenko-Pashukanis, art. 6 (1930), quoted in R. SCHLESINGER, SovIET LEGAL
THEORY 208 (1945).
'" Hazard, supra note 185, at 163.
" D. W. Chenoweth, Soviet Civil Procedures: An History and Analysis, 199-201 (Ph.D.
thesis, St. Louis University, 1971).
198 Id. at 165. Shirvindt would have had a judge rule by analogy where a "crime" was
not specifically listed in his code. Id. at 166.
'" Id. at 164.
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have been destroyed.0 o
For a year or so after Stalin's speech, the Pashukanis drafters
continued their agitation, but soon they realized that the tide was
not running in their favor. At the same time that he increased the
nationwide terror that he had begun in the late 1920's, Stalin cen-
tralized his absolute dominion over party affairs. As part of that
effort he chose to leave the existing legal codes in place and to
treat the enemies of his regime through separate legislation and
extralegal procedures.2 0 1 New criminal statutes reflected the in-
creased repression. Theft of socialist property could be punished
by death, and resistance to collectivization, or indulging in private
enterpreneurial activities brought harsh retribution. Unconsciously
imitating the ancient Chinese, the state held whole families re-
sponsible for their sons' desertion from military service.202 Begin-
ning in 1934, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs
(NKVD) was empowered to pass sentence upon dangerous persons
through their own Special Board. Millions were sent to the forced
labor camps.203
Stalin's choice to leave the formal Romanist codes in place was
cemented in 1936 when a new constitution was promulgated with
Stalin's words, "We need stability of laws now more than ever."2°4
The new Constitution of 1936 had more of a formal structure than
its two predecessors. 20 5 Its style and form was not unlike Western
constitutions.206 As such, it seemed to be in harmony with the idea
200 Id. at 166-67.
201 Revolutionary legality at this stage thus expressed the unilateral relationship
between the ruled and the ruler. Under this principle of legality, strict observance
of law by the people was required, but those at the center of power were immune
from any legal restrictions. They were entitled to set aside every law whenever it
was necessary in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Oda, Revolutionary Legality in the USSR: 1928-1930, 6 REv. SocmLIsT L. 141, 149 (1980).
20 BERMAN, supra note 159, at 29.
1s Id. at 31. See also JuvrLae, supra note 180, at 58-75 (discussion of types of crimes
and prison sentences received therefrom).
204 BERMAN, supra note 159, at 32.
205 Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [here-
inafter cited as, U.S.S.R. Const. of 1936], in TiusKA, supra note 128, at 37.




of rationality and order implicit in Romanist legal architecture. In
fact, the Constitution of 1936 was a combination of regularized le-
gal forms and a fictional list of political rights for all in a country
now officially without a bourgeois class. The document provided an
additional and important weapon in Stalin's plan to consolidate his
personal control, to strengthen the Soviet state, to intensify his
program of terror both within and outside of the law, and to pro-
vide himself with a propaganda piece establishing the legitimacy of
the Soviet state in the eyes of the Western powers and in Western
intellectual opinion. All in all it was a master stroke that helped to
accomplish every one of his goals.
In the Constitution of 1936, the structure of the courts and of
the procuracy was further developed, and rights and regularized
legal procedures promised to all citizens. 207 Article 131, however,
confirmed that "Persons encroaching upon public, socialist prop-
erty shall be enemies of the people. ' 208 It was a tag that denoted
those persons who could be dealt with outside of the legal system.
The Constitution of 1936 was promulgated in the midst of the
Great Purge. Under the doctrine of "socialist legality," Pashukanis
and Krylenko were liquidated as "wreckers" while the chameleon
Vyshinsky intoned the new catechetical rule.
Why do we need stability of laws? Because the stability of
laws fortifies the stamina of the political regime and the span
of governmental discipline; it multiplies and makes ten times
stronger the forces of socialism, mobilizing and directing
them against forces opposed to socialism. 20 9
N.I. Bukharin, the primary drafter of the constitution apparently
believed that "in this constitution the people will have more room.
They can no longer be pushed around. '210 Less than two years
207 U.S.S.R. Const. of 1936, arts. 102-133, in TmiSKA, supra note 128, at 49-52. In fact,
Stalin had rejected the traditional Communist practice of having a policy-oriented preamble
to the constitution. Id.
208 U.S.S.R. Const. of 1936, art. 131, id. at 52.
209 SovWr CONSTIUTmONAL LAW 54 (1938), quoted in 1 Gsovsvx, supra note 146, at 187-
88.
210 B. NICOLAEVSKY, POWER AND THE SoviEr ELrrE 22 (1966), quoted in UNOER, supra
note 127, at 134 n.12.
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later, he too was executed following one of Stalin's famous show
trials.
With the massiveness of Stalin's terror that continued until his
death, and with the willing complicity of legal authorities who
themselves systematically violated legal forms, one might question
whether in fact there was any true "law" in the Soviet Union
under Stalin. After all, the terror launched against the Soviet peo-
ple would not have been contrary to the ideas of Krylenko and
Pashukanis. The discarded draft codes of that wing of the Party
explicitly provided for continuing persecution of the regime's ene-
mies.21  But the new constitution and the maintenance of the Ro-
manist codes gave Stalin much that the proposed codes did not
have. First, there was the personal motive. Stalin had set himself
the task of removing any potential competitors to his rule. Adopt-
ing legal rules contrary to the views of the Pashukanis wing delegi-
timized their position and provided a basis for their removal. Sec-
ond, the Pashukanis school held that both the law and the state
would progressively diminish as socialism developed. Stalin may
not have cared much for the law, but above all, the totality of the
power of the state had to be maintained. If legal forms meant the
continuation of the strong central state, then he would have legal
forms.212 Third, the strength of the state apparatus was not merely
an internal matter. The blunting of Western fears and hostility
were also necessary. The surface structure of Romanist law and the
dramatic new constitution helped to reduce Russia's isolation in
Western opinion. Fourth and most crucially, Stalin saw that law
itself could be an instrument for greater control. A structured le-
gality could assure -his control over the vast area of "non-political"
relations among the Russian people. The very desire for totalitar-
ian control made the use of a centralized code system a natural
2 The ideas of Pashukanis and Krylenko have been called "the jurisprudence of ter-
ror" as providing a basis for Stalin's persecution of his enemies (including ultimately, them-
selves). BEIRNE & SHARLET, supra note 176, at 29.
212 As Vyshinsky put it, "Law and state cannot be studied separately and apart from
each other. Law draws its force, and obtains its content from the state." And, quoting
Lenin, Vyshinsky states, "Law is nothing without a mechanism capable of compelling the




instrument. Tying the need for control together with the law,
Vyshinsky said, "Only in a socialist society does law acquire a firm
soil for its development.
213
As for control over political elements, the law continued to per-
mit direct action against them to the full extent that Stalin de-
sired. Law was not an obstacle to Stalin's aims. Where Krylenko
wanted to destroy Romanist law to get at socialism's enemies, Sta-
lin kept the law and still got his enemies. A 1940 textbook on So-
viet law justified applying "to class foes extraordinary measures
necessarily evoked by the conditions of class struggle. '214 Law was
essentially an instrument, and only one instrument, based "on the
coercive force of the state" and applied "to the end of safeguard-
ing, making secure, and developing social relationships and ar-
rangements agreeable and advantageous to the dominant class. 21 5
The Soviet Union, as a consequence, developed a new bifurcated
system: direct terror to be used against the enemies of the people
and the state, and clearly defined principles of law to regulate the
"socialist" element of society.
What Stalin had realized was that Romanist law structures could
be expanded or contracted like an accordion to suit the needs of
the party for strengthening the state. Where legal regularity could
improve the economic basis of society without threatening political
competition, it could be permitted. Where "ordinary" civil and
criminal activities were regulated, a greater sense of predictability
in the law for both the people and the government could be
achieved. 21" After the brutal years of forced collectivization and in-
dustrialization, the constitution and the reaffirmation of the codes
promised some measure of stability to the ordinary Soviet citizen.
Despite the fact that Stalin's terror continued to permeate every
area of Soviet society, it nonetheless remained true that in some
areas of civil and criminal relations, the Soviet citizen experienced
213 BASIC TASKS OF THE SCIENCE OF SoviET SOCIALIST LAW 27 (1938), quoted in 1 Gsov-
SKI, supra note 146, at 175.
214 S. A. GOLUNSKII & M. S. STROGOVICH, THE THEORY OF THE STATE AND LAW (1940),
quoted in J. HAZARD, SovmT LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 393 (1951).
211 Id. at 370.
216 Nevertheless, with millions being imprisoned by the NKVD, it is difficult to say
what was or was not the "ordinary" criminal process of the era.
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a greater sense of legal regularity and predictability.
With one exception, the development of further codes of the Ro-
manist type did not occur until after Stalin's death. Nonetheless, it
was this insight of the man's malevolent genius that has provided
the basis of the modern Soviet state, namely, that Romanist struc-
tures are efficient methods to further the control of the state over
its people without the danger of "contamination" by those values
that are the'ultimate basis of the Romanist legal tradition. As
Vyshinsky put it, "There can be no discrepancy in Soviet law be-
tween the law and expediency because the Soviet law is precisely
the expression of what is expedient for the construction of social-
ism and the fight for socialism.1 17 Highlighting Stalin's desire for
an even greater unification of law at the center, the 1936 Constitu-
tion authorized the central government to write codes in most ar-
eas of law for all of Russia, thus replacing the federal system. Al-
though code commissions were formed for this work, nothing came
of the project until well after Stalin's death.218 It is possible that
political and international exigencies had in part caused Stalin to
lose interest in the idea. In the meantime, Soviet courts returned
to using the codes that had been neglected before 1936. By inter-
pretation, high courts reinstituted previously neglected Romanist
glosses. Fault had to be proven to establish contract or tort liabil-
ity, although in tort cases, the burden of proof fell on the defen-
dant to show lack of fault.21 9 In criminal law, crimes by analogy,
though revived temporarily during World War II, were circum-
scribed.220 Soviet courts mitigated the harshness of a 1947 edict of
the Presidium dealing with the theft of state property.2 2' Article 1
of the Civil Code, which permitted the suspension of civil rights
when exercised "contrary to their social purpose," fell into disuse.
17 Vyshinsky, The Stalin Constitution, 8 SOCIALiST LEGALrrY 12 (1936), quoted in 1
Gsovsmi, supra note 146, at 187.
2,8 THE SovIT CODES OF LAW xxx (W. Simons ed., Law in Eastern Europe, no. 23,
1980).
'" Hazard, supra note 185, at 154. J. HAzARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW 385 (1969).
For an update on contract law in the U.S.S.R., see Speer, Contract Rights and the Planned
Economy: Peaceful Co-existence under the 1969 Soviet Statutes on Deliveries of Goods, 3
L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 510 (1971).
120 Hazard, supra note 185, at 154.
22 F.J. FELDBRUGGE, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW 26 (1964).
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The industrial arbitration tribunals metamorphosized into com-
mercial courts. 2 A new Judiciary Act of 1938 emphasized legal
formality and regularity. At the same time, however, the mass of
new legislation continued to be formulated by Presidium edict and
by decree by the Council of Ministers, most of which was never
published.223
E. The Modern Codes
An additional opportunity to review the Romanist legal struc-
ture occurred after Stalin's death. In 1957, the constitution was
amended to allow for the traditional differentiation between fed-
eral "Fundamentals" and Republican codes. The U.S.S.R. Funda-
mentals of law are codes applicable through the country, while the
constitutent republics were allowed to pass codes extending the
Fundamentals to cover more specific issues. The debate began
anew between those who wanted law to reflect a progressive with-
ering of the state and those who demanded legal integration within
unitary codes. At first, the flamboyant Khrushchev made speeches
seeming to side with the neo-Pashukanist school. He called for the
development of informal courts untied to strict criminal procedure.
He also urged mass public trials against enemies of the state.224
But his rhetoric seemed to have little effect on the legal system
itself.
Among the compilers, the debate centered around the issue of
one civil code or two. The neo-Pashukanists called for a socialist
code of economic law and a separate civil code for the remaining
private relationships left in society. The opposition group de-
manded a single unitary civil code to cover all relation-
ships-public as well as private. The issue was central to the na-
ture of the legal system. A Romanist civil code is based on the legal
parity of subject agents, a strictly capitalist notion according to the
commodity exchange theory of law. A separate civil code would sig-
nal that the Romanist structures would have a lessening role to
The modem use of arbitrazh is examined in Pomorski, State Arbitrazh in the
U.S.S.R.: Development, Fuhctions, Organization, 9 Rurr.-CAM. L.J. 61 (1977).
22 UNGER, supra note 127, at 105.
11 Hazard, supra note 185, at 154-55.
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play in the legal system. The neo-Pashukanists seemed to be gain-
ing the upper hand when Khrushchev designated Aleksei Kosygin
to resolve the dispute. Kosygin sided entirely with the single-code
group 225 and the issue was settled definitively. 22
In 1961, the new U.S.S.R. Fundamentals of Civil Legislation ap-
peared. It regulated relationships among all segments of Soviet so-
ciety: citizens, co-operatives, and the state enterprises.227 The idea
of applying similar legal rules to all parts of the society was more
Romanist than anything that had come before. The Soviet Union
had decided to expand "the area of predictability epitomized by
norms."228 The Fundamentals of Civil Legislation defined and reg-
ulated legal capacity, juridical persons, liability, agency, statute of
limitations, property, obligations (with particular and lengthy em-
phasis on the law of contracts), insurance, credit, injuries (torts),
copyright, patents, succession, and some provisions on aliens,
choice of law rules, foreign transactions and treaties.229 The new
Fundamentals continued basic Romanist law principles: contracts
in general are permitted except those that are specifically forbid-
den; legal capacity was based not on class definition or on the re-
quirements of economic policy but on the fact of having been born;
215 Id. at 154. See Westen, The New Codes of Civil Law, PROB. OF COMMUNISM, March/
April 1965, at 37.
226 Ironically, Western Europe itself distinguishes between its civil codes, based on the
relations of individuals one to another, and its economic laws wherein individual transac-
tions are regulated according to a rather explicit state policy. See Kato, Civil and Economic
Law in the People's Republic of China, 30 AM. J. Comp. L. 429, 437-441 (1982). But where
in the West such a distinction makes sense conceptually, in the Soviet Union the same
division would be a political signal that the legalization trend is in doubt. Consequently, the
Soviet leaders have made a political decision to opt for a single code even with its attendant
conceptual anomalies.
2, Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics art. 2,
[hereinafter cited as Fund. of Civ. Leg.], in FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGISLATION OF THE USSR
AND THE UNION REPUmLIcs 150, 152 (1974).
22 Hazard, Preface to SovmT LAw AFTER STALIN xn (D. Barry, G. Ginsburgs, & P.
Maggs eds., Law in Eastern Europe, no. 20(I), 1977). Although Soviet legislation follows the
pattern of modem Western law, its debt to Romanist forms goes back even to ancient Ro-
man law rules. See Ioffe, supra note 41, at 702-21.
229 Fund. of Civ. Leg., supra note 227, at 150. For a view as to how Soviet tort law is
leading towards "full convergence with the tort laws of other modem Romanist legal sys-




juristic persons have similar legal rights and obligations as natural
persons; testamentary freedom is guaranteed. In fact, the defini-
tion of contractual obligations continues to follow the German
model closely,230 as do the rules of offer and acceptance. 231 The
Fundamentals, however, continued to provide the traditional es-
cape clause: "Civil rights shall be protected by law, except as they
are exercised in contradiction to their purpose in socialist society
in the period of communist construction. ' '232 The Fundamentals of
Civil Legislation were followed in 1964 by a longer Civil Code of
the R.S.F.S.R. which added many legislative details to the struc-
ture of the Fundamentals. 3
The Soviet Union also promulgated a Fundamentals of Civil
Procedure234 in 1961, followed again in 1964 by a far more detailed
Civil Code of the R.S.F.S.R. 3 5 Both codes follow the classic Ro-
manist models of Western Europe, including "inquisitorial princi-
ples, separation of the judiciary, rules of evidence, cassationary
powers, . . . an increased stress on legality, a streamlining of pro-
cedures, and a reduction in the amount of procedural conflicts. 23 6
The 1961 Civil Code was but one part of a major commitment by
the Soviet government to regulate public life by the mechanism of
comprehensive codes. In 1958, the government had promulgated
three major codes on criminal law, criminal procedure, and court
organization. 23 7 Soviet criminal procedure hews closely to Roman-
230 Compare Fund. of Civ. Leg., art. 33, supra note 227, at 165 with THE GERMAN CIVIL
CODE § 241 (L Forrester, S. Goren & M. Ilgen trans. 1975).
231 J. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEmIR LAW 316 (1969).
13 Fund. of Civ. Leg., art. 5, supra note 227, at 153.
23 The Civil Code of the RSFSR (A.K.R. Kiralfy trans.), in THE Sovir CODES OF LAW,
supra note 218, at 387.
234 Fundamentals of Civil Procedure of the USSR and the Union Republics, in FVNDA-
MENTALs OF LEGISLATION OF THE USSR AND THE UNION REPUBLICS 205 (1974).
235 The Code of Civil Procedure of the R.S.F.S.R., in THE SovIr CODES OF LAW, supra
note 218, at 543.
23 Chenoweth, supra note 197, at 199-201. For a discussion of civil procedure in the
U.S.S.R., see Note, Civil Procedure in the U.S.S.R., 7 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 211 (1975).
237 Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics
[hereinafter cited as Fund. of Crim. Leg.], in FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGISLATION OF THE USSR
AND ThM UNION REPUBLIcs 238; Fundamentals of Criminal Procedure of the USSR and the
Union Republics, id. at 272; Fundamentals of Legislation on the Judicial System of the
USSR, and the Union and Autonomous Republics, id. at 137. For an annotation of the
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ist lines (including the right to be represented by counsel). So does
substantive criminal law, although it has retained some distinctive
aspects. For example, in the 1958 Fundamentals of Criminal Legis-
lation, some crimes were still defined as "socially dangerous" acts,
although such acts now had to be defined in law.238 In addition, the
principle of crime by analogy was abolished-only those found
guilty of existing law by a court can be punished, and guilt can
only be imputed to one who acts wilfully or negligently in a man-
ner contrary to law.239 On the other hand, the Fundamentals on
Criminal Legislation were published in conjunction with a Law on
Crimes against the State and a Law on Military Crimes. 24° Clearly
the authorities were attempting to make coherent the coercive
methods used against the regime's enemies, and the Fundamentals
and subsequent republican codes did much to accomplish that end.
The content of the actions constituting crimes remained as wide as
the regime needed. The Law on Crimes against the State still con-
tains notoriously vague language regarding acts that "undermine,"
"weaken," or "wreck" the Soviet State.241 Similarly, in 1961, stiffer
penalties were enacted for fraud.242 Thus, although Soviet substan-
tive criminal law followed the trend towards Romanist forms, it
did so to a lesser degree than did the law of procedure. The regime
still required sufficient flexibility to deal with the many actions
major articles of the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation, see Osakwe, Contemporary So-
viet Criminal Law: An Analysis of the General Principles and Major Institutions of the
Post-1958 Soviet Criminal Law, 6 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 437 (1976).
23 Fund. of Crim. Leg., art. 7, supra note 237, at 240.
219 Fund. of Crim. Leg., art. 3, supra note 237, at 238.
240 Law on the Criminal Responsibility for Crimes against the State in LAw IN FAST-
ERN EUROPE 73 (Z. Szirmai ed., Law in Eastern Europe, no. 3, 1959); Law on the Criminal
Responsibility for Military Crimes in LAw IN EASTERN EUROPE 87 (Z. Szirmai ed., Law in
Eastern Europe, no. 3, 1959). See F.J. FELDBRUGGE, SOvwr CRIMiNAL LAw 38 (1964). For a
study on how the new codes and statutes affected the way the USSR treated those accused
of violating state secrets, see Ginsburgs & Rusis, Soviet Criminal Law and the Protection of
State Secrets, in MIxscELLA EA 3 (Z. Szirmai ed., Law in Eastern Europe, no. 7, 1963). For a
study of Soviet military trials, see Sims, Soviet Military Law: Judicial and Non-judicial
Punishment, 13 NEw ENG. L. REv. 381 (1978)
241 R.W. MAKEPEACE, MARXIST IDEOLOGY AND SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW 248 (1980).
242 FELDBRUGGE, supra note 240, at 39. Anti-parasite legislation was also enacted. For
an example of its use against an intellectual, see Burford, Getting the Bugs out of Socialist
Legality: The Case of Joseph Brodsky and a Decade of Soviet Anti-Parasite Legislation, 22
AM. J. Comp. L. 465 (1974).
1983] 185
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
that it might regard as a threat. Since 1958, decrees, legislation,
and codes of the USSR and the republics have, on the whole, made
more activities criminal and with harsher penalties.243 In addition,
although the Soviet Union has preferred to deal with its enemies
more through its developing structure of criminal law, the freedom
of agencies like the KGB to continue to harass and persecute dissi-
dents remains ingrained in the legal structure.244
Following after the federal Fundamentals, the R.S.F.S.R. Law on
Court Organization declared the multifaceted tasks of a court as
including the education of "citizens in the spirit of loyalty to the
Motherland and to the cause of communism and in the spirit of
strict and undeviated execution of Soviet laws. .... ,,245 That code
also demanded equality of citizens before the law, judgment only
according to law, independence of judges (though accountable to
the agencies that elect them, including right of recall), open trials
(with exceptions permitted by other laws), a right to a defense, and
the intercessory role of the procurator.24" The R.S.F.S.R. main-
23 See JUVHER, supra note 180, at 83-85; MAKEPEACE, supra note 241, at 249-67. See
also Morgan, People's Justice: The Anti-Parasite Law, People's Volunteer Militia, and
Comrades' Courts, in MisczE-LLA 49 (Z. Szirmai ed., Law in Eastern Europe, no. 7, 1963);
Hazard, The Soviet Post-Industrial Era and Soviet Law, 30 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 85, 90-
92 (1977); Feldbrugge, Law and Political Dissent in the Soviet Union, 26 CURRENT LEGAL
PRO Bs. 241 (1973); Adams, Capital Punishment in Imperial and Soviet Criminal Law, 18
AM. J. ComP. L. 575 (1970); Connor, The Soviet Criminal Correction System: Change and
Stability, 6 L. & Soc. Rnv. 367 (1972); Osakwe, Due Process of Law under Contemporary
Soviet Criminal Procedure, 50 TuL. L. REv. 266 (1978). Osakwe notes that although Article
3 of The Fundamentals of Criminal Procedure implies no prosecutorial discretion or selec-
tive enforcement of law and Article 4 rejects crime by analogy, a crime still need not be
defined with great particularly. Id. at 275, 283. For differing views on "presumption of inno-
cence" in Soviet courts, see Gorgone, Soviet Criminal Procedure Legislation: A Dissenting
Perspective, 28 AM. J. Comp. L. 577 (1980); Fletcher, The Presumption of Innocence in the
Soviet Union, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 1203 (1968); and Berman, The Presumption of Inno-
cence: Another Reply, 28 AM. J. Comp. L. 615 (1980).
4'" Although Soviet jurists have pressed for greater judicial review of the legality of
administrative actions, there is apparently little institutional change in that direction as yet.
See Barry, Administrative Justice and Judicial Review in Soviet Administrative Law, in
Sovmr LAW A~rER STALiN 241 (D. Barry, G. Ginsburgs, & P. Maggs eds., Law in Eastern
Europe, no. 20 (11), 1978).
"' The Law on Court Organization of the RFSFR, art. 3 in THE Sovmr CODES OF LAW,
supra note 218, at 1221-222.
246 The Law on Court Organization of the RFSFR, arts. 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 18, 19 & 24, id.
at 1222-224, 1226.
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tained the traditional structure of district courts of first instance,
various forms of regional courts, and a supreme court with original
and appellate jurisdiction, and with the power to issue "explana-
tory directives" on the application of the law.247 At the federal
level, the USSR Supreme Court has actively issued such directives
adding to the systemization of the law."'
The development of comprehensive codes had just begun. Since
1961, the Soviet Union has promulgated federal Fundamentals and
republican codes on customs, marriage and the family, merchant
shipping, land law, corrective labor, health, labor, water, public ed-
ucation, mineral resources, forestry, and housing.249 The hallmark
of the process became the new Constitution of 1977, impressed
upon the Soviet Union by Leonid Brezhnev with the same vigor as
Stalin had championed his Constitution of 1936. The impetus of
the new constitution can be traced to 1959, when Nikita
Khrushchev called for amendments to the 1936 constitution. By
1962 a constitutional commission had been formed to write an en-
tirely new document. Shortly after taking control, Brezhnev had
promised a new constitution by 1967, but it was ten years before
the document was finally promulgated. 50
Almost twice as long as Stalin's constitution, the new Constitu-
tion is far more explicit about the political and legal structure of
217 The Law on Court Organization of the RFSFR, art. 50, id. at 1235.
248 Barry & Barner-Barry, The USSR Supreme Court and the Systemization of Soviet
Criminal Law, in CODnIATION, supra note 170, at 1.
24 THE SoVIET CODES oF LAW, supra note 218, at xlvii. There have been recent calls for
an entirely new legal regime for agricultural enterprises. Osofsky, Soviet Agricultural Law
and Policy, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 1071, 1079 (1976). For a study of the effects of legislation on
marriage see Gorecki, Communist Family Pattern: Law as an Implement of Change, 1972
U. ILL. L.F. 121, and Bolas, No-Fault Divorce: Born in the Soviet Union? 14 J. FAM. L. 31
(1975). See also Luryi, Soviet Family Law, 10 MAN. L. J. 117 (1980), for an extensive review
of family law provisions, supplemented by case histories known to the author who practiced
law for twenty-five years in the U.S.S.R.
25 See UNGER, supra note 128, at 173; see generally R. SHlALnr, THm NEw SovIEr CON-
STITUTION OF 1977 (1978) (text and analysis). Other eastern European governments are mov-
ing toward more "legality" in statutory law. See Markovits, Law or Or-
der-Constitutionalism and Legality in Eastern Europe, 34 STAN. L. Rv. 513 (1982);
Hazard, The Common Core of Marxian Socialist Constitution, 19 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 297
(1982).
1983]
188 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
the Soviet state.251 Unlike previous constitutions, it specifies in de-
tail the leading role of the party in all parts of society.252 The Con-
stitution is more centralist than previous structures. It looks to-
wards the eventual elimination of national differences within the
Soviet Union, and the "strengthening of the social homogeneity of
society. 2 53 Indeed, the main purpose of the Constitution is to cen-
tralize and rationalize the organized control of the society by the
state. State ownership is now declared the "basic" form of prop-
erty in the U.S.S.R. into which apparently other forms will eventu-
ally be merged,2 " although the right to use small agricultural plots
is given to all citizens.2 5  The attempt at comprehensive organiza-
tion even includes a section on the goals of the Soviet state's for-
eign policy.256 The part of the Constitution allotted to individual
rights and duties is significantly longer than the corresponding sec-
tion of the 1936 constitution. There are few significant substantive
25 See Ginsburgs & Poworski, A Profile of the Soviet Constitution of 1977, in Tiiz
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE USSR AND THE UNION REPUBLICS: ANALYSIS, TEXTS, REPORTS 3 (F.
Feldbrugge ed., Law in Eastern Europe, no. 15, 1979); Ramundo, The Brezhnev Constitu-
tion: A New Approach to Constitutionalism, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 41 (1978). Professor
John Hazard notes that one school of legal thought in Russia is pressing for a concept of
"constitutional law" as opposed to "state law." The champions of the change assert that
constitutional law reflects a more complete structuring of the society including the actions
of the Communist Party. Stated thus far, the constitutional school merely reflects the re-
gime's purpose in a more ordered and predictable control over the people. But the constitu-
tional school necessarily meets opposition in its proposal to have some kind of institution
operate to keep governmental bodies within constitutional bounds. Hazard, A Constitution
for "Developed Socialism," in SovmT LAW Arm STALIN, supra note 244, at 11-14.
252 Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
[hereinafter cited as Const. of U.S.S.R.], preamble. For a study of the various ways in which
the Communist Party tries to control the system of justice, see Sharlet, The Communist
Party and the Administration of Justice in the USSR, in Sovre LAw AFTER STALIN 321 (D.
Barry, F. Feldbrugge, G. Ginsburgs, & P. Maggs eds., Law in Eastern Europe, no. 20 (III),
1979).
I" Const. of U.S.S.R., art. 19. The general trend of Soviet legality under Brezhnev has
been to centralize power. See, e.g., Schultz, Codification and Soviet Federalism, in CODIFI-
CATION, supra note 170, at 333; Hazard, The Future of Soviet Law, 8 SYDNEY L. REv. 590
(1979).
24 Const. of U.S.S.R., art. 11.
251 Id., art. 13. See generally Cameron, The Development of Individual Property
Rights under Soviet Law, 14 Am. Bus. L.J. 333 (1977). For a discussion of the effect of this
provision, see Osofsky, The Legal Status of the Russian Collective Farm Household, 22 AM.
J. Comp. L. 541 (1974).
25 Const. of U.S.S.R., arts. 28-30.
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additions, however, even though the courts are now assized of the
power to protect citizen's rights against actions by the administra-
tive organs of the state.257 The Constitution explicitly subjugates
the purview of all individual rights to the interests of the state.258
Within a year, all the constituent republics of the U.S.S.R. had
adopted parallel constitutions.
The last part of the program to Romanize the legal structure
consists of collecting, organizing, and publishing a digest for all the
decrees and statutes that remain in effect outside of the new codes.
A 1972 Statute on the Ministry of Justice directed that agency to
formulate a collection of laws-in-force. 59 It has not proved to be an
easy task. First, there is the sheer mass of the legislation. From
1945 until 1965 alone the Soviet Union issued approximately 200
laws, 10,000 edicts and 57,400 decrees over 80 per cent of which
remained unpublished.260 Second, the leaders of the U.S.S.R. do
not want to lose control of a legislative tool they can use whenever
code law becomes an impediment. At present a Systematic Collec-
tion (Sobranie) of Legislation in the U.S.S.R. is scheduled to be
published in the early 1980's to be followed by a Digest (Svod) of
Laws for the U.S.S.R. 2 1 The Sobranie, however will not be availa-
ble to the public.6 2
The Soviet Union has expended an astounding amount of energy
in the last twenty-five years in creating an integrated Westernized
legal system. But legalization has its limits. The Soviet Union's
257 Id., arts. 57-58. At the same time, Soviet judges continued to press for greater inde-
pendence from the administrative oversight of the Party. See Ginsburgs, The Political Un-
dercurrents of the Legal Dialogue, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1226 (1968).
2U Const. of U.S.S.R., art. 39. The dissonance between Soviet legal obligations and
human rights practice continues. See Comment, Human Rights in the Soviet Union: The
Policy of Dissimulation, 29 DEPAuL L. REv. 819 (1980); Feldbrugge, The Soviet Human
Rights Doctrine in the Crossfire between Dissidents at Home and Critics Abroad, 13 VAn.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451 (1980); V. CHALmZE, THE SoviEr Couvr AND HUMAN RIGwrs (1975).
250 Butler, supra note 170, at 89.
Loeber, Legal Rules "For Internal Use Only", 19 Ir'L & Comp. L.Q. 70, 76 (1970).
For a description of the structure of positive legislation in the Soviet Union, see Vanneman,
The Hierarchy of Laws in the Communist Party-State System in the Soviet Union, 8 Ir'L
LAW. 285 (1974) and Butler, Sources of Soviet Law, 28 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 223 (1975).
'6 Tan SovwT CODES OF LAw, supra note 218, at xxxi.
262 Id. at xli n.13.
1983]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
quest for orderly process- has been pursued only when the mainte-
nance of control is thereby improved. Where any crime has "politi-
cal" implications, "the rule of law gives way to unbridled arbitrari-
ness at both the operational and planning levels of the
government."263 As a distinguished observer has noted, "the secret
police function-whether somewhat larger or somewhat
smaller-remains central and vital, now as ever, in the Soviet
state."12 " Similarly, despite its Western structure, the entire pur-
pose of the civil law is to harness the energies of the Soviet citizen
to the accomplishment of the policies of the party.
6 5
VI. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST CHOICE
A. Revolutionary Communism
Unlike the Bolsheviks, the Chinese Communists had a relatively
long period of "pre-history" in which to experiment with legal
forms before coming to power. Between 1926 and 1931, while the
Kuomintang was undertaking a sophisticated program in code
building, the Communists controlled only remote rural areas.
There, they enforced a direct and often ruthless rule, designed to
cement their power and to begin social revolutionary activity at
once. Because they were desperately struggling to maintain a mili-
tary base in outlaying areas, exigencies of rebellion rather than ju-
risprudential conceptions had much to do with their style of ruling.
If there was any kind of legal model extant, it seemed a combi-
nation of Leninist ideology, militant Bolshevism, fa styles of pun-
ishments, and a desire to smash Confucianism and to construct a
new li among the people. Such devices as land reform and the es-
tablishment of a new status for women were promulgated and en-
forced by special ad hoc revolutionary tribunals. Legal rules, such
163 Osakwe, Due Process of Law and Civil Rights Cases in the Soviet Union, in 1 So-
v=T LAW AmR STALIN, supra note 252, at 214.
264 Feldbrugge, "Does Soviet Law Make Sense?" Rationality and Functionality in So-
viet Law: An Epilogue, in SoviET LAw Am STALIN, supra note 252, at 400.
265 While it is the purpose of Western civil law to provide the individual with an
orderly legal framework within which he can conduct his own affairs, with as little
hindrance as possible, it is the primary objective of Soviet civil law to realize the
ideological goals of the Communist social system.
Westen, supra note 226, at 40.
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as they existed, were direct applications of substantive revolution-
ary goals. There was no judicial structure, but rather a series of
individual trials that would educate the masses through terrorist
means (using the example of a fa-type severe punishment) directed
against "evil" kinds of persons.266 As in traditional China (and the
soon-to-come Soviet show trials), the whole point of the exercise
was exemplary punishment, which could include the traditional
bambooing, imprisonment, or execution. One writer has noted,
"Judicial procedure, crude as it may have been, was on the whole
regarded as a weapon against counter-revolutionaries. 2 6 7 In con-
trast, disputes among loyal comrades were handled informally
along the lines of the traditional 1i pattern (although the substance
of the new 1i consciousness was radically different).
In 1931, the Communists declared the areas under their control
to be an independent Chinese Soviet Republic. As a constituted
"government," the regime began inaugurating a legal superstruc-
ture. Here the Chinese communists copied many of the non-Ro-
manist aspects of the Russian Soviet system, together with some
traditional Chinese glosses.
Substantive legislation was passed dealing with land reform, la-
bor conditions, marriage law, and activities of counter-revolution-
aries. The government established a judicature in which existed a
Supreme Court made up of three chambers: civil, military, and
criminal. This roughly paralleled an appeal board that heretofore
had assisted the Emperor in reviewing capital cases. Lower courts
were staffed and controlled by the Commissariat of Justice, also
following the imperial Chinese tradition of a bureaucratic judici-
ary. The trial courts were staffed by a judge and two lay assessors,
assisted by procurators, but the Communists continued to make
wide use of special tribunals for mass educative show trials.268
The leadership also made use of a contemporary Soviet practice,
giving the Chinese version of the NKVD independent powers
266 Tay, Part 1, supra note 116, at 166; McAleavy, The People's Courts in Communist
China, 11 AM. J. Comp. L. 52, 54-57 (1962).
267 Tay, Part 1, supra note 116, at 166.
268 Id. at 168-69.
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against enemies and agents. However, in dealing with minor of-
fenses and civil disputes, the government preferred relying on in-
formal conciliation and re-education. '6
In 1937, the Communists and Nationalists joined in a common
front against the Japanese. The Chinese Soviet Republic was dis-
solved, though the Communists retained autonomous authority in
the regions they controlled. Consciously or not, the Communists
began to follow Stalinist-type policy that placed a greater empha-
sis on legality, though not to the same degree. The High Courts in
their provinces came under the titular authority of the Supreme
Court of the Republic, and the connection had some effect. The
Communists enforced some Republican legislation, and adopted a
formal structure of criminal adjudication. Torture and corporal
punishment were banned; evidence, not confession, was the basis
of conviction; and appeals were allowed. Public security organs
were restricted in their powers, and there were even calls for draft
codes of criminal and civil law.70 It was the Communists' first
brush with Romanist procedures.
The leadership, however, did not let things go too far. It put the
increasingly independent judiciary under political control again in
1943, placing party cadres at every judicial level. The pressure for
informal conciliation remained strong, and the practice of mass
show trials continued.27 1
The renewed revolutionary trends were increased during the
Communists' final push for victory after the end of the World War.
Party control of the formal court structure intensified, and there
were even more mass trials, public executions, and legislation by
revolutionary decree. When the Communists gained ultimate
power in 1949, their long struggle had given them some experience
with many legal practices: 1) direct revolutionary rule, 2) fa-style
punishments, 3) li-style adjudications, 4) Soviet examples, 5) impe-
rial judicial structures, and 6) Romanist forms.
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B. The Regime in Power
The victorious new regime began its legal rule remarkably like
the Bolsheviks had during their period of militant Communism.
Two of the regime's first acts were to abolish the Nationalist Gov-
ernment's Six Codes,272 and to direct judges to decide cases accord-
ing to the new laws that would be forthcoming, or in their absence,
by the spirit of the "New Democracy. '27 3 Under the Provisional
Regulations of the People's Courts of 1951, each local court was to
be politically controlled, staffed normally by one judge, and given
jurisdiction over both criminal and civil cases. The function of the
courts was to consolidate the revolution and to aid in the social
reorganization of the country. The judges were to base their deci-
sions on the policy of the Central People's Government, criminal
prosecutions were to issue against those committing "socially dan-
gerous acts," and appeals were discouraged.2 ' The courts typically
sentenced an accused "without telling him which law he was al-
leged to have violated. '275
Thousands of ad hoc revolutionary tribunals flourished through-
out the country and took on the bulk of criminal adjudications.
Goaded on by the land reform movement, and the Three-Anti and
Five-Anti campaigns,276 the tribunals were part of a massive plan
to repress counter-revolutionary activity. The police possessed a
free hand to deal with class enemies. Many "judicial" organs rou-
tinely conducted business in secret.27 7 Millions perished. Mean-
'72 The Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference,
art. 17, reprinted in THE NE w CONSTITUTION OF COMMUNIST CHINA: CoM AnATivn ANALYSES
285 (M. Lindsay ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as LINDSAY].
173 Tay, Part 1, supra note 116, at 171.
274 Comment, The Background and Evolution of Party Policy on the Drafting of Legal
Codes in Communist China, 15 AM. J. CoMp. L. 506, 513 (1967).
275 Chiu, The Judicial System under the New PRC Constitution, in LnDSAY, supra
note 272, at 73 (footnote omitted).
17' In 1951 and 1952, the Three-Anti campaign (anti-corruption,-waste, and -
bureaucratism) and the Five-Anti campaign (anti-bribery,-tax evasion,-theft of public as-
sets,-fraud, and-theft of government secrets) were designed to bring the revolution to the
government bureaucracy and to private industry. Liu, Economic Development of the Chi-
nese Mainland, 1945-1965, in 1 CHINA IN CRISS 611 (P. Ho & T. Tsou ed. 1968).
277 Bassiouni, The Criminal Justice System of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the People's Republic of China, 11 Rnv. D. P. 163, 183 (1971).
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while, swamped by an enormous case load, the People's Courts ap-
pointed local conciliation committees to help take over the mass of
civil complaints that had been brought to them.7 8 The court struc-
ture never truly solidified.
As it had been with the early Bolsheviks, substantive legislation
was limited to land reform, marriage, labor conditions, corrective
labor camps, and counter-revolutionary activity. 79 For the first few
years, the idea of a codification of laws was ridiculed by the state's
propaganda organs. "Some people," declared an editorial, "disre-
garding the present practical conditions, prematurely and fanci-
fully insist on the immediate enactment of a complete collection of
laws .... [T]hese viewpoints ... must be resolutely corrected."'2 °0
However, in 1952, a codification committee in the Ministry of Jus-
tice began to work on proposed codes of criminal law, judicial pro-
cedure, company law, and criminal rehabilitation. 281 But as yet, the
committee was running against the dominant trend.
The militant ideology of the period was reflected in the regime's
harsh attitude towards formal law in general. While the codifiers
were beginning their work, a purge of the judiciary ensued, taking
as its rationale the Leninist dictum that law and most of the
judges were appendages of the old exploitative order. Romanist le-
gal principles such as equality before the law, statutes of limita-
tions, nullum crimen sine lege, the prohibition of ex post facto
laws, and the independence of the judiciary were all singled out for
excoriation. In their stead, the principle of analogy was approved,
272 Tay, Law in Communist China-Part 2,6 SYDNEY L. REv. 335, 351 (1971) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Tay, Part 2].
' See Statute on Punishment for Counter-revolutionary Activity (1951), Temporary
Regulations for the Surveillance of Counter-revolutionary Elements (1952), Statute on Pen-
alties for Corruption (1952), Statute on Labor Re-education, the Marriage Law (1950), the
Agrarian Reform Law (1952), and the Trade Union Law (1950), in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
DocuMENTs OF COMMUNIST CmINA, 215, 222, 227, 240, 266, 276, 470 (A. Blaustein ed. 1962)
[hereinafter cited as BLAusTN]. For a textual analysis of the 1950 Marriage Law, see
Woodsworth, Family Law and the Resolution of Domestic Disputes in the People's Repub-
lic of China, 13 McGL. L.J. 169 (1967).
280 Editorial, Strengthen & Consolidate the People's Revolutionary Legal System, JE-
MIN JIH-PAO, Sept. 5, 1951; CURRENT BACKGROUND No. 183 (Hong Kong, U.S. Consulate
General), quoted in Comment, supra note 274, at 507.
"I Tay, Part 2, supra note 278, at 351.
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as well as the application of retroactive laws to those guilty of pre-
vious counter-revolutionary activities. 28 2 Local "self-criticism"
committees took on most of the purging and by April 1953, over
eighty percent of the judicial personnel had been fired.
C. Modernization
In 1954, Communist China ended its militant phase. For the
next four years, it attempted to consolidate it4 control at home, to
industrialize, and to seek legitimacy abroad. Though means dif-
fered, the basic objectives were similar to those of Lenin's NEP.
The legal phase had been prefigured by the National Conference
on Judicial Work, which at the end of the purge in 1953, had called
for extending the judiciary and populating it with newly trained
cadres. The law school of Peking was revivified, 23 and propaganda
appeared exhorting party members to adhere to a "law abiding
spirit."28 All seemed in harmony with the goals of the first five-
year plan of economic development.
The newly promulgated Constitution of 1954 confirmed the new
trend. It was based upon the model of Stalin's constitution of
1936.285 Encouraging citizens to "uphold the law," the Constitution
in some detail indicated a formal structure of courts and a signifi-
cant amount of judicial independence.288 Cases were to be heard
"in public unless otherwise provided for by law" and the accused
possessed "the right to defence [SiC]. ''287 The procuracy was consti-
tutionalized.288 The document recognized individual, peasant, arti-
san, and capitalist ownership of property in addition to state and
cooperative forms.8 9 Inheritance was to be protected 290 with the
282 Comment, supra note 274, at 514. Tay, Smash Permanent Rules: China as a Model
for the Future, 7 SYDNEY L. REV. 400, 407 (1976).
283 Macdonald, supra note 96, at 323.
284 Tay, Part 2, supra note 278, at 353.
285 See Cohen, China's Changing Constitution, 1978 CHINA Q. 794, 798. Soviet law
professors soon arrived at Peking University. Macdonald, supra note 96, at 324.
286 Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1954), art. 78, in 1 SELECTED LEGAL
DOCUMNTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1, 45 (J. Wang ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited
as SELECTED LEGAL DocuMENTs].
287 Art. 76. Id.
28 Arts. 81-84. Id. at 46-47.
288 Arts. 5-11. Id. at 12-15.
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only significant limitation being that the constitution forbade "any
person to use his private property to the detriment of the public
interest."2 91 Like Stalin's constitution, there was also a long list of
rights whose observance has not been historically confirmed. They
included equality before the law;29 2 freedom of speech, press, as-
sembly, association, demonstration, religion;29 3 privacy of homes
and freedom to change one's residence; and freedom from arbitrary
arrest.294 Also in 1954 a Court Law, a Procuracy Law, and Regula-
tions on Arrest and Detention were announced. The revised court
structure followed the Soviet model closely.2 5 The Court Law en-
joined the courts "to try criminal and civil cases, and, by judicial
process, to punish criminals and settle civil disputes."29 This law
also followed the Soviet model closely. Independence of the courts
was guaranteed "subject only to the law. '297 Similarly, equality
before the law, public trials, the right to a defense, recusal, and
court responsibility to the political organs were all included. 298
Under the Procuracy Law, the procurators were "[tio see that the
judicial process of people's courts conforms to the law."299 The Ar-
rest and Detention Act was also designed to ensure proper arrest
procedures through the procuracy and the police.300 During the
next three years the procuracy grew in power and importance.80 1
Although process of law and formal decision-making became
more important during this period, the Chinese never entirely gave
29 Art. 12. Id. at 15.
291 Art. 14. Id. at 16.
292 Art. 85. Id. at 51.
29M Arts. 87-88. Id. at 51-52.
2% Arts. 89-90. Id. at 52.
2,5 Li, The Role of Law in Communist China, 1970 CHINA Q., at 66, 78.
2" Organic Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China, art. 3, in
BLAUSTEIN, supra note 279, at 131.
297 Art. 4. Id. at 132.
"' Arts. 5, 7, 12 & 14. Id. at 132, 134-35.
" Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates of the People's Republic of China, art.
4(4), in BLAUSTSI, supra note 279, at 145. See Cohen, The Communist Party and "Judicial
Independence," 1949-1959, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 967, 980 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cohen,
Judicial Independence].
Soo J. COHEN, THE CRIMUNAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1963
360-62 (1969) [hereinafter cited as COHEN, CRIMINAL PROCESS].
201 Ginsburgs & Stahnke, The People's Procurate in Communist China: The Period of
Maturation, 1951-1954, 1965 CHINA Q., at 53, 79-88.
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up on the informal dispute settlement devices. The lower people's
courts, for example, called People's Tribunals, were empowered to
hear civil and minor criminal offenses and were staffed in the So-
viet style with one judge and two lay assessors. But they were also
encouraged to set up People's Conciliation Committees to aid in
the resolution of disputes arising from "contradictions among the
people. 3 0 2
The work begun on civil, criminal, and procedural codes in 1952
was pressed forward. Problems arose, however, because of the lack
of legally trained personnel to do proper drafting, most experts
having been purged earlier. In addition, although the party left the
courts in a relatively unencumbered position, many members still
doubted whether legalism could fit in with the revolutionary char-
acter of the society. Despite these difficulties, a draft criminal code
was ready by the end of 1956. Progress on the civil and procedural
codes was somewhat slower.
The draft criminal code had 261 sections, "divided into two
parts, the first made up of 'general principles' and subdivided into
five chapters, and the second comprising nine chapters under the
general title 'special provisions.' ",303 The code structure may seem
reminiscent of the lu-li form of the Ta Ch'ing, but what is more
significant is that the form followed the Nationalist code, which
had 357 sections divided into a "General Principles" part of twelve
chapters, and a "Special Provisions" part of thirty-five chapters.30'
Although the specific contents of the draft code were never re-
leased, there is evidence that the drafters were looking to the So-
viet Union's NEP-era Criminal Codes for guidance.30 5
The pace of codification was still too slow for many. During the
Hundred Flowers Campaign, which began in May 1956, men as
high as Liu Shao-chi and Tung Pi-wu, elder statesmen and Presi-
dent of the Supreme People's Court, vehemently pressed for the
establishment of a legal system. Tung Pi-wu, a "humanist" edu-
303 Tay, Part 2, supra note 278, at 360.
303 Comment, supra note 274, at 520.
304 See The Criminal Code, in LAW REVISION PLANNING GROUP, CUSA, THE EXECUTIVE
YuAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 893-1081 (1961).
305 Comment, supra note 274, at 522.
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cated in Japan,30 6 called "urgently" for complete codification.3 07
Complaining that party functionaries would not obey court orders,
Tung used words startlingly like those of the Legalists of ancient
Ch'in.
All the laws must be strictly observed. No violations of the
law should henceforth be permitted .... In future any per-
son who deliberately violates the law must be prosecuted even
if he is in a high position and has rendered meritorious ser-
vice to the State .... To demand that everyone do his work
in accordance with the law is one of the chief methods of end-
ing the occurrence of violations of the laws of the State. 08
In like manner, Liu Shao-chi, who had witnessed how the same
debate in Russia had been resolved in favor of those who wanted
to maintain the codes, opted for the Stalinist solution.
The period of revolutionary storm and stress is past ... and
the aim of our struggle is changed to one of safeguarding the
successful development of the productive forces of society; a
corresponding change in the methods of struggle will conse-
quently have to follow and a complete legal system becomes
an absolute necessity .... All state organs must strictly ob-
serve the law.309
At the same time, the Institute of Criminal Law Research in Pe-
king published a textbook of law, apparently geared for the guid-
ance of the courts in anticipation of the forthcoming legal struc-
ture. Entitled Lectures on the General Principles of Criminal Law
in the People's Republic of China,3 10 the content was really a
translation of Soviet legal principles, and Romanist form was im-
plicit. A series of lectures on civil law that reflected a new legality
was also published. Contract law, for example, never really a part
30' Boorman, Tung Pi-wu: A Political Profile, 1964 CHINA Q., at 66, 82.
3" Comment, supra note 274, at 507 (quoting Speech by Tung Pi-wu, EIGHTH NA-
TIoNAL CONGRSS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 79-97 (Peking 1956)).
308 As reported by the New China News Agency, Peking, Sept. 20, 1956, quoted in Tay,
Part 2, supra note 278, at 364.
309 Id.
810 No. 13331, Joint Publications Research Service, Office of Technical Services, U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, 30 March 1962, trans. of Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Hsing-Fa
Tsung-tse Chiang-i (1957) [hereinafter cited as Lecture on Criminal Law].
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of Chinese Communist legal doctrine, was delineated in Western
juridical terms. 311 In the face of such pressure, Premier Chou En-
lai resisted, defensively asserting that the enactment of codes was
awaiting the final liquidation of private property. 12
The new legalists, however, were not mollified. The tone of argu-
ment turned to direct attacks on the party. "Some Party mem-
bers," said Tung, "even looked upon themselves as special person-
ages and considered that the law was made for the people and that
they themselves were over and above the law. '313 Chia Ch'ien,
President of the Criminal Division of the Supreme People's Court,
said bluntly, "[J]udges need only be subject to the law and must
not receive any other leadership from the Party.' "14 Chia Ch'ien
joined others in declaring that the party committees' leadership
may not be correct in that they did not know the applicable law in
the circumstances of individual cases, a reference to the practice of
ad hoc intervention.
Part of the struggle lay in the fact that the law in China was
administered by two separate groups of legal specialists. One
group, trained under the Nationalists or recently graduated from
the retained law schools, served the new regime by their expertise
and their more Westernized values of law. Another group of law
cadres had been appointed by the party, not because of their legal
knowledge, but because of their ideological dependability. 31
The legal experts had no illusions. They knew that they were
fighting a desperate struggle with the revolutionaries within the
party. Even as legal forms began to mature in 1955 and 1956, the
party launched a new wave of extra-judicial persecution and liqui-
dation of class enemies.316
3 Pfeffer, The Institution of Contracts in the Chinese People's Republic-Part 2,
1963 CHINA Q. at 115, 117.
312 Comment, supra note 274, at 519.
313 Id. at 518.
314 Cohen, supra note 299, at 992, quoting Feng-Jo-ch'uan, Refute Chia Ch'ien's Anti-
Party Nonsense about "Independent Adjudications," [1958] 1 POLmCAL-LEGAL RESEARCH
18.
315 V. Li, LAW WrrHOUT LAwYERs 22-23 (1977). Foster, Codification in Post-Mao China,
30 AM. J. Comp. L. 395, 397 (1982).
316 Bassiouni, supra note 277, at 184.
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D. The Maoist Phase
The criticism of the party had become too intense. The leader-
ship believed the party's authority was. being threatened. In 1957
the Hundred Flowers Campaign abruptly terminated, and during
the subsequent purge of "rightist" elements, the Communist Party
of China made its choice: there would be no Romanist legal forms
to structure the new socialist society. The draft criminal code was
about to be distributed, and the civil code was nearly complete
when the scene changed. Nothing more was heard of either for
twenty years. 17 Economically, the new campaign was paralleled by
the "Great Leap Forward," a program vigorously opposed by Liu-
Shao-chi that was designed to develop China along non-Western
lines. It turned out to be an economic disaster, and the reversal of
its consequences was not to begin until the late 1970's.
The Lectures on the General Principles of Criminal Law was
being printed when Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai announced the
new line in May of 1957. The editors decided to proceed with pub-
lication with the explicit hope that the draft criminal code would
soon be promulgated, but they hastily formulated an introductory
confession that "we are too late to reflect the significance of this
hectic struggle in our lectures, nor are we able to criticize and re-
fute the bourgeois rightists reactionary statements on criminal leg-
islation and judicial problems."3 18 In the proper self-critical mode
the editors asked that the reader "not hesitate to criticize these
lectures and give us advice so that we can correct our mistakes,
make up our defects, and revise the lectures at the time of re-
printing." 19 There was no second edition. Instead, there was a re-
turn to extra-legal practices. Professional members of the judiciary
3" An anemic attempt to promulgate new legislation surfaced in the early 1960's, but
did not prosper. Kato, supra note 226, at 435.
3 8 Lectures on Criminal Law, supra note 310, at i.
319 Id. at ii. Just before the hundred flowers campaign turned on the legalists, there
were other textbooks on civil law, the state and law, and the constitution. In addition, the
period from 1954 to 1957 was relatively rich in other legal publications, particularly in col-
lections of laws on various subjects. See Hsia, Chinese Legal Publications, in J. COHEN,
CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVE 22-36 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter cited as COHEN, CONTEMPORARY CHiNEsE LAW].
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were replaced by military and public security personnel.3 20 The
new forces disposed directly of many cases, and there was a re-
sumption of forced labor. Lawyers disappeared from any official
function. The "smashing of all permanent rules" was the party's
goal. Direct party rule through all its branches was the policy.
Echoing the new requirements, Chao Yuan, President of the
Higher Provincial People's Court of Fukien, said
The people's courts must not only observe the policy and di-
rectives of the Party, but also obey the direction and supervi-
sion of the Party over adjudication of actual cases. They must
voluntarily seek instructions from and report their work to
the Party committees. When an official of a court goes to the
countryside, he must do his work under the unified leadership
of the local Party committee, no matter where he happens to
be.3 21
It was decreed that an "expert" in the law was one whose revolu-
tionary consciousness had been properly formed. Consequently,
formal legal training was regarded as unnecessary. The new judi-
cial cadres enforced the party's laws and decrees directly with the
people, "not by books.13 22
The "mass line" dictated total aversion to formal codes and
structures. A 1959 document stated,
Those who advocate the writing of law codes do not consider
what our country actually needs. They insist on producing
subjectively and formally, a so-called complete system which
amounts actually to reducing our laws to a rigid system.
Thus, this view does not accord with the spirit of permanent
revolution. We must oppose it.323
SI0 Tay, Part 2, supra note 278, at 369.
"I Chao Yuan, Report on a Year's Work of the People's Court of Fukien Province,
China, delivered before the Fukien People's Congress and published in FUKIEN JIH-PAO,
Feb. 13, 1959, quoted in Comment, supra note 274, at 523.
:22 Li, supra note 295, at 95. Although statutes remained on the books, their provisions
were subordinated entirely to Party policy. For an example of Party control over marriage
in the face of contrary statutory regulations, see Kato, supra note 226, at 431-32 n.16.
323 Several Problems Relating to the Legal System of the Chinese People's Democracy,
Cheng-fa Yen-Chiu (Political and Legal Study) No. 2 (Peking, 1959), quoted in Comment,
supra note 274, at 507.
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Attacks were once again launched against specific Romanist princi-
ples such as the presumption of innocence, and the "judge's free
evaluation of the evidence. 3 24 People's attorneys were ordered to
divulge all admissions of guilt made to them by their clients.3 25
Any appeal to a higher court almost always resulted in a heavier
sentence.3 26 High officials were forced to adhere to a "socialist self-
reform pact," promising "to give [their] hearts to the Party."3 27
The party began a systematic program to replace judicial proce-
dures and judicial organs. The Ministry of Justice was eliminated.
The procuracy was criticized for having a pro-defendant attitude
and for failing to prosecute elements of the population found dan-
gerous by the police.323 The courts were forbidden to hear eco-
nomic disputes between state enterprises. Instead, all such dis-
agreements were to be "mediated" by an appropriate ministry.
This was not the Soviet arbitration system, which in contrast had
developed towards being a formal court. 29 For individual civil dis-
putes, mediation and conciliation groups were given almost com-
plete authority. Before long, the institution of the "People's attor-
neys" was itself abolished.330 Just before the Great Cultural
Revolution, an American professor asked a former Chinese official
from Shanghai about the legal profession in that city. The official
replied, "Lawyers in Shanghai? What do you think China is-the
Soviet Union?"3''
The party's crusade against a formal legal system reached its
324 Chang Tzu-pe'i, Censure the Bourgeois Principle of the "Judge's Free Evaluation
of the Evidence," 2 CFYC 42 (1958); Wu Yu-su, Censure the Bourgeois Principle of "Pre-
sumption of Innocence," 2 CFYC 37 (1958); in J. COHEN, CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 301,
at 4 n.6 (1968).
3'5 Bassiouni, supra note 277, at 185.
'2 Chiu, Structural Changes in the Organization and Operation of China's Criminal
Justice System, 7 REV. SOc LmsT L. 3, 56 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Chiu, Structural
Changes].
327 Hsiao, The Role of Economic Contracts in Communist China, 53 CALIF. L. REV.
1029, 1036 (1965).
323 Cohen, Due Process?, in R. TRRLL, THE CHINA DIFFERENCE 240 (1979).
329 Li, supra note 295, at 101.
30 Chiu, supra note 326, at 56.
3"1 Cohen, Continuity and Change in China: Some "Law Day" Thoughts, 24 S.C.L.
REV. 3, 3 (1972).
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highest pitch in the Great Cultural Revolution, which Mao Tse-
tung launched in 1966. The new campaign was directed against the
"four olds" (old customs, old habits, old culture, and old social
thought).,3 2 During the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards at-
tacked all law-making authorities, including the public security or-
gans.3 33 Entire areas of the legal/administrative structure were
abandoned, as China pressed towards a "no law" situation, con-
trolled by the party, and enforced by a vast mediation system. The
government closed the law schools and universities. The Red
Guards destroyed legal libraries throughout the country. Law
professors were actively persecuted and found surcease only if they
could show some utility in another field, such as teaching foreign
languages.
Some courts remained, but their function was to punish the "en-
emies of the people" for the edification of the populace.3 The Su-
preme People's Court was purged and most of its positions were
filled by people from the military or security organs. 35 Where re-
education through various local mediation committees failed,
where the independent power of the police to punish was to no
avail, and where the malefactor was notorious enough that the in-
dependent action of revolutionary groups was insufficient, then the
residual court system would take over.33 For the most part, how-
ever, the courts had been shorn of Western procedures and their
legal specialists. They became part of the revolutionary struggle.337
332 Oxnam, The Past is Still Present, in TEERRILL, supra note 328, at 65.
333 Li, supra note 296, at 105-07.
"' Some sense of the plastic definition of "enemy" can be seen in Comment, Commu-
nist China's Emerging Fundamentals of Criminal Law, 13 AM. J. CoMP. L. 80, 85-86 (1964).
3*5 See R. Edwards, Reflections on Crime and Punishment in China, with Appended
Sentencing Documents, 16 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 45, 50 (1977), [reprinted in OCCASIONAL
PAERs/REPRinS SERIES IN CoNTEMPoRARY ASIAN STUDIES (No. 8, 1977).] See also Tao, Elite
Politics and the New Constitution in the PRC, in LINDSAY, supra note 272, at 221; Hong
Yung Lee, Mao's Strategy for Revolutionary Change: A Case Study of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, 1979 CHINA Q. 50.
33' See Li, supra note 315, at 61-65. Crimes by analogy and retroactive findings of crim-
inality were imbedded in the residual legal system. Comment, supra note 334, at 86-87. For
an analysis of the Chinese Communist concept of "trial," see Jones, A Possible Model for
the Criminal Trial in the People's Republic of China, 24 AM. J. Comp. L. 229 (1976).
337 Tao, The Criminal Law of Communist China, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 43, 68 (1966). See H.
Chiu, Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some Yunnan Province Docu-
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In one sense, but only a formal sense, the struggle between the
revolutionary and the legal specialists was a reflection of the an-
cient Chinese li-fa distinction. The new legalists pressed for the
universalization of legal norms while the revolutionaries desired a
constant process of re-education at the local level.338 The Maoist
solution was the traditional imperial Chinese solution: the values
of the (new) society would be enforced by local pressure supple-
mented by exemplary "legal" punishment of those unable to be re-
educated properly. Of course, the social values were not Confucian,
either in content or style. 3 9 The new social relationships were to
be Marxist or Maoist. The party changed the nature of the infor-
mal adjudicative system by politicizing even civil disputes, so that
the parties were "less able to compromise their differences" than
before. 40 There was not, however, to be any stability even in these
new Marxist relationships. The process of re-education was con-
stant.3 4 1 The population was kept off-balance by a series of party-
inspired campaigns each rectifying the errors of the one that went
before. Permanent revolution was designed to keep the people to-
tally dependent on the next directive of the party. In its necessary
arbitrariness, the Cultural Revolution was anti-legal in its very es-
sence. Permanent revolution was the formula for permanent
control.
Where Stalin's enemies had been the anti-legalists, Mao's were
the legalists. Where Stalin had seen that law could be a technique
of control, Mao believed that any kind of stable rules had to be an
impediment to his authority. No institution having any indepen-
ments, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 374 (1977), [reprinted in Occasional Papers/Reprints
Series in Contemporary Asian Studies (No. 6, 1978).] Cohen, The Criminal Process in the
People's Republic of China: An Introduction, 79 HARv. L. REv. 469, 485 (1966).
33 See H. KiM, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPrs OF CHINA AND THE WEST 151-52 (1981).
33 Leng, The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China as Reflecting Mao Tse-
Tung's Influence, 68 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 356 (1977), [reprinted in Occasional Pa-
pers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies 2 (No. 5, 1978)].
340 Lubman, Methodological Problems in Studying Chinese Communist "Civil Law", in
J. COHEN, Contemporary Chinese Law, supra note 319, at 230, 235.
34 In the internecine struggles within the Party, the campaign later transformed into a
"Criticize Confucius-Criticize Lin Piao" program. See Resolution of the First Session of
the Fourth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on the Report of
the Work of the Government (January 17, 1975) in 1 SEaCTED LEGAL DOCUMENTS, supra
note 286, at 127.
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dent social or legal existence outside of the party could be
tolerated.
If one were to compare the brutality of the regimes of Stalin and
Mao, it would be difficult to determine who should be declared the
"winner" in such a sorry exercise. For all their common aims and
pernicious policies, Stalin nonetheless grasped an insight that
eluded the Chinese leader: a rational structure of law that orders
relations in a predictable manner can be a vital mechanism for
state power. Where Mao feared that any coherent body of rules
and experts to administer them would necessarily diminish party
authority, Stalin perceived not only that the rules increased con-
trol, but that the leader could fine tune the relationship between
structured law and arbitrary decree according to the political needs
of the situation. The successors of Stalin believed that even he had
been too arbitrary for the good of the regime (and for their own
safety). They nonetheless decided that his conception of the utility
of law should be followed. They have undertaken a massive pro-
gram of legalization of the society in the Romanist mode.
E. Legal Reform
By the time Mao Tse-tung died in 1976, forces within the Chi-
nese Communist Party were already at work to undertake a funda-
mental legal restructuring of the society. The high point of the
Cultural Revolution had lasted from 1966 until 1969. In 1968 Lui
Shao-chi had been dismissed as chief of state and in 1970 Mao de-
clared supreme commander of the whole nation and the whole
army. Yet despite the purges and liquidations, the struggle be-
tween the legalists and the revolutionaries renewed. Mao's support
of Chou En-lai in opening China to the United States gave heart to
those who wished to strengthen China economically and technolog-
ically. Such a policy necessarily called for an ordering along more
predictable lines within the country.
Even one of Mao's ideological campaigns during the Cultural
Revolution had the ironic effect of strengthening the hands of the
legal reformers. In the early 1970's, Mao launched a "Criticize
Confucius" campaign. Its objective was to break down traditional
Chinese values among the populace, and once again to leave them
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with no standard but the party's. It also sought to undermine those
functionaries who sought to gain for themselves positions of privi-
lege and respect. 42 In order to demonstrate the evil of the Con-
fucian tradition, the media extolled the virtues of the ancient legal-
ists.343 The power of the new legalists was growing, but it did not
triumph over those who championed the Cultural Revolution until
after Mao's death.
In 1975, the revolutionaries sought to solidify their line in a new
constitution, a document only slightly moderated by the legal re-
formers. 4 The preamble declared that the society was to be
guided by "the theory of continued revolution. '345 The procuracy
was formally abolished and its functions given over to the police.
Public showcase trials for the education of the people were ap-
proved, and trials in general had to follow the "mass line.".840 The
1975 constitution also omitted nearly every judicial protection for-
merly provided by the 1954 constitution, most significantly the
rule that all were to be equal before the law. The new constitution
did retain the distinction between the people and the enemies of
the people, the latter, of course, targeted for specific attack.3 47 One
technique for exposing the enemies of the people had been the use
of "big-character" posters prominant during the Cultural Revolu-
tion and revived by Mao in 1974.48 The constitution made the
practice a guaranteed right. 49 Only two forms of property owner-
-"2 See, e.g., Mao's speech to the important Congress of Communist and Workers' Par-
ties in Moscow in 1957, The Dialectical Method of Creating Unity within the Party (No-
vember 18, 1957), 10 CmNsE L. & Gov. 63, 63-66 (1977).
341 Oxnam, supra note 332, at 66. See, Leng, supra note 339, at 369-73.
344 The 1975 Constitution was shorter than the Constitution of 1954 and followed
rather closely drafts that were developed in 1970 and 1973. See Revised Draft of the Consti-
tution of the People's Republic of China (1973), in LINDSAY, supra note 272, at 312, 319
(1976). The major difference among the drafts was that the 1970 version specifically desig-
nated Lin Piao as Mao's successor while, following his purge and disappearance, the 1973
draft and the Constitution of 1975 omitted any reference to him.
"I The Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1975) [hereinafter cited as
P.R.C. Const. of 1975], in 1 SELECTED LEGAL DocuMENTs, supra note 286, at 68.
34 Art. 25. Id. at 85.
'7 See Cohen, supra note 328, at 240-44. P.R.C. Const. of 1975, arts. 14-15, in 1 SE-
LECTED LEGAL DocUMENTs, supra note 286, at 77-78.
34 See Chan & Unger, The Case of Li I-che, 10 CHNESE L. & Gov. 5 (1977).
141 P.R.C. Const. of 1975, art. 13, in 1 SELECTED LEGAL DocUMENTs, supra note 286, at
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ship remained under the constitution: state and collective. 50 Pri-
vate property had already been abolished by the people's commune
movement following the Hundred Flowers Campaign.351 The docu-
ment listed certain welfare rights but was silent on the previous
right of small artisans to own their means of production, and it
rejected a 1954 provision guaranteeing the right to change one's
residence. Of course, the rights listed in the 1954 constitution had
turned out to be fictional for the most part, at least after 1957.
Some of these same "rights" were incorporated into the 1975 con-
stitution, including freedom of speech, press, assembly, association,
demonstration, and a new right to strike. 52 However, in other re-
spects the 1975 constitution possessed a greater congruence to the
actual legal and political situation. The leadership of the Commu-
nist Party was emphasized throughout. The provision of the 1954
document guaranteeing a right to scientific, literary, and artistic
activity was replaced by the directive that such activities "must all
serve proletarian politics, serve the workers, peasants and soldiers,
and be combined with productive labour. 53 The promulgation of
the constitution was accompanied by a campaign to "restrict bour-
geois rights. ' "s
As was noted above, Communist constitutions are not law-mak-
ing documents. They are statements of the fundamental goals of
the regime. The proclaimed rights are rights only of the "people"
and are rights only for the strengthening of socialist society and
not for any anti-socialist purpose. When the goals of the regime
change, the constitution becomes irrelevant, or it is replaced. 55
Shortly after the death of Mao, the legal reformers purged the rad-
ical elements of the party (symbolized by the "Gang of Four")3 5 6
S5o Art. 5. Id. at 72.
351 Kato, supra note 226, at 431 n.12.
52 P.R.C. Const. of 1975, art. 28, in 1 SELECTED LEGAL DocuMENTs supra note 286, at
87.
353 Art. 12. Id. at 76.
34 Baum, Politics and the Citizen, in TERRILL, supra note 328, at 168.
3' See generally Rowe, The PRC's Constitutions and the Philosophy of Constitution-
alism, in LINDSAY, supra note 272, at 185 (discussing the evolution of the Chinese
Constitution).
"3 The "Gang of Four" was a group of radical leaders who exercised significant power
during and after the Cultural Revolution. They were Chiang Ch'ing, Chang Ch'un-chi'iao,
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and by 1978, had promulgated their own constitution.
In October 1976, the campaign against the Gang of Four was
launched. It signalled the beginning of the ascendancy of the legal
reformers. Hua Kuo-feng was designated the successor to Mao, but
after some time, it was clear that the twice purged and twice reha-
bilitated Teng Hsiao-p'ing directed, as Vice-Premier, the program
to purge the radical wing of the party, to modernize the economy,
and to develop the law.
True to the Chinese Communist tradition, the new movement
pursued its policies through a number of campaigns. The umbrella
campaign is known as the Four Modernizations: agriculture, indus-
try, defense, and science and technology. Originally urged by Chou
En-lai in 1975, the Four Modernizations has become the represen-
tative slogan of the new leadership. 57 At the same time, a second
major campaign was to purge the country of the influence of the
Gang of Four. That occurred after a great political struggle be-
tween contending factions after Chou En-lai's death in January,
1976.358 Although the campaign did not culminate in a public trial
of the four radicals until 1981, it was carried out vigorously in the
cities and countryside from 1976 onwards.
In exposing the terror of the Cultural Revolution, the leadership
almost universally criticized the actions of the Red Guards, the
Gang of Four, and radical officials, as "contrary to legality."
Throughout the nation the standard became obedience to the law,
both in terms of actions by party leaders and by administrative
officials.3 59 Although legal procedures have not been universalized
and although the regime continues to persecute those tagged as
"enemies of the people," the movement to structure the society
more along Romanist legal lines has continued. During the late
Wang Hung-wen, and Yao Wen-yuan. See generally Onate, Profiles: The Origins of the
Gang of Four, 10 AsiA FORUM 9 (1980).
357 See generally R. BAUM, CHINA'S FOUR MODERNISATIONS: THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
REVOLUTION (1980).
3" See generally Domes, The "Gang of Four" and Hua Kuo-feng: Analysis of Political
Events in 1975-76, 1977 CHINA Q. 473; Onate, Hua Kuo-feng and the Arrest of the "Gang of
Four," 1978 CHINA Q. 540.
31 Strengthen Legal System and Democracy, BEIJING (PEKING) REVIEW, July 6, 1979,
at 35.
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1970's universities and law schools reopened. Elderly law profes-
sors were rehabilitated and put to work teaching throughout the
country. National and regional judicial conferences were held to
move the country into legality. Posters, radio broadcasts, and mass
meetings exposed the "illegal" abuses of the Gang of Four. Re-
gional conferences were held to drum up support for a new legality.
Suppressed organizations were reborn, including the Legal Re-
search Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences and the Legal
Committee of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress.360 Foreign legal specialists arrived. Chinese students
were sent to law schools in Western countries. Even Chinese law
professors-in great demand at home-became visiting scholars at
American and other law schools. Once again, the government led
by Hua Kuo-feng announced the policy of "Let a hundred flowers
blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend," ' a phrase in-
corporated directly into the new constitution. 362 Hua, however,
cautioned that the renewed openness must "adhere to the six polit-
ical criteria"363 one of which requires that words and deeds "should
help to strengthen, and not shake off or weaken, the leadership of
the Communist Party."' '
The new legalists marked their ascent to power by promulgating
a new constitution in 1978. Containing twice as many articles as its
three-year old predecessor, the new constitution made some pro-
gress towards re-establishing legality in China.6 5 Even though
many provisions were retained from the Constitution of 1975,'36
the phrasing became more declaratory than hortatory. With but a
nod to the Cultural Revolution in the preamble (attacks on the
"0 Kato, supra note 226, at 436.
361 Hua Kuo-feng, Unite and Strive to Build a Modern, Powerful Socialist Coun-
try!-Report on the Work of the Government delivered at the First Session of the Fifth
National People's Congress on February 26, 1978, in 2 SELECTED LEGAL DocuMENTs, supra
note 286, at 79.
362 The Constitution of the People's Republic of China [hereinafter cited as P.R.C.
Const. of 1978], art. 14, in 2 SELECTED LEGAL DocuMENTs, supra note 286, at 139.
363 Hua Kuo-feng, supra note 361, at 79.
3 Id. at 117-18 n.5.
365 See, for example, the analysis in a pro-Peking Hong Kong journal: Ho Ming, On the
Way to the Rule of Law, 11 CnNE.sE L. & Gov. 115 (1978).
3 See generally Cohen, CINA'S CHANGING CONSTITUTION, supra note 285.
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Cultural Revolution itself would surface two years later), the Con-
stitution of 1978 re-established the judicial structure and the
procuracy. 36 7 The articles on human rights were expanded to in-
clude protection against arbitrary arrest and searches. 68 Article 55
provided:
Citizens have the right to lodge complaints with organs of
state at any level against any person working in an organ of
state, enterprise or institution for transgression of law or neg-
lect of duty. Citizens have the right to appeal to organs of
state at any level against any infringement of their rights. No
one shall suppress such complaints and appeals or retaliate
against persons making them.369
Although the Constitution of 1978 signalled a new turn to legal-
ism, it did not abjure many of the prime techniques of social con-
trol of the past. Hua Kuo-feng promised to "enforce dictatorship
over the reactionary classes and elements and all those who resist
socialist transformation and oppose socialist construction. ' 37 0 For
example, the educative function of show trials was maintained in
the new constitution. Article 41 declared, "[w]ith regard to major
counter-revolutionary or criminal cases, the masses should be
drawn in for discussion and suggestions. 3 7 1
The distinction between the people and the enemies of the peo-
867 P.R.C. Const. of 1978, arts. 41-43, in 2 SELECTED LEGAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 286,
at 161-63.
368 Art. 47. Id. at 165.
399 Id. at 168.
370 Hua Kuo-feng, supra note 361, at 90.
37 P.R.C. Const. of 1978, art. 41, in 2 SELECTED LEGAL DocUMEsrrs, supra note 286, at
161. The transitional nature of the Constitution of 1978 was revealed at the Eighth National
Conference on People's Judicial Work, called to drum up support for the new constitution.
There, Teng-kuei, member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee, spoke of the constitution in classic Maoist terms. He praised Chairman Mao's
leadership in the law and likewise found the extant legal system and the legal cadres wor-
thy. He called for exemplary mass trials against those causing "damage to the interests of
the state and people. . . ." Such trials "will delight the people," he said. At the conference,
Chi Teng-kuei also insisted that party leadership over judicial work had to be maintained
and that all had to adhere to the "mass line." Reportage on National Judicial Conference
Held in Peking, Foreign Brdadcast Information Service, Daily Report-People's Republic of
China [hereinafter cited as FBIS], May 31, 1978, at El-2. Soon, however, the emphasis on
legality became more protninent.
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ple was also maintained. As Hua put it "Dictatorship over the en-
emy and democracy among the people are the two inseparable as-
pects of the dictatorship of the proletariat. ' 37 2 The constitution
furthermore honestly admitted that "enemies" are not limited to
the residue of the bourgeoisie toppled in 1949, but included "new-
born bourgeois elements" as well.3 73 Hua himself demonstrated the
elasticity of the tag by calling Lui Shao-chi, Lin Piao, and the
Gang of Four all "bourgeois. ' '13 4
During the Cultural Revolution, the technique of big-character
posters was used to expose the enemies of the regime. Similarly,
suppressing the followers of the Gang of Four, the new leadership
made use of the same means of publicity. Thus, the right to write
big-character posters was retained in the constitution of 1978.375
But the practice grew out of hand. During the campaign against
the illegal or, more accurately, the non-legal abuses of the Gang of
Four, the regime faced a growing human rights movement in
China. In 1978 and 1979, a wall-poster campaign erupted. The au-
thors demanded increased democratic freedoms. They attacked in-
equalities, called for greater freedom of communication, criticized
leaders, exposed China's "Gulag," and showed sympathy to foreign
political systems. 76 Yet at the same time the authorities demon-
strated that they had grasped the principle that the legal system
could be adjusted or contracted to fit the needs of social control. In
1980, they amended out of the constitution the provision permit-
372 Hua Kuo-feng, supra note 361, at 91.
373 P.R.C. Const. of 1978, art. 18, in 2 SELECTED LEGAL DOcuMENTS, supra note 286, at
141.
,." Hua Kuo-feng, supra note 361, at 88. Parroting the propaganda line at the time, the
chief judge of the Chekiang Provincial People's Higher Court said, "The 'gang of four' were
skillful in 'disguising themselves as ultraleftists' to promote an ultrarightist line." Meeting
of Representatives, FBIS, supra note 371, May 31, 1978, at E7, E8. By 1980, the Gang of
Four were recharacterized as "Left deviationists." Why the Gang of Four's Was an Ultra-
Left Line, BEIJING (PEKING) REvIEw, Feb. 11, 1980, at 24. Later, Teng Hsiao-ping posthu-
mously rehabilitated Liu Shao-chi. Eternal Glory to Comrade Liu Shaogi, a Great Marxist
and Proletarian Revolutionary! Memorial Speech by Vice-Chairman Deng Xiaoping, BEIJ-
ING (PEKING) REVIEW, May 26, 1980, at 9.
371 P.R.C. Const. of 1978, art. 45, in 2 SELECTED LEGAL DoCuMENTs, supra note 286, at
164.




ting big-character posters. 7"
The legal ordering of society continued apace. Shortly after the
Constitution of 1978 was promulgated, a Chinese domestic broad-
cast declared that "to bring great order across the land and make
China a powerful, modern socialist country before the end of this
century, it is necessary to have a set of rules for managing the af-
fairs of state and strengthening the socialist legal system. '378 In
January, 1979, the Beijing (Peking) Review announced that
"[s]ome 30 codes and regulations need to be drafted right away. ' 379
The following month the regime published a law regulating arrest
procedures.380 In March, the regime echoed Stalin's dictum.
"There must be stability and continuity of laws, rules, and regula-
tions," declared the news magazine, paraphrasing Ye Jianying,
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress.381 An eight year National Program for the Study of Law
was commenced.38 2
On July 1, 1979, the National People's Congress of the People's
Republic of China promulgated seven new statutes. Two dealt with
the structure of the government. Five went directly towards estab-
lishing a new legal order. They were the Criminal Law, the Code of
Criminal Procedure, the Organic Law of the People's Courts, the
377Hsia, Book Review, 6 REv. SocLALmsT L. 524 (1980) (reviewing THE NEW CONSTITU-
TION OF COMMUNIST CHINA: COMPARATn ANALYSIS (M. Lindsay ed. 1976)). The human
rights movement in China represented a different form of dissent from that which the lead-
ership had previously known.
[T]he major way to express dissent in the Soviet Union has been to go outside the
system, to the underground and the foreign press. While underground protests
became important in the PRC in 1978-79, the chief approaches to the expression
of dissent there have remained either forming alliances with political factions in
the establishment or capitalizing upon opportunities available when the leadership
itself has allowed dissent for its own political purposes.
Goldman, Dissent in China, PROB. OF COMMUNISM, March-April 1982, at 58-59. See also
Dreyer, Limits of the Permissible in China, PROB. OF COMMUNISM, November-December
1980, at 48-65.
378 Meeting of Representatives, FBIS, supra note 278, May 31, 1978, at E7.
379 Jones, The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, 6 REv. SOCIALIST L.
405, 416 n.5 (1980).
38 Chiu,- Certain Problems in Recent Law Reform in the People's Republic of China,
Occasional Papers/Reprints'Series in Contemporary Asian Studies (No. 5, 1980).
38 Speeding the Work of Law-Making, BEIJING (PEKING) REvIEw, Mar. 2, 1979, at 3.
3"2 Macdonald, supra note 96, at 313.
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Organic Law of the People's Procuracies, and the Law on Joint
Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment.383
The purge of legal experts in China had had an effect on the new
codes. Despite the fact that the new Criminal Law was claimed to
have been the product of thirty-nine earlier drafts,84 there are evi-
dences of lacunae in the provisions, and many definitions are un-
clear.38 5 Yet, the Romanist form is present throughout. In fact, the
new Criminal Law appears to one observer to be "an abridged ver-
sion" of the 1935 Criminal Code of Nationalist China.86 The code
is replete with Western concepts. Punishments are delineated.387
The element of intent is required.388 Most of the specific offenses
are Romanist in formulation.38 9 Even the structure of the statute
follows the German example.390 Nonetheless, like the Criminal
Codes and Fundamentals of the U.S.S.R., the Criminal Law of the
P.R.C. is explicit on the requirement for state control of the soci-
ety. Article 2 declares:
The task of the criminal law of the People's Republic of
China is to use punishment to combat all counterrevolution-
38 The statutes went into effect on January 1, 1980. Those dealing with the govern-
mental structure were the Organic Law of the Local Peoples' Congresses and Local Peoples'
Governments at Various Levels, and the Electoral Law of the National Peoples' Congress
and Local Peoples' Congresses at Various Levels. Jones, supra note 379, at 405, 416 n.4. The
Chinese press joined in the movement. "We need protection of contracts, and thus must
enact a civil code." See Su Ching & Wang Chia-fu, A Civil Code Must Be Drafted, People's
Daily FBIS, supra note 371, Dec. 5, 1978, at E4. See also Speech by Chao Tsant-pi, Minister
of Public Security and Deputy Leader of the Central Political and Judicial Group, reported
in People's Daily (Oct. 29, 1978), reprinted in FBIS, supra note 371, Nov. 1, 1978, at El,
E4. Because of its importance to Western business interests, the Joint Venture Law has
received unusual attention. See, e.g., Comment, China's New Joint Venture Law: Analysis
and Economic Overview, 4 B.C. INr'L & Compu. L. REv. 115 (1981); Rich, Joint Venture in
China: The Legal Challenge, 15 INT'L LAW. 183 (1981); Shiao-Ming, China's New Law on
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, 34 Sw. L.J. 1183 (1981); Cf. Wan, A
Comparative Study of Foreign Investment Laws in Taiwan and China, 11 CALIF. W. IN'L
L.J. 236 (1981).
3" New Laws in Effect, BEIJNG (PEKING) REvIEw, Jan. 28, 1980, at 3.
" Jones, supra note 379, at 405.
3"Id.
38 The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, arts. 27-56, 7 REV. SocIAsT
L. 199, 204-07 (W. Chi trans. 1981).
3"Arts. 11-13. Id. at 202.
38 See, e.g., arts. 116-117, 121, 131, 133-135, 139-140. Id. at 214-17.
35 Jones, supra note 279, at 409.
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ary crimes and acts of criminal offenses, defend the dictator-
ship of the proletariat, and protect socialist property of the
whole people, property collectively owned by the workers, and
legitimate private property of citizens.3 9 1
A very large section of the law is devoted to counterrevolutionary
crimes including the outlawing of "big-character posters" and
"small-character posters" as well. 39 2 Finally, the Criminal Law per-
mits prosecution by analogy 93 thus differing from present-day So-
viet law and violating one of the most significant Romanist legal
principles. It is clear then that although China's new Criminal Law
is part of a restructuring of the society along Romanist lines, it
follows the Soviet example in containing fewer Western legal
norms than other parts of the emerging legal order.
The Code of Criminal Procedure and the Organic Law of the
People's Courts are more thoroughly Romanist.3 94 Provisions in-
clude a guarantee of equality before the law, procuratorial ap-
proval of public-security arrests, time limits on detention before
trial, the right to a defense and to a public trial, the requirement
that confessions must be verified, and a prohibition on appellate
courts increasing sentences.39 5 Only courts are permitted to try
cases. Shortly after the code was promulgated, the People's Daily
quoted a law professor who declared that the courts "must strictly
abide by the law, and must reject instructions and orders from any
301 The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, supra note 387, at 201. After
the passage of the criminal law and prior to its entering into force on January 1, 1980, the
Central People's Broadcast Station presented eleven lectures explaining the new criminal
code. Lectures on the Criminal Law, 13 CHINESE L. & Gov. 1 (No. 2, Summer 1980). The
lectures emphasized that "(t)he main attacking spearhead of China's Criminal Law is aimed
at counterrevolutionary elements, enemy agent elements, and other criminal elements." Id.
at 11.
30 The Criminal Law of The People's Republic of China, art. 145, supra note 387, at
217.
3,3Art. 79. The law does require approval for analogical prosecution from the Supreme
People's Court. Id. at 210.
3" See generally Zhang Sipei, Basic Principles of the Law of Criminal Procedure,
BELING (PEKING) REvmw, June 9, 1980, at 23.
3," Herbst, Book Reviev, 7 REv. SocALIsT L. 460-61 (1981) (reviewing PoLITICAL IM-
PRISONMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT
(1978)).
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organization other than the law." '98 Public security officials are ad-
monished to observe procedural requirements strictly.39 7 The
courts now have functioning civil and criminal chambers, as well as
economic chambers in cities with large populations.398
Following the promulgation of the seven new laws, the regime
continued to institute new legislation, including a Nationality Law
and laws and regulations on income tax, foreign exchange, off-
shore drilling, lawyers, and an Economic Contract Law."99 A notary
public system has been restored,4 0 0  and legal offices opened
throughout the country.401 More significantly, successive drafts of a
civil code have been circulated while university law departments
S8 Qiao Wei, Independent Judiciary, Adherence to Law, quoted in People's Daily,
FBIS, supra note 371, Jan. 9, 1979, at E-11.
3 Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 4. Jones, supra note 379, at 421 n.99. The policy of
the Code of Criminal Procedure was previewed in a 1978 editorial in the Anhwei Daily. "It
is necessary to give full play to the roles of the public security departments, procuratorate
and people's courts in coordinating with each other and also restraining each other. They
should work together to uphold the strictness of the legal system." Strengthen the Socialist
Legal System, Anhwei Daily, August 31, 1978, (Editorial) reported in FBIS, supra note 371,
Sept. 6, 1978, at G-3.
398 Kato, supra note 227, at 431. But see, Ellis & Shea, Foreign Commercial Dispute
Settlement in the People's Republic of China, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 155, 275 (1980-81), in
which the Chinese emphasis on informal dispute settlement seems likely to remain
dominant.
39' Texts of new laws may be found as follows: The Nationality Law of the People's
Republic of China, BEnNG (PEKING) Rzvmw, Oct. 6, 1980, at 17; The Income Tax Law of
the People's Republic of China concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign In-
vestment, id., Oct. 6, 1980, at 17-18; The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of
China Concerning Foreign Enterprises, id., Dec. 28, 1981, at 17; Rules Governing the Car-
rying of Foreign Exchange, Precious Metals and Payment Instruments in Convertible Cur-
rency Into or Out of China, id., at 19; Detailed Rules and Regulations for the Implementa-
tion of the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign
Enterprises, id., Apr. 5, 1982, at 20; Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the
Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum Resources in Co-operation With Foreign Enterprises,
id., Feb. 22, 1982, at 14. See He Bian, China's Lawyers, id., June 7, 1982, at 14, and Kato,
supra note 226, at 457, for a description of the law on lawyers. For an analysis of the Na-
tionality Law, see Ginsburgs, The 1980 Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China,
30 AM. J. Comp. L. 459 (1982). The new Economic Contract law is especially needed as
previously the contract itself was often the only positive legal document available to the
parties. Analysis of Chinese Contractual Policy and Practice, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 1229, 1242
(1981). For a discussion of modern tax enactments, see Pomp, Gelatt, & Surrey, The Evolv-
ing Tax System of the People's Republic of China, 16 Tx. IN 'L L.J. 11 (1981).
400 Notary Republic System, BELING (PEKING) REvIEw, Feb. 4, 1980, at 5.
401 He Bian, supra note 399, June 7, 1982, at 16.
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teach the principles of civil law, as well as "prescription, owner-
ship, contracts, torts, inheritance, patents and copyright. 402
The primary work of the newly established judicial system ap-
parently has been to review and rectify all the criminal "cases"
brought against persons during the era of the Gang of Four.403 The
propaganda organs of the regime continue to emphasize "equality
before the law" as central to the new legality. By that they mean
that party functionaries (particularly local party functionaries)
may not stand outside of the legal directives of the government.
But the government is extending the legal rule of equality to en-
compass the standard Western law requirements for imputing
guilt, viz., "no one can be prosecuted unless 1) objectively the act
endangered society; 2) subjectively the person involved committed
the act deliberately and [sic] through negligence; 3) the act fell
into categories stipulated by the criminal law as punishable.'' 404
There is even a debate in the Chinese press on whether to extend
the guarantee of equality to the legislative sphere where decrees
depriving persons of their social rights because of their member-
ship in an enemy class would be forbidden. If that comes to pass,
only persons who committed specified acts could be prosecuted.405
In addition, the Chinese are laying the theoretical groundwork
for accepting Romanist law forms into their Marxist society. It has
been argued in the Chinese press that the destruction of the legal
system after 1957 was harmful to China; that it is a legitimate
402 Kato, supra note 226, at 436, 441-42 n.59. For a summary of the present state of
civil law in China, see id. at 443-457.
403 In 1980, The Supreme People's Court made the astonishing claim that the people's
courts had re-examined 1.13 million cases including 270,000 "counter-revolutionary" cases
of which 175,000 were found to be without merit or with unduly harsh sentences. Report on
the Work of the Supreme People's Court (Excerpts), BEIJING (PEKING) REvIEw Oct. 6, 1980,
at 15.
404 NPC Official Discusses Equal Application of Law, Beijing XINHUA (English ed.),
Jan. 19, 1980, reported in FBIS, supra note 371, Jan. 21, 1980, at L-6.
405 Trends in Chinese Jurisprudence, BEIJING (PEKING) REVIEW, Apr. 6, 1981, at 14, 15.
Already by late 1978, a factory committee was chastised for having imposed a criminal pen-
alty on one of its members partly because of the "comrade's poor family background."
Three Wrong Convictions Reversed in Kweichow, Peking People's Daily, Aug. 23, 1978, re-
ported in FBIS, supra note 371, Sept. 6, 1978, at J-1. Another article stated, "The practice
of inequality in applying the law because of family status makes law exist in name only."
Some Current Problems in Drafting Law, FBIS, supra note 371, Dec. 26, 1978, at E-8.
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function of law to regulate "social relations" as well as being "an
instrument of class warfare"; that the concept of "presumption of
innocence," though bourgeois in origin, may not be contrary to the
"proletarian principle of seeking the truth" but may merely refer
"to the legal position of the accused prior to the trial"; and that
the nature of law permits some laws to be assimilable from previ-
ous regimes with different ruling classes. 48 This last principle jus-
tifies the tacit borrowing from the Kuomingtang codes of law. Af-
ter all, virtually all of the legal experts in China today were trained
before 1949 in European conceptions of law.
It is evident from the foregoing that China, like the Soviet
Union, has decided to utilize a Western, primarily Romanist, legal
form in ordering its society. This conclusion, however, is not with-
out some qualifications. The government has had difficulty in com-
pleting work on the civil and commercial codes. Drafts of the civil
code have been prepared and it is expected that the code will also
follow the Romanist model. But in China, as in Russia in the late
1950's, groups are debating whether to have one comprehensive
civil code or two, one to regulate the dying area of private relation-
ships while the other regulates the "socialist" segment.0 7 Others
argue that civil and economic laws should be enacted piecemeal as
the-need arises.408 In the commercial area also there is an apparent
dispute whether to make the code fashioned on a model analogous
to the U.C.C., or more like the European model which is a form of
corporation law. The Chinese are receiving significant legal advice
from American legal experts, which may explain the pressure for
the first alternative. On the other hand, the Chinese are entering
many joint ventures and Western companies are pressing for a
Chinese corporation law so that they know with what kind of en-
tity they are dealing. 40 9 In the meantime, the courts follow the
406 Trends in Chinese Jurisprudence, supra note 405, at 14-16. In November 1978, the
Institute of Jurisprudence of the Chinese Academy of Social Scientists declared, "We may
also undertake a comparative study of laws in capitalist countries, because they also contain
factors worth considering." Peking Meeting Discusses Legal System, Democracy, Peking
Domestic Service in Mandarin, FBIS, supra note 371, Dec. 1, 1978, at E9.
407 Trends in Chinese Jurisprudence, supra note 405, at 16.
408 Kate, supra note 226, at 442.
409 As with many indications of current (as of this writing) trends in China, one has to
rely on information gathered in conversations with the Chinese and with those who deal
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Maoist habit of basing their decisions on party policy in the ab-
sence of promulgated statutes.410
There is also a serious question as to whether China can produce
the infrastructure necessary to effectuate the legalization of soci-
ety. In 1957 there were approximately 3000 lawyers in China,'but
twenty years of persecution have taken a toll. Despite major efforts
to reopen law schools and train new lawyers, in 1981 the Chinese
counted only 6,200 full-time and 2,350 part-time attorneys. 11
These numbers are clearly insufficient to service a society of one
billion. The Chinese are attempting to expand the pool by giving
specialized legal training to people who already have expertise in
certain industries.1 2 At the same time, the effectiveness of the le-
gal reforms to reorder the society as the party wishes has not yet
come to fruition.413
The problem therefore remains: how far can legalization pro-
ceed? The regime seems to be using the traditional technique of
mass educational programs to help accomplish its objective, 4 but
the need for specific codes becomes evident for the success of the
legalization campaign. If the cadres of the party (many of whom
are still appointees of the Gang of Four) can be mobilized to follow
the letter of the law, then the society can be reformed, once again,
through education. Law will provide the unitary predictable stan-
dard of social control.415 Nonetheless, some observers suggest that
with them. Such is the source of the data tentatively put forward in the statements above.
See generally G. HsiAo, THE FOREIGN TRADE OF CHINM POLICY, LAW, AND PRACTICE (1977);
G. GINSBURGS, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF TRADE BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1976); V. LI, LAW AND PoLrIcS IN CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE (1977); LE-
GAL ASPECTS OF DOING BusNEss WITH CHINA (H. Holtzmann ed. 1976).
410 Kato, supra note 226, at 431. For a view that party policy is likely to remain unfet-
tered by the area of labor law, see Lewis & Ottley, China's Developing Labor Law, 59 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1165 (1982).
411 He Bian, supra note 399, at 16.
412 Id. at 16-17.
411 See Foster, supra note 315, at 425-27.
414 See, e.g., supra note 391, the broadcast lectures that accompanied the publication of
the criminal code. For a description of the mechanisms used to educate the populace in the
new legal forms, and a criticism of the asserted process of popular participation, see Foster,
supra note 315, at 419-24.
415 See comments and speculation by Jones, supra note 379, at 412-13. Frances Foster
has suggested that the legalization process has undergone seven stages since the death of
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the Chinese leadership may be abandoning its goal "of promulgat-
ing all-inclusive legislation. '416 There is no doubt that there has
been a waning in the momentum of the legalization drive, but this
does not necessarily indicate a withdrawal from the technique of
using legal codes as the preferred mechanism of social control. The
Chinese have just begun the codification process. It took the Soviet
Union a full twenty years after Stalin's 1936 Constitution even to
begin to launch a thorough campaign of modern codification. The
Chinese do not yet possess the legal infrastructure that the Soviets
had at that time. They also have a longer period of "anti-legality"
as part of their history to overcome. It seems more likely that the
current hesitation to further codification in China is tactical rather
than strategic. 17
As in the codified Soviet Union, the government will continue to
dispense with the requirements of the legal system for certain po-
litical objectives. The Communists see no contradiction between
this practice and legality. The highly publicized trial of the Gang
of Four, for example, contained serious legal deficiencies through-
out.418 The Chinese also continue to utiliz~e the technique of the
mass trial in a new campaign to prosecute officials for economic
crimes. Here the government has reverted to the traditional bifur-
cation of law and punishment (fa) on the one hand and education
(1i) on the other. "The stress is on big and serious cases," the Beij-
Mao, the most recent of which has "discredited" the "[s]upremacy of law" in favor of the
directives of the party leadership. Foster, supra note 315, at 409-10. It is the contention of
this paper that no Communist leader, Chinese or Soviet, has ever acknowledged the
"supremacy" of law. Legal forms have been and continue to be a mechanism of control by
the party. They are not seen (by the present leaderships) as antithetical to the dictatorial
role of the party. Foster herself properly notes in the conclusion to her article that China's
laws "are articulated party policies given concrete legal form through an elaborate indirect
drafting process." Id. at 428. See Su Ching & Wang Chip-fu, FBIS, supra note 379, at E-4,
calling for economic laws to force "leading comrades" to fulfill contracts and implement
state policies.
4"16 Foster, supra note 315, at 425.
417 For a thoughtful agnostic view on the tactical versus strategic issue, see Jones, Re-
flections on the Modern Chinese Legal System, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 1221 (1982).
418 See, Chiu, Certain Legal Aspects of the Recent Peking Trials of the "Gang of
Four" and Others, in J. Hsiung, Symposium: The Trial of the Gang of Four and Its Impli-




ing (Peking) Review reported.
The law must be strictly enforced to punish offenders who
have done serious damage to the economy, no matter who
they are. . .[I]t is absolutely impermissible for anyone to try
to shield them or plead for lenient treatment. Anyone who
violates this principle will be held responsible and punished
accordingly.
As for minor cases, the offenders should be dealt with
mainly through education... 419
Even during the trial of the Gang of Four, the government lamely
excused Mao's actions on the traditional ground that they were
"mistakes" and not "crimes. '420
Hand in hand with the drive for more law has been a campaign
against those who would espouse individualist values. Teng Tsiao-
ping himself announced a new campaign against liberalization in
early 1980.421 Recently, spokesmen for the government have de-
cried that the "bourgeois ideological tendency" is "consciously or
unconsciously demanding China forsake the socialist road and in-
stall the so-called capitalist liberal system in the political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural arenas.' 22 Lawyers are instructed that
their "first duty is to find the truth and uphold the law, not to
protect a guilty client from legal prosecution.' 23 A new marriage
law further weakens the family unit as a possible competitor to the
state.
424
419 Decision on Combating Economic Crimes, BEIJING (PEKING) REVIEW, Apr. 26, 1982,
at 9.
420 "Mistakes are matters where criticism and education come in, where one should
draw lessons from them and accept Party and government disciplinary measures, whereas in
the case of a criminal offence, a person shall bear criminal responsibility for his offence and
is punishable by law." In The Trial Doesn't Involve Chairman Mao, BEUNG (PEKING) RE-
vIEw, Jan. 3, 1981, at 3, the news organ stated that the Central Committee officially took
note of Mao's "mistakes" six months later. On Questions of Party History-Resolution on
Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic
of China (June 27, 1981), reprinted in BEnNG (PEKING) Rnvmw, July 6, 1981, at 10, 23-24.
421 Opposes Further Liberalization, Hong Kong AFP (English ed.), Jan. 18, 1980, re-
ported in FBIS, supra note 371, Jan. 21, 1980, at L-14.
422 Hu Qiaomu on Bourgeois Liberalization and Other Problems, BEIJING (PEKING) RE-
viEw, June 7, 1982, at 20.
43 He Bian, supra note 399, at 14.
424 See China's Marriage Law, reprinted in BELJING (PEKING) REVIEW, Mar. 16, 1981, at
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The capstone of the process of legalization for political control is
yet another constitution, a draft of which was published in May,
1982 and adopted on December 4, 1982.425 The regime stated that
the values of the Cultural Revolution were still present even in the
Constitution of 1978. Consequently, a new document is needed. 26
The new Constitution makes more formal the state decision-
making structure. It provides for equality before the law, the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, and forbids extra-legal detention or ar-
rest.427 Foreign enterprises are allowed, as permitted by legislation;
the two forms of socialist real property are maintained; and citi-
zens are permitted to retain personal property. 28 On the other
hand, individual rights are much more severely restricted. The
right to use "big-character" posters remains absent and the right
to strike is deleted.429 The new charter permits criticism of the
government, but "fabrication or distortion of facts with the inten-
tion of libel or frame-up is prohibited.' '43 0 Freedom of religion is
much more severely restricted: "No one may make use of religion
to . . . interfere with the educational system of the state. '43 1 In a
restriction targeted against the Catholic Church, the Constitution
declares, "Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to
any foreign domination."'4 2 The new Constitution is evidence of
how seriously the Chinese are pursuing their drive for legalization
as a mechanism of political control. The Constitution is seen as
setting primary norms of national policy to which law must always
remain subservient. Article 5 declares that "No law or administra-
tive or local rules and regulations shall contravene the Constitu-
24.
425 Draft of the Revised Constitution of the People's Republic of China (April 21,
1982), reprinted in BEIJING (PEKING) REviEw, May 10, 1982, at 27. Constitution of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, reprinted in BEIJING (PEKING) REVIEw, Dec. 27, 1982, at 10 [herein-
after cited as Const. of P.R.C.].
428 See Draft of Revised Constitution Made Public, BEIJING (PEKmG) REVIEW, May 3,
1982, at 5, and Hu Sheng, On the Revision of the Constitution, id. at 15.
427 Draft of Revised Constitution Made Public, supra note 426, at 5. Const. of P.R.C.,
arts. 33, 37, 126, supra note 425, at 16, 28.
428 Const. of P.R.C., arts. 6, 10, 13, supra note 425, at 13.
429 Hu Sheng, supra note 426, at 17.
420 Const. of P.R.C., art. 41, supra note 425, at 17.




tion," and no person or organization is "above the Constitution
and the law. 4 33 No mechanism for enforcement of these norms,
however, is provided for.
Even deprivations of human freedoms are reflected in constitu-
tional provisions. Disturbance of the state economic plan is prohib-
ited.434 The state "combats capitalist, feudalist, and other decadent
ideas.' 4 5 Work, education, family planning, and national unity are
constitutional duties, as is the obligation "not to commit acts det-
rimental to the security, honour and interests of the mother-
land.' ' 3  No citizen may exercise any right or freedom which in-
fringes the interests of the state.437
In sum, we can see that China is pressing forward with the use of
Western legal forms while restricting individual freedoms at the
same time. The government seems to be relying on educative cam-
paigns to impress the legal norms on the people and the bureau-
cracy. But where need arises, the party has little hesitation to
avoid legal procedures, to use trials as techniques of mass propa-
ganda, and to revert to the traditional distinction between mistake
and crime.
It is ironic that Chinese history actually presented a more highly
developed Romanist legal system to the Communists than that
which the Tsars bequeathed to the Bolsheviks. Yet the Chinese
took much longer in turning to it. The Tsars' movements towards
Romanism had been haphazard, and where progress was made, in
the early nineteenth century for example, it was often later re-
tracted. Indeed, the model the Soviets used for their civil code was
an unpromulgated draft of $he Duma.
On the other hand, the Chinese had greater experience not only
with hierarchical codes, and with a structured judiciary, but the
Nationalists had developed a fully Romanist system for China by
1935. Of course, the very fact that it was the Kuomintang's system
I'l Const. of P.R.C., art. 5, supra note 425, at 12-13.
4" Const. of P.R.C., art. 15, supra note 425, at 14.
411 Const. of P.R.C., art. 24, supra note 425, at 15.
411 Const. of P.R.C., arts. 42, 46, 49, 52 & 54, supra note 425, at 17-18.
437 Const. of P.R.C., art. 51, supra note 425, at 18.
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obviously made it distasteful to Mao, but the reasons for his rejec-
tion go deeper than that.
The Russians faced the issue of doing away with their codes in
the 1930's, while the Chinese faced the question of adopting them
in the 1950's. Yet for both states, the response went against the
contemporary direction of thought. Stalin reversed a growing con-
sensus among his legal scholars, and Mao did the same with oppo-
site results. There may have been a personal element in each deci-
sion, for the only organized groups with a coherent and mutually
supporting ideology were the legal confraternities. In both China
and Russia, their public autonomy necessarily infringed on Stalin's
and Mao's respective control.
But the real control aimed at was societal, not merely factional.
For Stalin, the state could not afford to be weak. Contradictions
among the people could only be measured and controlled through
their external behavior. Perhaps knowing that the Bolshevik take-
over was fundamentally opportunistic and not determined by the
objective forces of history, Stalin wished to use all means possible
to maintain the regime's sway. Despite all that has been written on
the Soviet desire to create a "new Socialist man, '38 the legal struc-
ture confirmed by Stalin fundamentally and primarily seeks to
channel the external behavior of the citizen into predictable and
manipulable patterns.3 9
Mao's Chinese heritage, on the other hand, taught him that
revolution must be internal. He believed that any threat to the
new regime could only come from the minds of the people. For
him, the contradictions were those of an internal struggle, not ex-
ternal. Using the ancient Chinese example of li, but transforming
it to suit a new totalitarian need, Mao increased his anti-legalist
campaign. He rejected codes for fear that they would take control
of the revolution out of his hands. Despite the failure of the Great
Leap Forward, he continued to attack legal forms throughout the
48 See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 3, at 284.
4"9 "[F]ar from eliminating crime, socialism has in fact created new categories of crimi-
nal conduct." Shelley, Crime and Punishment Under Socialism, PROB. OF COMMUNISM, July-
August 1982, at 71.
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Cultural Revolution and beyond. When that too ended in economic
and political chaos, the legalist faction regrouped and consolidated
power upon the death of the revolution's leader. If the current
drive for legalization fails, and if there is a reversion to Maoism, it
will come partly from the persistence of the traditional Chinese
pattern of inculcating values internally coupled with the dynamic
of Communist totalitarianism.
Although the current leaders of China deny any connection with
the "social-imperialist clique" that rules Russia, the fact is that
they have today opted for the Soviet model. Romanist forms are to
be used to cement political control. True, there are variations. The
Chinese do not have the legal infrastructure that the Russians
have. They will rely more on local bodies to enforce the new legal
norms. The Chinese are still far behind the Soviet Union in legisla-
tion. But whatever the differences, the two legal systems are now
variations on a single type. China and the Soviet Union have made
Western forms of law a central feature of their architecture of
dictatorship.
VII. DICTATORSHIP, LAW, AND FREEDOM
As the Communists have adopted Romanist law into their re-
spective systems, the question always asked, particularly by aca-
demics in the West, is, "Do they mean it?" Western observers have
been perplexed because they (like Marx) have presumed the basic
incompatibility between the values underlying Western law and
the exigencies of dictatorship. The suspicion arises that the forms
of law used by the Communists are merely part of a propaganda
scheme directed both at their people and at the West. There is
doubt whether the Communists can make their reforms work even
if they are serious about them. And there is the hope that the
adoption of Western law will eventually modify, if not undermine,
the power base of the regime. To these questions the Russian and
Chinese leaders have given answers. Yes, they really mean to insti-
tute the reforms. Yes, they intend to make them effective through-
out their societies. No, they do not expect to be undermined by
Western values.
To begin with, the foregoing history reveals that the decision of
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the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. to structure their law along Romanist
lines was a conscious choice. There was nothing automatic about
the acceptance of Western forms. The reforms occurred after much
struggle and bloodshed. Yet, at first sight, it might have seemed
that one or another of the alternatives would have been preferable.
Customary, imperial, and Marxist forms of law were available.
For centuries, the Russian Tsars and the Chinese emperors had
successfully ruled over a large peasantry by utilizing a legal struc-
ture that incorporated customary norms. But with the exception of
the mir, or village, which is only a ghostly backdrop to the collec-
tivist structure of Soviet agriculture, there is little left of the cus-
tomary peasant legal structure. In fact, Stalin's policy towards the
Russian landowning peasant was nothing less than an economic
war of extermination for the purpose of industrialization. 44 The
Bolshevik revolution itself was built on a different base: the peas-
ants belonged to a rival socialist party. It is not inconceivable that
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union could have taken the
volost legal structures of the peasantry and adapted them to con-
trol of the party, while utilizing other forms of law for the indus-
trial sector of society. Yet the Bolshevik leaders made little effort
to harness the customary structures of the peasantry to the revolu-
tion's purposes. Capitalist legal forms were more acceptable than
feudal.
The Chinese Communists were more open to customary forms.
They did try to adopt the traditional li-fa distinction to their ends.
By using the local mediative mechanisms for those amenable to re-
education and reserving the more formal legal adjudications for ex-
emplary punishment of the ideologically incorrigible, the Commu-
nist leadership utilized a customary form familiar to the Chinese.
The customary form, however, contained little of the customary
values. In the effort to impregnate Communist values into Chinese
society, the implicit battle against the Confucian ethos became ex-
plicit during and after the Cultural Revolution. Now, however, the
present leadership seems bent on reversing the customary formula
of using fa to supplement Ii. Instead, the leadership is establishing
4 1 Osofsky, supra note 249, at 1071.
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a formal structure of fa to be internalized by 1i type educative
measures. Excepting the Kuomintang era, the values of the legal-
ists have not been so dominant in China for over two thousand
years.
Both Communist states have utilized some parts of the imperial
model in their style of governance. In Russia, decretal law was the
norm until the late 1950's when Romanist codes and statutes be-
gan progressively displacing that mode. Recently, the drive for the
collection, and organization, the digesting and publication of the
tens of thousands of decrees has continued, although the regime is
still reluctant to jettison its right to pass secret decrees.
Similarly, the Chinese Communists long have continued to use
the Chinese imperial model of having the judiciary as part of the
central bureaucracy staffed by loyal functionaires. The pressure of
the legalists to give the judicial process a major measure of inde-
pendent adjudicatory authority based on Western legal norms has
now reached a new level and is being fostered by the present re-
gime. In both countries, then, Western' forms are now more domi-
nant than imperial forms.
The third alternative, the Marxist, was vigorously attempted, yet
it too was found inadequate. For the first fifteen years, Marxist
principles directed the legal development of the Soviet Union. Im-
mediately after the revolution, the period of war communism
swept away the previous regime's laws. The Bolsheviks waged war
against the displaced classes by direct decree and direct action. In
the NEP, when capitalism was partially restored, bourgeois codes
of the Romanist type were instituted. Following the NEP when the
codes fell into desuetude, Soviet legal experts devised new codes to
reflect more accurately the stage of the class struggle that they be-
lieved the country was entering. Pashukanis created a sophisti-
cated jurisprudential theory for the new legality. The Marxist le-
galists expected the new codes and law itself would gradually
disappear as the class struggle waned.
Similarly in China, the Communist Party ruled by a form of war
communism during the first few years after its ascension to power.
A weaker NEP-type period followed, which was accompanied by
[Vol. 32
WESTERN LAW AND COMMUNISM
the beginnings of Romanist law structures. But then China re-
verted to a long period of renewed war communism, pursuing the
party's class enemies by direct action and by recurring purges. Law
and legal process were themselves objects of attack. Unlike in Rus-
sia, however, the Chinese radicals were able to cap their policy by
their own radical Constitution of 1976. In fact, during the Maoist
period, Chinese law reflected Pashukanis' theories more than So-
viet law ever did.441 Now, however, China has made an about-face.
The government echoes Stalin's words that it needs "stability of
laws now more than ever." It too is restructuring its society along
Romanist law lines.
The reason for the choice made by both states is now evident.
The Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. chose West-
ern legal structures because those forms seemed a superior and
more sophisticated mechanism to gain control of the society and
direct it to desirable policies. The motivation is Leninist, although
the form the law took might have surprised him.
It is true that the policies of the current leadership fly in the
face of the received views of Marx. He had said, for example, in
1849,
[S]ociety does not depend on the law. That is a legal fiction.
The law depends rather on society, it must be an expression
of society's communal interests and needs, arising from the
material mode of production, and not the arbitrary expression
of the will of the single individual. I have here in my hands
the Code Napoleon, but it is not the Code which created
modern bourgeois society. Instead, it is bourgeois society, as it
originated in the eighteenth century and underwent further
development in the nineteenth century, which finds its merely
legal expression in the Code. As soon as the Code ceases to
correspond to social relations, it is no more than a bundle of
paper.442
Instead of bearing witness to Marx's prediction, the modem Soviet
and Chinese leaders have adopted Romanist codes for the same
441 Hsiao, supra note 327, at 1059-60 (1965).
442 Marx's speech in his defense at the "Trial of the Rhineland District Committee of
Democrats," 1849, quoted in P. PHmIu's, MARx AND ENGELS ON LAW AD LAWS 187 (1980).
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reason that Napoleon did: it helps to consolidate power at the
center. With hierarchical codes and regularized procedures, the
patterning of human action can be better calculated and directed.
"Socialist law is one of the most effective means by which the pol-
icy of the Party and state is carried out," states a current Soviet
legal writer.44 s
As Napoleon needed to reduce the power of the provinces, so the
two Communist leaderships seek uniformity throughout their re-
spective nations. Regularity and uniformity provide a basis for effi-
cient manipulation. The call for "the precise observation and ful-
fillment by all government and non-government bodies, officials
and individuals of Soviet laws and enactments based upon
them"444 is but one more tool to make the government's policies
effective.445 So long as the government remains above the law with
the absolute power to shrink it or modify it, then the objectives of
state policy are more efficiently achieved.
The leaders of Russia and China seem less concerned than are
Western scholars about their contradicting Marx. Most of those in
the party who were perturbed by the acceptance of Western law
have been eliminated. Nor does legal opinion in either country
seem much exercised by the problem. Soviet writers continue to
cling to the line that the new extensive legal structure is still prefa-
tory to the final withering of the state and law in the communist
ending to history.448 They asiert that law's purpose is educative,
that the Soviet man will internalize all its values so that the exter-
nal compulsion of the state will no longer be necessary. 447 But the
elite remains outside of the rule of law and must remain so if it is
to oversee the re-education of those who are its subjects. As a re-
443 V. CHKHIKVADZE, THE STATE, DEMOCRACY, AND LEGALITY IN THE U.S.S.R.: LENIN'S
IDEAs TODAY 47 (1976).
44 Id. at 322.
44 V. CHALJDZE, To DEFEND THESE RIGHTS 4 (1974).
446 For an excellent survey of such Soviet apologetics, see Funk, Lessons of Soviet Ju-
risprudence: Law for Social Change Versus Individual Rights, 7 IND. L. REv. 449, 453-66
(1974).
47 Id. at 466-76. Funk reveals the tension between the value of the rule of law, and the
use of legal mechanisms for authoritative educative purposes. Id. at 494-95. See also
BERMAN, supra note 3, at 282. Cf. Hildebrand, The Sociology of Soviet Law: The Heuristic
and "Parental" Functions, 22 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 157 (1971).
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suit, "the program of Soviet jurisprudence becomes locked" in the
stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 48 One Soviet legal phi-
losopher, V. Chkhikvadze, distinguishes between a law's "essence"
and its "content." He refuses to accept the offer by Western
Sovietologists to divide Soviet law into a Romanist form and a so-
cialist content. Form and content are indistinguishable in law, he
asserts. The "essence" of the law he defines as its class basis, i.e.,
the proletarian dictatorship. The law's content, however, can
change according to the social requirements at any particular time
and place. 4 9
For its part, contemporary Chinese legal philosophy divides law
into two categories. One is the element directed at class suppres-
sion. The other element orders social relations no matter what the
particular social system.450 They do not seem to worry that Marx
may have been concerned only about the first form of law.
It is also evident that China and the Soviet Union are serious
about the degree to which law is to order the whole society. The
U.S.S.R. has had decades to develop the infrastructure to staff its
complex legal system. Its legislative program has not abated. The
Chinese have just begun. Woefully understaffed, the Chinese re-
gime seems to be attempting to short-circuit the process by having
law impressed upon the society through mass education cam-
paigns. Of course a palace coup by the anti-legalists could change
China's policy overnight, but the present regime appears to be
committed to the legalization of social and economic relations
throughout the society.
The Communists are much more concerned with preventing the
infiltration of Western ideas of rights than they are with fidelity to
the Marxian theory of law. For the most part, both China and Rus-
sia have succeeded in keeping the situation well under control.
Modern Soviet jurisprudential theory discounts the danger of con-
tamination by Western values. As Chkhikvadze puts it, "Under so-
448 Funk, supra note 446, at 497. See generally J. STONE, SOCIAL DIMNSIONS OF LAW
AND JUSTICE (1966).
449 CHKHIKVADZE, supra note 443, at 262-63.
450 Trends in Chinese Jurisprudence, supra note 405, at 14-15.
1983] 229
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
cialism individual freedom is based upon the identity of personal
and social interests and upon the unity of rights and obliga-
tions.' 4 51 This means that "[o]nly those who contribute to the
common cause in accordance with their abilities and who observe
discipline and public order have the right to make demands upon
society. 4 52 In both Russia and China, as legalization has pro-
ceeded, the campaign against dissidents has increased.453
Throughout his book, Chkhikvadze lays the basis of contempo-
rary Soviet law at the feet of Lenin. Yet Lenin, though a lawyer,
was ambivalent about the form that law should take in a revolu-
tionary state.45 He seemed to prefer simple adjudicative struc-
tures. He even echoed the Marxist view that law would progres-
sively wither with the diminishing need for suppression of the
enemy classes.455 But Lenin showed no uncertainty in the reason
for law. To the question, "What is Law?" Lenin's reply was, "The
expression of the will of the classes which have emerged victorious
and hold the power of the state. 4 5' But, Lenin emphasized, for the
will of the state to be maintained, it "must be expressed in the
form of a law established by the state. Otherwise the word 'will' is
an empty sound."'457 In Soviet legal theory, the will of the state is
the will of the ruling class, the proletariat, though, of course the
state is not the sum of individual proletarian wills but an "ab-
stracted" Rousseauean-type will perceived and articulated by the
party. For Marxism-Leninism, therefore, law in its essence is not
merely coercive. It is suppressive.
The true father of modern Soviet law, then, is Joseph Stalin. He
froze it in its suppressive state and reversed Marx's and Lenin's
" CHKIKVADZE, supra note 443, at 221.
452 Id. at 220.
43 Chkhikvadze explains it thus: "The further Soviet society advances towards commu-
nism, the more acute becomes the reaction to every case of lawlessness and arbitrary ac-
tion." Id. at 326.
45 As Robert Sharlet puts it, there were "several Lenins." Sharlet, Legal Policy under
Khrushchev and Brezhnev: Continuity and Change, in SovIwr LAW AFTER STALIN, supra
note 244, at 320.
45' See generally V. LENto, STATE AND REvOLUTION (2d ed. 1932), and analysis in
JUvILR, supra note 180, at 17.
4 13 V. LENIN, CoLLECTD WORKS 327, quoted in CHKHIKVADZE, supra note 443, at 265.
457 25 V. LmNm, COUECTED WORKS 90, quoted in CHKHiKvADzE, supra note 443, at 265.
[Vol. 32
WESTERN LAW AND COMMUNISM
earlier view of its progressive simplification, informality, and evap-
oration.458 Instead, Stalin justified his actions by calling on a
sterner Leninist definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat as
"the legally unlimited dominance of the proletariat over the bour-
geoisie, resting on violence, and enjoying the sympathy and sup-
port of the toiling and exploited masses."45 9 But even in regard to
the "toiling and exploited masses," the law exercises a control to
direct them to accomplish the objectives set by the state. Such a
state is not designed to wither except when the ever distant goal of
the stage of communism is achieved. Rather, for Brezhnev as much
as for Stalin, law's function is to consolidate the Soviet state even
further."0 Consequently, "Soviet legal science rightly holds that
the victory of socialism does not mean the 'winding up' or 'wither-
ing away' of regulation by means of the law. On the contrary, the
role of law in Soviet society is growing." 6 1
In one way, however, the role of Soviet law is in harmony with
the classical views of Marx and Lenin. The Soviet leadership con-
tinues to operate on a two class basis: the party and the people.
458 Lenin himself moved towards a more "realistic" view of law's capabilities during the
NEP. Sharlet, supra note 454, at 320.
' J. HA ARA, SovIwT LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 303-04 (1951).
480 CHKHIKVADZE, supra note 443, at 224. Robert Sharlet describes the change in legal
policy that followed Stalin as movement from the "prerogative" to the "normative." Sharlet,
supra note 454, at 319. Yet it was Stalin who saw the control function of law. Although his
own personality led him to weigh the balance of Soviet law on the "prerogative" side, his
successors have only taken his insights on the uses of the "normative" and extended them
beyond the inefficiencies of Stalin's prerogative sphere. This is not to say that Stalin's suc-
cessors have given up on the prerogative. It remains a central aspect of their rule, expand-
able whenever the instituted law falls short of their aims. As Professor Juviler states, "One
feels that the recent Party leaderships do not appreciate the rule of law or legality as inher-
ently good (where have we heard that before?) but, rather, as long as and in ways that
enhance their authority, social stability, economic and community discipline." Juviler, Some
Trends in Soviet Criminal Justice, in 3 Sovwr LAw AMR STALIN, supra note 253, at 80.
It can be seen that the debate between F.H. Lawson and Rene David over whether
Marxism has "transformed the Romanist base" of Soviet law is a bit beside the point. The
Romanist structures are substitutes for Marxist structures, but they are used to further
Stalinist ends, i.e., purposes Marx thought would only be present in late capitalism or possi-
bly soon after the capitalist overthrow. See J. Hazard, Soviet Law and Western Legal Sys-
tems, Parker School of Comparative Law, Columbia School of Law 5 (rev. 2d ed. 1970)
(unpublished materials).
481 CHKHIKVADZE, supra note 443, at 308.
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Using a formula of "he who is not with us is against us,"462 the
leadership treats the Soviet people as a subjugated class. The party
hierarchy possesses the mechanisms of the law that Marx and
Lenin described as necessary to maintain control over a people
presumed to be antagonistic to the position of the party.4 3 It is no
exaggeration to note that the history of the U.S.S.R. since 1917 is a
history of a government at war with its people, even when the peo-
ple were not at war with the government. But with the modern
structures of law at its disposal, the government has achieved con-
trol with far less blood.
Stalin is hardly mentioned in official Soviet publications any
longer, despite the political and legal debt the current leadership
owes him. In Mao's China, Stalin was constantly glorified even
though Mao rejected the mechanism of law to control the popu-
lace. Only now is the Chinese government belatedly adopting the
Stalinist model. Where Mao had declared in a curious reversal of
the American adage, "Depend on the rule of man, not on the rule
of law, ' "4 China's current leaders believe that the rule of man can
better be accomplished by the rule of law.
At the beginning of the current drive for legalization, Hua Kuo-
feng declared, "It is essential to strengthen the socialist legal sys-
tem if we are to bring about great order across the land."4 5 As in
Russia, the Chinese have used the law to rationalize control, while
at the same time further restricting individual freedoms. The pub-
lic Lectures on the Criminal Law emphasized throughout the goal
of combating counter revolutionary justice.4"6 Lawyers are required
to "find the truth and uphold the law" and not protect the
guilty.467 Even party propaganda statements are parallel in the two
countries. Where Leonid Brezhnev said that there is "no place" in
Soviet society for "those who harm society, be they roughneck or
criminal, bureaucrat or layabout, parasite or misappropriator of
462 CHALIDZE, supra note 445, at 19.
463 See generally BESANCON, THE RISE OF THE GULAG (1981).
4" Leng, supra note 339, at 356.
466 Hua Kuo-feng, supra note 361, at 92.
466 Lectures on Criminal Law, 13 CHINESE L. & Gov. 6 (1980).
4167 He Bian, supra note 401, at 14. See also supra note 423 and accompanying text.
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public property, ' 468 Hua Kuo-feng had said, "We must also exer-
cise dictatorship over new bourgeois elements, thieves, swindlers,
murderers, arsonsists, criminal gangs, smash-and-grabbers and
other scoundrels who seriously disrupt public order."' 469 Both re-
gimes have maintained the capacity to pursue their domestic ene-
mies outside of the legal framework if necessary. There is no indi-
cation that the state leadership is becoming imprisoned in its own
legal structure.
What has the effect been of the Soviet and now Chinese use of a
Westernized legal system? To answer this question is no easier
than to answer the question, for example, what has the effect been
of the Napoleonic Code on French society. We may essay a few
indications, however, knowing they remain tentative pending qual-
ified long term studies.
First, if the Soviet Union and China believed or believe that the
Western codes will markedly assist a dramatic economic develop-
ment, then there has been a serious miscalculation. It is true that
if the basic economic and other relationships between and among a
state and its people are ordered by predictable and rational stan-
dards, productivity will certainly be greater than in a chaotic state
of arbitrary and terrorizing changes in party decree. The period
during and since the Cultural Revolution has proven that. But be-
yond these basics, there is little evidence of any growing strength
in the Soviet economy, which unlike the Chinese has had many
years to operate under these legal rules. 7 0 Indications are that the
Soviet Union has increasingly serious and fundamental economic
dislocations with which to contend. As in the West, economic pol-
icy is variable in relation to the form of the law. Romanist legal
structures can accommodate a state run economy as well as a free
market economy.
The Soviet and Chinese leaderships may, however, be reaping a
different form of benefit. It has frequently been noted that law has
468 CHKHIKVADZE, supra note 443, at 283.
4'9 Hua Kuo-feng, supra note 361, at 90.
470 In fact, it is more true that economic policy is at the behest of political objectives




a legitimizing function. Where it is authoritative, rational, public,
and creates basic order, the promulgating agency gains legitimacy.
Since legitimacy on the stage of history is the primary goal for all
revolutionary Communist regimes, such a benefit is to be highly
prized. Furthermore, revolutionary regimes such as the Napoleonic
frequently seek to gain legitimacy from their adverseries by adopt-
ing their adversaries' own symbols of authority. If that be the case,
then Stalin's constitution and the triumph of the legalists in China
were significant achievements. It should be noted, however, that
the gains in domestic legitimacy have been compromised by the
deep and continuing cynicism that pervades Chinese and Soviet
society. There is no indication that the people may revolt. Cyni-
cism is different from outrage. But neither is there much evidence
that the enthusiastic unalienated socialist man has yet to arrive,
despite all the unending beatific smiles we see in Communist gov-
ernment publications. 47 1
Finally, might there be an infiltration in Soviet and Chinese cul-
ture of the very values that underlay the development of law in the
West? Will the Soviet and Chinese citizen come to internalize
those values we include in the concept of due process? Will he be-
gin to see himself as an individual entitled in law to equality of
treatment and to a recognition that without explicit legal reason
his voluntarist actions should be respected? At present, despite the
constitutional guarantees, and despite the U.S.S.R.'s international
obligations, "[iln Soviet law there is no procedure for defending
one's constitutional right in court if this right is not repeated in
another law for which a judicial procedure for its defense is pro-
vided. 47 2 It is possible that in time, the normative presuppositions
behind Western law may turn increasing cynicism into an articul-
able demand for a different kind of government. But a frank exam-
ination does not indicate that the dissidents are folk heroes to any
important segment of Russian or Chinese society. The proper an-
swer to the question of the long term effects of Western law on
Communist political society is beyond the scope of this study. At
47' See Boim, Ombudsmanship in the Soviet Union, 22 AM. J. CoMP. L. 509, 538 (1974).
472 Chalidze, Human Rights in the New Soviet Constitution, in 2 SovIEr LAW AFTER
STALIN, supra note 244, at 81.
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present, however, it does not seem that Romanist legal forms have
substantially infiltrated the basic political values of the system.
Unless the values of the legal system are themselves among the
primary values of the political culture, that is to say, until the rul-
ers are themselves regarded as part of and beholden to the law,
then the law will not be efficacious in the realization of fundamen-
tal human values.
Since Stalin, the Communists have proceeded on the idea that
law is only a means for the ruling center to exert its control. Law
remains brutally instrumental. The tail does not wag the dog. If we
are dismayed that legal forms do not necessarily bring in their
train those human values that originally led to their creation, then
we should be dismayed for ourselves as well as for the citizens of
Russia and China. The modern history of those two states shows
the danger of having law used as a manipulative tool for a social
end. In the West, realist and sociological theories of law similarly
justified legal rules on both subjective and consequentialist
grounds. A state operating purely on an instrumental theory of law
can so bear down a society in a matrix of rules that a spiritual
deadening of the person and of society can come about, as
Solzhenitsyn so trenchantly warned. 73 On the other hand, if law is
seen as emanating from a basic theory of rights or of value, then it
can have a dynamic effect in limiting the arbitrary will of those in
charge of the state. The recent explosion in rights theory in Anglo-
American jurisprudence gives heart. Law and the human spirit
should not be at odds with one another.
473 See generally A. SOLZHENITSYN, A WoRLD SPLIT APART (1978).
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